Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Book 12, Part 3

Commentaries of Origen (Cont.)

Book XII. (Cont.)

33. Interpretation of “Tasting of Death.”

But we must seek to understand what is meant by “tasting of death.” And He is life who says, “I am the life,” (Joh_14:6) and this life assuredly has been hidden with Christ in God; and. “when Christ our life shall be manifested, then along with Him” (Col_3:3-4) shall be manifested those who are worthy of being manifested with Him in glory. But the enemy of this life, who is also the last enemy of all His enemies that shall be destroyed, is death, (1Co_15:26) of which the soul that sinneth dies, having the opposite disposition to that which takes place in the soul that lives uprightly, and in consequence of living uprightly lives. And when it is said in the law, “I have placed life before thy face,” (Deu_30:15) the Scripture says this about Him who said, “I am the Life,” and about His enemy, death; the one or other of which each of us by his deeds is always choosing. And when we sin with life before our face, the curse is fulfilled against us which says, “And thy life shall be hanging up before thee,” etc., down to the words, “and for the sights of thine eyes which thou shall see.” (Deu_28:66-67) As, therefore, the Life is also the living bread which came down from heaven and gave life to the world, (Joh_6:33, Joh_6:51) so His enemy death is dead bread. Now every rational soul is fed either on living bread or dead bread, by the opinions good or bad which it receives. As then in the case of more common foods it is the practice at one time only to taste them, and at another to eat of them more largely; so also, in the case of these loaves, one eats insufficiently only tasting them, but another is satiated, — he that is good or is on the way to being good with the living bread which came down from heaven, but he that is wicked with the dead bread, which is death; and some perhaps sparingly, and sinning a little, only taste of death; but those who have attained to virtue do not even taste of it, but are always fed on the living bread. It naturally followed then in the case of Peter, against whom the gates of Hades will not prevail, that he did not taste of death, since any one tastes of death and eats death at the time when the gates of Hades prevail against him; and one eats or tastes of death in proportion as the gates of Hades to a greater or less extent, more or fewer in number, prevail against him. But also for the sons of thunder who were begotten of thunder, which is a heavenly thing, it was impossible to taste of death, which is extremely far removed from thunder, their mother. But these things the Word prophesies to those who shall be perfected, and who by standing with the Word advanced so far that they did not taste of death, until they saw the manifestation and the glory and the kingdom and the excellency of the Word of God in virtue of which He excels every word, which by an appearance of truth draws away and drags about those who are not able to break through the bonds of distraction, and go up to the height of the excellency of the Word of truth.

 

34. Meaning of “Until.” No Limitation of Promise.

But since some one may think that the promise of the Saviour prescribes a limit of time to their not tasting of death, namely, that they will not taste of death “until” (Mat_16:28) they see the Son of man coming in His own kingdom, but after this will taste of it, let us show that according to the scriptural usage the word “until” signifies that the time concerning the thing signified is pressing, but is not so defined that after the “until,” that which is contrary to the thing signified should at all take place. Now, the Saviour says to the eleven disciples when He rose from the dead, this among other things, “Lo, I am with you all the days, even until the consummation of the age.” (Mat_28:20) When He said this, did He promise that He was going to be with them until the consummation of the age, but that after the consummation of the age, when another age was at hand, which is “called the age to come,” He would be no longer with them? — so that according to this, the condition of the disciples would be better before the consummation of the age than after the consummation of the age? But I do not think that any one will dare to say, that after the consummation of the age the Son of God will be no longer with the disciples, because the expression declares that He will be with them for so long, until the consummation of the age is at hand; for it is clear that the matter under inquiry was, whether the Son of God was forthwith going to be with His disciples before the age to come and the hoped for promises of God which were given as a recompense. But there might have been a question — it being granted that He would be with them — whether sometimes He was present with them, and sometimes not present. Wherefore setting us free from the suspicion that might have arisen from doubt, He declared that now and even all the days He would be with the disciples, and that He would not leave those who had become His disciples until the consummation of the age; because He said “all the days” He did not deny that by night, when the sun set, He would be present with them. But if such is the force of the words, “until the consummation of the age,” plainly we shall not be compelled to admit that those who see the Son of man coming in His own kingdom shall taste of death, after being deemed worthy of beholding Him in such guise. But as in the case of the passage we brought forward, the urgent necessity was to teach us that “until the consummation of the age” He would not leave us but be with us all the days; so also in this case I think that it is clear to those who know how to look at the logical coherence of things that He who has seen once for all “the Son of man coming in His own kingdom,” and seen Him “in His own glory,” and seen “the kingdom of God come with power,” could not possibly taste of death after the contemplation of things so good and great. But apart from the word of the promise of Jesus, we have conjectured not without reason that we would taste of death, so long as we were not yet held worthy to see “the kingdom of God come with power,” and “the Son of man coming in His own glory and in His own kingdom.”

 

35. Scriptural References to Death.

But since here it is written in the three Evangelists, “They shall not taste of death,” (Mat_16:28; Mar_9:1; Luk_9:27) but in other writers different things are written concerning death, it may not be out of place to bring forward and examine these passages along with the “taste.” In the Psalms, then, it is said, “What man is he that shall live and not see death?” (Psa_89:48) And again, in another place, “Let death come upon them and let them go down into Hades alive;” (Psa_55:18) but in one of the prophets, “Death becoming mighty has swallowed them up;” (Isa_25:8) and in the Apocalypse, “Death and Hades follow some.” (Rev_6:10) Now in these passages it appears to me that it is one thing to taste of death, but another thing to see death, and another thing for it to come upon some, and that a fourth thing, different from the aforesaid, is signified by the words, “Death becoming mighty has swallowed them up,” and a fifth thing, different from these, by the words, Death and Hades follow them.” And if yon were to collect them, you would perhaps find also other differences than those which we have mentioned, by a comparison of which with one another and right investigation, you would find the things signified in each place. But here I inquire whether it is a less evil to see death, but a greater evil than seeing to taste of it, but still worse than this that death should follow any one, and not only follow him, but also now come upon him and seize him whom it formerly followed; but to be swallowed up seems to be more grievous than all the things spoken of. But giving heed to what is said, and to the differences of sins committed, you will not I think, be slow to admit that things of this kind were intended by the Spirit who caused these things to be written in the oracles of God. But, if it be necessary to give an exposition clearer than what has been said of what is signified by seeing the Son of man coming in His own kingdom, or in His own glory, and what is signified by seeing the kingdom of God come with power, these things — whether those that are made to shine in our hearts, or that are found by those who seek, or that enter gradually into our thoughts. — let each one judge as he wills — we will set forth. He who beholds and apprehends the excellency of the Word, as tie breaks down and refutes all the plausible forms of things which are truly lies but profess to be truths, sees the Son of man, according to the word of John, “the Word of God,” coming in His own kingdom; but if such an one were to behold the Word, not only breaking down plausible oppositions, but also representing His own truths with perfect clearness, he would behold His glory in addition to His kingdom. And such an one indeed would see in Him the kingdom

of God come with power; and he would see this, as one who is no longer now under the reign of “sin which reigns in the mortal body of those who sin,” (Rom_6:12) but is ever under the orders of the king, who is God of all, whose kingdom is indeed potentially “within us,” (Luk_17:21) but actually, and, as Mark has called it, “with power,” and not at all in weakness within the perfect alone. These things, then, Jesus promised to the disciples who were standing, prophesying not about all of them, but about some.

 

36. Concerning the Transfiguration of the Saviour.

“Now after six days,” according to Matthew and Mark, (Mat_17:1-2) “He taketh with him Peter and James and John his brother, and leads them up into a high mountain apart, and was transfigured before them.” Now, also, let it be granted, before the exposition that occurs to us in relation to these things, that this took place long ago, and according to the letter. But it seems to me, that those who are led up by Jesus into the high mountain, and are deemed worthy of beholding His transfiguration apart, are not without purpose led up six days after the discourses previously spoken. For since in six days — the perfect number — the whole world, — this perfect work of art, — was made, on this account I think that he who transcends all the things of the world by beholding no longer the things which are seen, for they are temporal, but already the things which not seen, and only the things which are not seen, because that they are eternal, is represented in the words, “After six days Jesus took up with Him” certain persons. If therefore any one of us wishes to be taken by Jesus, and led up by Him into the high mountain, and be deemed worthy of beholding His transfiguration apart, let him pass beyond the six days, because he no longer beholds the things which are seen, nor longer loves the world, nor the things in the world, (1Jo_2:15) nor lusts after any worldly lust, which is the lust of bodies, and of the riches of the body, and of the glory which is after the flesh, and whatever things whose nature it is to distract and drag away the soul from the things which are better and diviner, and bring it down and fix it fast to the deceit of this age, in wealth and glory, and the rest of the lusts which are the foes of truth. For when he has passed through the six days, as we have said, he will keep a new Sabbath, rejoicing in the lofty mountain, because he sees Jesus transfigured before him; for the Word has different forms, as He appears to each as is expedient for the beholder, and is manifested to no one beyond the capacity of the beholder.

 

37. Force of the Words “Before Them”

But you will ask if, when He was transfigured before those who were led up by Him into the lofty mountain, He appeared to them in the form of God, in which He formerly was, so that He had to those below the form of a servant, but to those who had followed Him after the six days to the lofty mountain, He had not that form, but the form of God. But hear these things, if you can, at the same time giving heed spiritually, that it is not said simply, “He was transfigured,” but with a certain necessary addition, which Matthew and Mark have recorded; for, according to both, “He was transfigured before them.” (Mat_17:2; Mar_9:2) And according to this, indeed, you will say that it is possible for Jesus to be transfigured before some with this transfiguration, but before others at the same time not to be transfigured. But if you wish to see the transfiguration of Jesus before those who went up into the lofty mountain apart long with Him, behold with me the Jesus in the Gospels, as more simply apprehended, and as one might say, known “according to the flesh,” by those who do not go up, through works and words which are uplifting, to the lofty mountain of wisdom, but known no longer after the flesh, but known in His divinity by menus of all the Gospels, and beholden in the form of God according to their knowledge; for before them is Jesus transfigured, and not to any one of those below. But when He is transfigured, His face also shines as the sun, that He may be manifested to the children of light, who have put off the works of darkness, and put on the armour of light, (Rom_13:12) and are no longer the children of darkness or night, but have become the sons of day, and walk honestly as in the day; (Rom_13:13; 1Th_5:5) and being manifested, He will shine unto them not simply as the sun, but as demonstrated to be the sun of righteousness.

 

38. The Garments White as the Light.

And not only is He transfigured before such disciples, nor does He only add to the transfiguration the shining of His face as the sun; but further also to those who were led up by Him into the high mountain apart, His garments appear white as the light. (Mat_17:2) But the garments of Jesus are the expressions and letters of the Gospels with which He invested Himself. But I think that even the words in the Apostles which indicate the truths concerning Him are garments of Jesus, which become white to those who go up into the high mountain along with Jesus. But since there are differences also of things white, His garments become white as the brightest and purest of all white things; and that is light. When therefore you see any one not only with a thorough understanding of the theology concerning Jesus, but also making clear every expression of the Gospels, do not hesitate to say that to Him the garments of Jesus have become white as the light. But when the Son of God in His transfiguration is so understood and beheld, that His face is a sun, and His garments white as the light, straightway there will appear to him who beholds Jesus in such form Moses, — the law — and Elijah, — in the way of synecdoche, not one prophet only, but all the prophets — holding converse with Jesus; for such is the force of the words “talking with Him;” (Mat_17:3) but, according to Luke, “Moses and Elijah appeared in glory,” down to the words, “in Jerusalem.” (Luk_9:30, Luk_9:31) But if any one sees the glory of Moses, having understood the spiritual law as a discourse in harmony with Jesus, and the wisdom in the prophets which is hidden in a mystery, (1Co_2:7) he sees Moses and Elijah in glory when he sees them with Jesus.

 

39. Jesus Was Transfigured — “As He Was Praying.”

Then, since it will be necessary to expound the passage as given in Mark, “And as He was praying He was transfigured before them,”50 we must say that perhaps it is possible especially to see the Word transfigured before us if we have done the things aforesaid, and gone up into the mountain, and seen the absolute Word holding converse with the Father, and praying to Him for such things as the true High-Priest might pray for to the only true God. But in order that He may thus hold fellowship with God and pray to the Father, He goes up into the mountain; and then, according to Mark, “His garments become white and glistening as the light, so as no fuller on earth can whiten them.” (Mar_9:3) And perhaps the fullers upon the earth are the wise men of this world who are careful about the diction which they consider to be bright and pure, so that even their base thoughts and false dogmas seem to be beautified by their fulling, so to speak; but He who shows His own garments glistering to those who have ascended and brighter than their fulling can make them, is the Word, who exhibits in the expressions of the Scriptures which are despised by many the glistering of the thoughts, when the raiment of Jesus, according to Luke, becomes white and dazzling. (Luk_9:29)

 

40. Discussion of the Saying of Peter.

But let us next see what was the thought of Peter when he answered and said to Jesus, “Lord, it is good for us to be here; let us make three tabernacles,” (Mat_17:4; Mar_9:5; Luk_9:33 etc.) And on this account these words call for very special examination, because Mark, in his own person, has added, “For he wist not what to answer,” (Mar_9:6) but Luke, “not knowing,” he says, “what he spake.” (Luk_9:33) You will consider, therefore, if he spake these things as in a trance, being filled with the spirit which moved him to say these things, which could not be a Holy Spirit; for John taught in the Gospel that, before the resurrection of the Saviour, no one had the Holy Spirit, saying, “For the Spirit was not yet, because Jesus was not yet glorified.” (Joh_7:39) But if the Spirit was not yet, and he, not knowing what he said, spoke under the influence of some spirit, the spirit which caused these things to be said was some one of the spirits which had not yet been triumphed over in the cross, nor made a show of along with them, about whom it is written, “Having put off from Himself the principalities and the powers, He made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in the cross. (Col_2:5) ” But this spirit was perhaps that which is called a stumbling-block by Jesus, and which is spoken of as Satan in the passage, “Get thee behind Me, Satan; thou art a stumbling-block unto me.’ (Mat_16:23) But I know well that such things will offend many who meet with them, because they think that it is opposed to sound reason that he should be spoken ill of who a little before had been pronounced blessed by Jesus, on the ground that the Father in heaven had revealed to him the things concerning the Saviour, to-wit, that He was verily Jesus, and the Christ, and the Son of the living God. But let such an one attend more exactly to the statements about Peter and the rest of the Apostles, how even they made requests as if they were yet alien from Him who was to redeem them from the enemy and purchase them with His own precious blood; or let them also, who will have it that even before the passion of Jesus the Apostles were perfect, tell us whence it came about that “Peter and they that were with him were heavy with sleep.” (Luk_9:32) But to anticipate something else of what follows and apply it to the subject in hand, I would raise in turn these questions, — whether it is possible for any one to find occasion of stumbling in Jesus apart from the working of the devil who caused him to stumble; and whether it is possible for any one to deny Jesus, and that in presence of a little maid and a doorkeeper and men most worthless, unless a spirit had been with him in his denial hostile to the Spirit which is given and the wisdom, which is given to those who are assisted by God to make confession, according to a certain desert of theirs. But he who has learned to refer the roots of sin to the father of sin, the devil, will not say that apart from him either the Apostles were caused to stumble, or that Peter denied Christ thrice before that well-known cock-crowing. But if this be so, consider whether perhaps with a view to make Jesus stumble, so far as was in his power, and to turn Him aside from the dispensation whose characteristic was suffering that brought salvation to men, which He undertook with great willingness, seeking to effect these things which seemed to contribute to this end, he himself also here wishes as it were, by deceit, to draw away Jesus, as if calling upon Him no longer to condescend to men, and come to them, and undergo death for them, but to abide on the high mountain with Moses and Elijah. But he promised also to build three tabernacles, one apart for Jesus, and one for Moses, and one for Elijah, as if one tabernacle would not have sufficed for the three, if it had been necessary for them to be in tabernacles and in the high mountain. And perhaps also in this he acted with evil intent, when he incited him “who did not know what he said,” not desiring that Jesus and Moses and Elijah should be together, but desiring to separate them from one another, under pretext of the three tabernacles.” And likewise it was a lie, “It is good for us to be here;” (Mat_17:4) for if it had been a good thing they would also have remained there. But if it were a lie, you will seek to know who caused the lie to be spoken; and especially since according to John, “When he speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar and the father thereof;” (Joh_8:44) and as there is no truth apart from the working of Him who says, “I am the Truth,” (Joh_14:6) so there is no lie apart from him who is the enemy of truth. These contrary qualities, accordingly, were still in Peter truth and falsehood; and from truth he said, “Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God,” (Mat_16:16) but from falsehood he said, “May God be propitious to Thee, Lord, this shall not be unto Thee,” (Mat_16:20) and also, “It is good for us to be here.” (Mat_17:4) But if any one will not admit that Peter spoke these things from any evil inspiration, but that his words were of his own mere choice, and it is demanded of him how he will interpret, “not knowing what he said,” and, (Luk_9:33) “for he did not know what to answer,” (Mar_9:6) he will say, that in the former case Peter held it to be a shameful thing and unworthy of Jesus to admit that the Son of the living God, the Christ, whom already the Father had revealed to him, should be killed; and in the: present case that, as having seen the two forms of Jesus and the one at the transfiguration which was much more excellent, being well pleased with that, he said that it was good to make their sojourning in that mountain, in order that he himself and those with him might rejoice as they beheld the transfiguration of Jesus and His face shining as the sun, and His garments white as the light, and, in addition to these things, might always behold in glory those whom they had once seen in glory, Moses and Elijah; and that they might rejoice at the things which they might hear, as they talked and held intercourse with each other, Moses and Elijah with Jesus, and Jesus with them.

 

41. Figurative Interpretation of the Same.

But since we have not yet spent our energy in interpreting the things in the place figuratively, but have said these things by way of searching into the mere letter, let us in conformity with these things, consider whether the aforesaid Peter and the sons of thunder who were taken up into the mountain of the dogmas of the truth, and who saw the transfiguration of Jesus and of Moses and Elijah, who appeared in glory with Him, might wish to make tabernacles in themselves for the Word of God who was going to dwell in them, and for His law which had been beholden in glory, and for the prophecy which spake of the decease of Jesus, which He was about to accomplish; (Luk_9:31) and Peter, as one loving the contemplative life, and having preferred that which was delightsome in it to the life among the crowd with its turmoil, said, with the design of benefiting those who desired it, “It is good for us to be here.” (Mat_17:4) But since “love seeketh not its own,” (1Co_13:5) Jesus did not do that which Peter thought good; wherefore He descended from the mountain to those who were not able to ascend to it and behold His transfiguration, that they might behold Him in such form as they were able to see Him. It is, therefore, the part of a righteous man who possesses “the love which seeketh not its own” (1Co_13:5) to be free from all, but to bring himself under bondage to all those below that He might gain the more of them. (1Co_9:19) But some one, with reference to what we have alleged about the trance and the working of an evil spirit in Peter, concerning the words, “not knowing what he said,” (Luk_9:33) not accepting that interpretation of ours, may say that there were certain mentioned by Paul “desiring to be teachers of the law,” (1Ti_1:7) who do not know about what they speak, but who, though they do not clearly expound the nature of what is said, nor understand their meaning, make confident affirmations of things which they do not know. Of such a nature was the affection of Peter also, for not apprehending what was good with reference to the dispensation of Jesus and of those who appeared in the mountain, — Moses and Elijah, — he says, “It is good for us to be here,” etc., “not knowing what he said,” “for he wist not what to say,” for if “a wise man will understand the things from his own mouth, and carries prudence in his lips,” (Pro_16:23) he who is not so does not understand the things from his own mouth, nor comprehend the nature of the things spoken by him.

 

42. The Meaning of the “Bright Cloud.”

Next to these come the words, “While He was yet speaking, behold, also, a bright cloud overshadowed them,” (Mat_17:5) etc. Now, I think that God, wishing to dissuade Peter from making three tabernacles, under which so far as it depended on his choice he was going to dwell, shows a tabernacle better, so to speak, and much more excellent, the cloud. For since it is the function of a tabernacle to overshadow him who is in it, and to shelter him, and the bright cloud overshadowed them, God made, as it were, a diviner tabernacle, inasmuch as it was bright, that it might be to them a pattern of the resurrection to come; for a bright cloud overshadows the just, who are at once protected and illuminated and shone upon by it. But what might the bright cloud, which overshadows the just, be? Is it, perhaps, the fatherly power, from which comes the voice of the Father bearing testimony to the Son as beloved and well-pleasing, and exhorting those who were under its shadow to hear Him and no other one? But as He speaks of old, so also always does He speak through what He wills. And perhaps, too, the Holy Spirit is the bright cloud which overshadows the just, and prophesies of the things of God, who works in it, and says, “This is My beloved Son in whom I am well-pleased;” but I would venture also to say that our Saviour is a bright cloud. When, therefore, Peter said, “Let us make here three tabernacles,”51 … one from the Father Himself, and from the Son, and one from the Holy Spirit. For a bright cloud of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit overshadows the genuine disciples of Jesus; or a cloud overshadows the Gospel and the law and the prophets, which is bright to him who is able to see the light of it in the Gospel, and the law, and the prophets. But perhaps the voice from the cloud says to Moses and Elijah, “This is My beloved Son in whom I am well-pleased, hear Him,” as they were desirous to see the Son of man, and to hear Him, and to behold Him as He was in glory. And perhaps it teaches the disciples that He who was, in a literal sense, the Son of God, and His beloved in whom He was well-pleased, whom it behoved them especially to hear, was He who was then beheld, and transfigured, and whose face shone as the sun, and who was clothed with garments white as the light.

 

43. Relation of Moses and Elijah to Jesus. The Injunction of Silence.

But after these things it is written that, when they heard the voice from the cloud bearing testimony to the Son, the three Apostles, not being able to bear the glory of the voice and power resting upon it, “fell on their face,” (Mat_17:6) and besought God; for they were sore afraid at the supernatural sight, and the things which were spoken from the sight. But consider if you can also say this with reference to the details in the passage, that the disciples, having understood that the Son of God had been holding conference with Moses, and that it was He who said, “A man shall not see My face and live,” (Exo_30:20) and taking further the testimony of God about Him, as not being able to endure the radiance of the Word, humbled themselves under the mighty hand of God; (1Pe_5:6) but, after the touch of the Word, lifting up their eyes they saw Jesus only and no other. (Mat_17:8) Moses, the law, and Elijah, the prophet, became one only with the Gospel of Jesus; and not, as they were formerly three, did they so abide, but the three became one, But consider these things with me in relation to mystical matters; for in regard to the bare meaning of the letter, Moses and Elijah, having appeared in glory and talked with Jesus, went away to the place from which they had come, perhaps to communicate the words which Jesus spake with them, to those who were to be benefited by Him, almost immediately, namely, at the time of the passion, when many bodies of the saints that had fallen asleep, their tombs being opened, were to go to the city which is truly holy — not the Jerusalem which Jesus wept over — and there appear unto many. (Mat_27:52-53) But after the dispensation in the mountain, when the disciples were coming down from the mountain in order that, when they had come to the multitude, they might serve the Son of God concerning the salvation of the people, Jesus commanded the disciples saying, “Tell the vision to no man until the Son of man rise from the dead.” (Mat_17:9) But that saying, “Tell the vision to no man,” is like that which was investigated in the passage above, when “He enjoined the disciples to tell no man that He was the Christ.” (Mat_16:20) Wherefore the things that were said at that passage may be useful to us also for the passage before us; since Jesus wishes also, in accordance with these, that the things of His glory should not be spoken of, before His glory after the passion; for those who heard, and in particular the multitudes, would have been injured when they saw Him crucified, who had been so glorified. Wherefore since His being glorified in the resurrection was akin to His transfiguration, and to the vision of His face as the sun, on this account He wishes that these things should then be spoken of by the Apostles, when He rose from the dead. 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

50 Luke (Luk_9:28-29) alone mentions the praying.

51 The text is mutilated.



Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Book 13, Part 1

Commentaries of Origen (Cont.)

Book XIII.

1. Relation of the Baptist to Elijah. The Theory of Transmigration Considered.

“The disciples asked Him, saying, Why then say the scribes that Elijah must first come?” (Mat_17:10) The disciples indeed who went up with Jesus remembered the traditions of the scribes concerning Elijah, that before the advent of Christ, Elijah would come and prepare for Him the souls of those who were going to receive Him. But the vision in the mountain, at which Elijah appeared, did not seem to be in harmony with the things which were said, since to them it seemed that Elijah had not come before Jesus but after Him; wherefore, they say these things, thinking that the scribes lied. But to this the Saviour answers, not setting aside the traditions concerning Elijah, but saying that there was another advent of Elijah before that of Christ of which the scribes were ignorant; and, in regard to this, being ignorant of him, they “had done unto him whatsoever they listed,” (Mat_17:12) as if they had been accomplices in his having been cast into prison by Herod and slain by him; then He says that according as they had done towards Elijah so would He suffer at their hands. (Mat_17:12) And these things indeed as about Elijah the disciples asked and the Saviour answered, but when they heard they understood that the words, “Elijah has already come,” and that following which was spoken by the Saviour, had reference to John the Baptist. (Mat_17:13) And let these things be said by way of illustration of the passage before us. But now according to our ability let us make investigation also into the things that are stored up in it. In this place it does not appear to me that by Elijah the soul is spoken of, lest I should fall into the dogma of transmigration, which is foreign to the church of God, and not handed down by the Apostles, nor anywhere set forth in the Scriptures; for it is also in opposition to the saying that “things seen are temporal,” (2Co_4:18) and that “this age shall have a consummation,” and also to the fulfilment of the saying, “Heaven and earth shall pass away,” (Mat_24:35) and “the fashion of this world passeth away,” (1Co_7:31) and “the heavens shall perish,” (Psa_102:26) and what follows. For if, by hypothesis, in the constitution of things which has existed from the beginning unto the end of the world, the same soul can be twice in the body, for what cause should it be in it? For if because of sin it should be twice in the body, why should it not be thrice, and repeatedly in it, since punishments, in respect of this life, and of the sins committed in it, shall be rendered to it only by the method of transmigration? But if this be granted as a consequence, perhaps there will never be a time when a soul shall not undergo transmigration: for always because of its former sins will it dwell in the body; and so there will be no place for the corruption of the world, at which “the heaven and the earth shall pass away.” (Mat_24:35) And if it be granted, on this hypothesis, that one who is absolutely sinless shall not come into the body by birth, after what length of time do you suppose that a soul shall be found absolutely pure and needing no transmigration? But nevertheless, also, if any one soul is always thus being removed from the definite number of souls and returns no longer to the body, sometime after infinite ages, as it were, birth shall cease; the world being reduced to some one or two or a few more, after the perfecting of whom the world shall perish, the supply of souls coming into the body having failed. But this is not agreeable to the Scripture; for it knows of a multitude of sinners at the time of the destruction of the world. This is manifest from consideration of the saying, “Howbeit when the Son of man cometh shall He find faith on the earth?” (Luk_18:8) So we find it thus said in Matthew, “As were the days of Noah so shall also be the coming of the Son of man; for as they were in the days of the flood,” etc. (Mat_24:37-39) But to those who are then in existence there shall be the exaction of a penalty for their sins, but not by way of transmigration; for, if they are caught while still sinning, either they will be punished after this by a different form of punishment, – and according to this either there will be two general forms of punishment, the one by way of transmigration, and the other outside of a body of this kind, and let them declare the causes and differences of these, – or they will not be punished, as if those who were left at the consummation of things had forthwith cast away their sins; or, which is better, there is one form of punishment for those who have sinned in the body, namely, that they should suffer, outside of it, that is, outside the constitution of this life, what is according to the desert of their sins. But to one who has insight into the nature of things it is clear that each of these things is fitted to overturn the doctrine of transmigration. But if, of necessity, the Greeks who introduce the doctrine of transmigration, laying down things in harmony with it, do not acknowledge that the world is coming to corruption, it is fitting that when they have looked the Scriptures straight in the face which plainly declare that the world will perish, they should either disbelieve them, or invent a series of arguments in regard to the interpretation of the things concerning the consummation; which even if they wish they will not be able to do. And this besides we will say to those who may have had the hardihood to aver that the world will not perish, that, if the world does not perish but is to exist for infinite periods of time, there will be no God knowing all things before they come into being. But if, perhaps, tie knows in part, either He will know each thing before it comes into being, or certain things, and after these again other things; for things infinite in nature cannot possibly be grasped by that knowledge whose nature it is to limit things known. From this it follows that there cannot be prophecies about all things whatsoever, since all things are infinite.

 

2. “The Spirit and Power of Elijah” – Not the Soul – Were in the Baptist.

I have thought it necessary to dwell some time on the examination of the doctrine of transmigration, because of the suspicion of some who suppose that the soul under consideration was the same in Elijah and in John, being called in the former case Elijah, and in the second case John; and that, not apart from God, had he been called John, as is plain from the saying of the angel who appeared to Zacharias, “Fear not, Zacharias, for thy supplication is heard, and thy wife Elisabeth shall bear thee a son, and thou shalt call his name John;” (Luk_1:33) and from the fact that Zacharias regained his speech after he had written in the tablet, that he who had been born should be called John. (Luk_1:63) But if it were the soul of Elijah, then, when he was begotten a second time, he should have been called Elijah; or for the change of name some reason should have been assigned, as in the case of Abram and Abraham, Sarah and Sarrah, Jacob and Israel, Simon and Peter. And yet not even thus would their argument in the case be tenable; for, in the case of the aforesaid, the changes of name took place in one and the same life. But some one might ask, if the soul of Elijah was not first in the Tishbite and secondly in John, what might that be in both which the Saviour called Elijah? And I say that Gabriel in his words to Zacharias suggested what the substance was in Elijah and John that was the same; for he says, “Many of the children of Israel shall he turn to the Lord their God; and he shall go before his face in the spirit and power of Elijah.” (Luk_1:16, Luk_1:17) For, observe, he did not say in the “soul” of Elijah, in which case the doctrine of transmigration might have some ground, but “in the spirit and power of Elijah.” For the Scripture well knows the distinction between spirit and soul, as, “May God sanctify you wholly, and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ;” (1Th_5:23) and the passage, “Bless the Lord, ye spirits and souls of the righteous” (Daniel 3:86; Song of the Three Children 64) as it stands in the book of Daniel, according to the Septuagint, represents the difference between spirit and soul. Elijah, therefore, was not called John because of the soul, but because of the spirit and the power, which in no way conflicts with the teaching of the church, though they were formerly in Elijah, and afterwards in John; and “the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets,” (1Co_14:32) but the souls of the prophets are not subject to the prophets, and “the spirit of Elijah rested on Elisha.” (2Ki_2:15) But we ought to inquire whether the spirit of Elijah is the same as the spirit of God in Elijah, or whether they are different from each other, and whether the spirit of Elijah which was in him was something supernatural, different from the spirit of each man which is in him; for the Apostle clearly indicates that the Spirit of God, though it be in us, is different from the spirit of each man which is in Him, when he says somewhere, “The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God;” (Rom_8:16) and elsewhere, “No one of men knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him; even so the things of God none knoweth save the Spirit of God.” (1Co_2:11) But do not marvel in regard to what is said about Elijah, if, just as something strange happened to him different from all the saints who are recorded, in respect of his having been caught up by a whirlwind into heaven, (2Ki_2:11) so his spirit had something of choice excellence, so that not only did it rest on Elisha, but also descended along with John at his birth; and that John, separately, “was filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother’s womb,” and separately, “came before Christ in the spirit and power of Elijah.” (Luk_1:15, Luk_1:17) For it is possible for several spirits not only worse, but also better, to be in the same man. David accordingly asks to be established by a free spirit, (Psa_51:12) and that a right spirit be renewed in his inward parts. (Psa_51:10) But if, in order that the Saviour may impart to us of “the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and reverence,” (Isa_11:2) he was filled also with the spirit of the fear of the Lord; it is possible also that these several good spirits may be conceived as being in the same person. And this also we have brought forward, because of John having come before Christ “in the spirit and power of Elijah,” (Luk_1:17) in order that the saying. “Elijah has already come,” (Mat_17:12) may be referred to the spirit of Elijah that was in John; as also the three disciples who had gone up with Him understood that He spake to them about John the Baptist. (Mat_17:13) Upon Elisha, then, only the spirit of Elijah rested, but John came before, (Luk_1:17) not only in the spirit, but also in the power of Elijah. Wherefore, also, Elisha could not have been called Elijah, but John was Elijah himself. But if it be necessary to adduce the Scripture from which the scribes said that Elijah must first come, listen to Malachi who says, “And behold I will send to you Elijah the Tishbite,” etc., down to the words, “Lest I come and smite the earth utterly.” (Mal_4:5, Mal_4:6) And it seems to be indicated by these words, that Elijah was to prepare for the glorious coming of Christ by certain holy words and dispositions in their souls, those who had been made fittest for this, which those upon earth could not have endured, because of the excellency of the glory, unless they had been prepared before hand by Elijah. And likewise, by Elijah, in this place, I do not understand the soul of that prophet but his spirit and his power; for these it is by which all things shall be restored, (Mat_17:11) so that when they have been restored, and, as a result of that restoration, become capable of receiving the glory of Christ, the Son of God who shall appear in glory may sojourn with them. But if also Elijah be in some sort a word inferior to “the Word who was in the beginning with God, God the Word,” (Joh_1:1) this word also might come as a preparatory discipline to the people prepared by it, that they might be trained tot the reception of the perfect Word. But some one may raise the question whether the spirit and power of Elijah, suffered what was suffered in John, according to the words, “They did in him whatsoever they listed.” (Mat_17:12) And to this it will be said on the one hand, in simpler fashion that there is nothing strange in the thought, that the things which assist do, because of love, suffer along with those that are assisted; and Jesus indeed says. “Because of the weak I was weak, and I hungered because of the hungry, and I thirsted because of the thirsty,” (Mat_25:35) and, on the other hand, in a deeper sense that the words are not, “But they did unto him whatsoever they listed in him,” for the things which suffered leaned upon the spirit and the power of Elijah, the soul of John being in no wise Elijah; and probably also the body leaned upon them. For in one fashion is the soul in the body, and the spirit, and the power; and in another fashion is the body of the righteous man in these better parts, as leaning upon them, and clinging to them; but “they who are in the flesh cannot please God; but ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if the Spirit of God dwell in you;” (Rom_8:8-9) for the soul of the sinner is in the flesh, but of the righteous man in spirit. And likewise, further, this might be inquired into, to whom refer the words, “But they did in him whatsoever they listed.” (Mat_17:12) Was it to the scribes in regard to whom the disciples inquired and said, “Why then do the scribes say that Elijah must first come?” (Mat_17:10) But it is not at all evident that John suffered anything at the hands of the scribes, except, indeed, that they did not believe him; or, as we said also before, that they were accomplices in the wrongs which Herod dared to inflict on him. But another might say that the words, “But they did in him whatsoever they listed,” refer not to the scribes but to Herodias and her daughter, and Herod, who did in him whatsoever they listed. And that which follows, “So shall the Son of man suffer from them,” (Mat_17:12) might be referred to the scribes, if the former were referred to them; but, if the former refers to Herod and Herodias and her daughter, the second passage will also refer to them;52 for Herod also seems to have joined in the vote that Jesus should die, perhaps his wife also taking part with him in the plot against Him.

 

3. Concerning the Epileptic.

“And when they were come to the multitude, there came to Him a man kneeling to Him and saying, Lord, have mercy upon my son.” (Mat_17:14, Mat_17:15) Those who are suffering, or the kinsfolk of the sufferers, are along with the multitudes; wherefore, when He has dispensed the things that were beyond the multitudes, He descends to them, so that those, who were not able to ascend because of the sicknesses that repressed their soul, might be benefited when the Word descended to them from the loftier regions. But we ought to make inquiry, in respect of what diseases the sufferers believe and pray for their own healing, and in respect of what diseases others do this for them, as, for example, the centurion for his servant, and the nobleman for his son, and the ruler of the synagogue for a daughter, and the Canaanitish woman for her female child who was vexed with a demon, and now the man who kneels to Him on behalf of his epileptic son. And along with these you will investigate when the Saviour heals of Himself and unasked by any one, as for example, the paralytic; for these cures, when compared with one another for this very purpose, and examined together, will exhibit to him who is able to hear “the wisdom of God hidden in a mystery,” (1Co_2:7) many dogmas concerning the different diseases of souls, as well as the method of their healing.

 

4. Spiritual Epileptics.

But since our present object is not to make inquiry about every case, but about the passage before us, let us, adopting a figurative interpretation, consider who we may say the lunatic was, and who was his father who prayed for him, and what is meant by the sufferer falling not constantly but oft-times, sometimes into the fire, and sometimes into the water, and what is meant by the fact that he could not be healed by the disciples but by Jesus Himself. For if every sickness and every infirmity, which our Saviour then healed among the people, refers to different disorders in souls, it is also in accordance with reason that by the paralytics are symbolised the palsied in soul, who keep it lying paralysed in the body; but by those who are blind are symbolised those who are blind in respect of things seen by the soul alone, and these are really blind; and by the deaf are symbolised those who are deaf in regard to the reception of the word of salvation. On the same principle it will be necessary that the matters regarding the epileptic should be investigated. Now this affection attacks the sufferers at considerable intervals, during which he who suffers from it seems in no way to differ from the man in good health, at the season when the epilepsy is not working on him. Similar disorders you may find in certain souls, which are often supposed to be healthy in point of temperance and the other virtues; then, sometimes, as if they were seized with a kind of epilepsy arising from their passions, they fall down from the position in which they seemed to stand, and are drawn away by the deceit of this world and other lusts. Perhaps, therefore, you would not err if you said, that such persons, so to speak, are epileptic spiritually, having been cast down by “the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places,” (Eph_6:12) and are often ill, at the time when the passions attack their soul; at one time falling into the fire of burnings, when, according to what is said in Hosea, they become adulterers, like a pan heated for the cooking from the burning flame; (Hos_7:4) and, at another time, into the water, when the king of all the dragons in the waters casts them down from the sphere where they appeared to breath freely, so that they come into the depths of the waves of the sea of human life. This interpretation of ours in regard to the lunatic will be supported by him who says in the Book of Wisdom with reference to the even temperament of the just man, “The discourse of a pious man is always wisdom,” but, in regard to what we have said, “The fool changes as the moon.” (Ecclesiasticus 17:11) And sometimes even in the case of such you may see impulses which might carry away in praise of them those who do not attend to their want of ballast, so that they would say that it was as full moon in their case, or almost full moon. And you might see again the light that seemed to be in them diminishing,  – as it was not the light of day but the light of night, – fading to so great an extent, that the light which appeared to be seen in them no longer existed. But whether or not those who first gave their names to things, on account of this gave the name of lunacy to the disease epilepsy, you will judge for yourself.

 

5. The Deaf and Dumb Spirit.

Now the father of the epileptic – perhaps the angel to whom he had been allotted, if we are to say that every human soul is put in subjection to some angel – prays the Physician of souls for his son that He may heal him who could not be healed from his disorder by the inferior word which was in the disciples. But the dumb and deaf spirit, who was cast out by the Word, must be figuratively understood as the irrational impulses, even towards that which seems to be good, so that, what things any man once did by irrational impulse which seemed to onlookers to be good, he may do no longer irrationally but according to the reason of the teaching of Jesus. Under the inspiration of this Paul also said, “If I have all faith so as to remove mountains;” (1Co_13:2) for he, who has all faith, which is as a grain of mustard seed, (Mat_17:20) removes not one mountain only, but also several analogous to it; for although faith is despised by men and appears to be something very little and contemptible; yet when it meets with good ground, that is the soul, which is able fittingly to receive such seed, it becomes a great tree, so that no one of those things which have no wings, but the birds of heaven which are winged spiritually, are able to lodge in the branches of faith so great. (Mat_13:31-32)

 

6. Influence of the Moon and Stars on Men.

Let us now, then, give heed to the very letter of the passage, and first let us inquire, how he who has been cast into darkness and repressed by an impure and deaf and dumb spirit is said to be a “lunatic,” and for what reason the expression to be a “lunatic” derives its name from the great light in heaven which is next to the sun, which God appointed “to rule over the night.” (Gen_1:16) Let physicians then, discuss the physiology of the matter, inasmuch as they think that there is no impure spirit in the case, but a bodily disorder, and inquiring into the nature of things let them say, that the moist humours which are in the head are moved by a certain sympathy which they have with the light of the moon, which has a moist nature; but as for us, who also believe the Gospel that this sickness is viewed as having been effected by an impure dumb and deaf spirit in those who suffer from it, and who see that those, who are accustomed like the magicians of the Egyptians to promise a cure in regard to such, seem sometimes to be successful in their case, we will say that, perhaps, with the view of slandering the creation of God, in order that “unrighteousness may be spoken loftily, and that they may set their mouth against the heaven,” (Psa_73:8, Psa_73:9) this impure spirit watches certain configurations of the moon, and so makes it appear from observation of men suffering at such and such a phase of the moon, that the cause of so great an evil is not the dumb and deaf demon, but the great light in heaven which was appointed “to rule by night.” and which has no power to originate such a disorder among men. But they all “speak unrighteousness loftily,” as many as say, that the cause of all the disorders which exist on the earth, whether of such generally or of each in detail, arises from the disposition of the stars; and such have truly “set their mouth against the heaven,” when they say that some of the stars have a malevolent, and others a benevolent influence; since no star was formed by the God of the universe to work evil, according to Jeremiah as it is written in the Lamentations, “Out of the mouth of the Lord shall come things noble and that which is good.”53 And it is probable that as this impure spirit, producing what is called lunacy, observes the phases of the moon, that it may work on him who for certain causes has been committed to it, and who has not made himself worthy of the guardianship of angels, so also there are other spirits and demons who work at certain phases of the rest of the stars; so that not the moon only, but the rest of the stars also may be calumniated by those “who speak unrighteousness loftily.” It is worth while, then, to listen to the casters of nativities, who refer the origin of every form of madness and every demoniacal possession to the phases of the moon. That those, then, who suffer from what is called lunacy sometimes fall into the water is evident, and that they also fall into the fire, less frequently indeed, yet it does happen; and it is evident that this disorder is very difficult to cure, so that those who have the power to cure demoniacs sometimes fall in respect of this, and sometimes with fastings and supplications and more toils, succeed. But you will inquire whether there are such disorders in spirits as well as in men; so that some of them speak, but some of them are speechless, and some of them hear, but some are deaf; for as in them will be found the cause of their being impure, so also, because of their freedom of will, are they condemned to be speechless and deaf; for some men will suffer such condemnation if the prayer of the prophet, as spoken by the Holy Spirit, shall be given heed to, in which it is said of certain sinners, “Let the lying lips be put to silence.” (Psa_31:18) And so, perhaps, those who make a bad use of their hearing, and admit the hearing of vanities, will be rendered deaf by Him who said, “Who hath made the stone-deaf and the deaf,” (Exo_4:11) so that they may no longer lend an ear to vain things.

 

7. The Power of Faith.

But when the Saviour said, “O faithfulness and perverse generation,” (Mat_17:17) He signifies that wickedness, which is contrary to nature, stealthily enters in from perversity, and makes us perverted. But of the whole race of men on earth, I think, being oppressed by reason of their wickedness and His tarrying with them, the Saviour said, “How long shall I be with you?” We have already, then, spoken in part of the words, “If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain,” (Mat_17:20 etc.); but nevertheless also we shall speak in this place the things that appear to us fitted to increase perspicuity. The mountains here spoken of, in my opinion, are the hostile powers that have their being in a flood of great wickedness, such as are settled down, so to speak, in some souls of men. Whenever, then, any one has all faith so that he no longer disbelieves in any things which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, and has faith such as was that of Abraham, who believed in God to such a degree that his faith was counted for righteousness, he has all faith as a grain of mustard seed; then will such an one say to this mountain – I mean, the dumb and deaf spirit in him who is called lunatic, – “Remove hence,” clearly, from the man who is suffer-lug, perhaps to the abyss, and it shall remove. And the Apostle, taking, I think, his starting-point from this place, says with apostolical authority, “If I have all faith so as to remove mountains,” (1Co_13:2) for not one mountain merely, but also several analogous to it, he removes who has all faith which is as a grain of mustard-seed; and nothing shall be impossible to him who has so great faith. (Mat_17:20) But let us also attend to this, “This kind goeth not out save by prayer and fasting,” (Mat_17:21) in order that if at any time it is necessary that we should be engaged in the healing of one suffering from such a disorder, we may not adjure, nor put questions, nor speak to the impure spirit as if it heard, but devoting ourselves to prayer and fasting, may be successful as we pray for the sufferer, and by our own fasting may thrust out the unclean spirit from him.

8. Jesus’ Prediction of His “Delivery” into the Ha

nds of Men.

“And while they abode in Galilee, Jesus said unto them, The Son of man shall be delivered into the hands of men.” (Mat_17:22) And these things will appear to be of the same effect as those, “that Jesus began to show unto His disciples that He must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and chief priests and scribes.” (Mat_16:21) But it is not so; for it is not the same thing “to show unto the disciples that He must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and chief priests and scribes,” and, after suffering, “be killed,” and, after being killed, “be raised up on the third day,” as that which was said to them, when they were in Galilee, – which we did not learn before, – that the Son of man “would be delivered up;” for the being delivered up was not mentioned above, but now also it is said that “He is to be delivered up into the hands of men.” (Mat_17:22) As for these matters let us inquire by what person or persons He will be delivered up into the hands of men; for there we are taught of whom He will suffer, and in what place He will suffer; but here, in addition, we learn that while His suffering many things takes place at the hands of the aforesaid, they are not the prime causes of His suffering many things, but the one or ones who delivered Him up into the hands of men. For some one will say that the Apostle, interpreting this, says with reference to God, “He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all;” (Rom_8:32) but the Son also gave Himself to death for us, so that He was delivered up, not only by the Father but also by Himself. Bat another will say not merely that, but also collecting the passages together, will say that the Son is first delivered up by God, – then about to be tempted, then to be in conflict, then to suffer for men, or even for the whole world that He might take away its sin, (Joh_1:29) – to the prince of this age, and to the rest of its princes, and then by them delivered into the hands of men who would slay Him. The case of Job will be taken as an illustration. “Lo, all that is his I give into thy hands, but do not touch him;” (Job_1:12) thereafter, he was, as it were, delivered up by the devil to his princes, namely, to those who took prisoners of war, to the horsemen, to the fire that came down from heaven, to the great wind that came from the desert and broke up his house, (Job_1:15-19) But you will consider if, as he delivered up the property of Job to those who took them captive, and to the horsemen, so also he delivered them up to a certain power, subordinate to “the prince of the power of the air, of the spirit that now worketh in the sons of disobedience,” (Eph_2:2) in order that the fire which descended thence on the sheep of Job might seem to fall from heaven, to the man who announced to Job that “fire fell from heaven, and burned up his sheep, and consumed the shepherds likewise.” (Job_1:16) And in the same way you will inquire whether also the sudden mighty wind, that came down from the desert and assailed the four corners of the dwelling, was one of those which are under the devils to whom the devil delivered up the banquet of the sons and daughters of Job, that the house might fall on the children of the just man, and they might die. Let it be granted, then, that, as in the case of Job, the Father first delivered up the Son to the opposing powers, and that then they delivered Him up into the hands of men, among which men Judas also was, into whom after the sop (Joh_13:27) Satan entered, who delivered Him up in a more authoritative manner than Judas. But take care lest on comparing together the delivering up of the Son by the Father to the opposing powers, with the delivering up of the Saviour by them into the hands of men, you should think that what is called the delivering up is the same in the case of both. For understand that the Father in His love of men delivered Him up for us all; but the opposing powers, when they delivered up the Saviour into the hands of men, did not intend to deliver Him up for the salvation of some, but, as far as in them lay, since none of them knew “the wisdom of God which was hidden in a mystery,” (1Co_2:7, 1Co_2:8) they gave Him up to be put to death, that His enemy death might receive Him under its subjection, like those who die in Adam; (1Co_15:22) and also the men who slew Him did so, as they were moulded after the will of those who wished indeed that Jesus should become subject to death. I have deemed it necessary also to examine into these things, because that when Jesus was delivered up into the hands of men, He was not delivered up by men into the hands of men, but by powers to whom the Farther delivered up His Son for us all, and in the very act of His being delivered up, and coming under the power of those to whom He was delivered up, destroying him that has the power of death; for “through death He brought to nought him that hath the power of death, that is, the devil, and delivered all them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage.” (Heb_2:14-15)

 

9. Satan and the “Delivery” of Jesus.

Now we must think that the devil has the power of death, – not of that which is common and indifferent, in accordance with which those who are compacted of soul and body die, when their soul is separated from the body, – but of that death which is contrary to and the enemy of Him who said, “I am the Life,” (Joh_14:6) in accordance with which “the soul that sinneth, it shall die.” (Eze_18:4) But that it was not God who gave Him up into the hands of men, the Saviour manifestly declares when He says, “If My kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight that I should not be delivered to the Jews.” (Joh_18:36) For, when He was delivered up to the Jews. He was delivered into the hands of men, not by His own servants, but by the prince of this age who says, concerning the powers which are in the sphere of the invisible, the kingdoms which are set up against men. “All these things will I give Thee, if Thou wilt fall down and worship Me.” (Mat_4:9) Wherefore also we should think that in regard to them it was said, “The kings of the earth stood side by side, and the rulers were gathered together against the Lord and against His Christ.” (Psa_2:2) And those kings, indeed, and those rulers stood side by side and were gathered against the Lord and against His Christ; but we, because we have been benefited by His being delivered by them into the hands of men and slain, say, “Let us break their bonds asunder and cast away their yoke from us.” (Psa_2:3) For, when we become conformed to the death of Christ, we are no longer under the bonds of the kings of the earth, as we have said, nor under the yoke of the princes of this age, who were gathered together against the Lord. And, on this account, “the Father spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all,” (Rom_8:32) that those, who took Him and delivered Him up into the hands of men, might be laughed at by Him who dwells in the heavens, and might be derided by the Lord, inasmuch as, contrary to their expectation, it was to the destruction of their own kingdom and power, that they received from the Father the Son, who was raised on the third day, by having abolished His enemy death, and made us conformed, not only to the image of His death but also of His resurrection; through whom we walk in newness of life, (Rom_6:4) no longer sitting “in the region and shadow of death,” (Mat_4:16) through the light of God which has sprung up upon us. But when the Saviour said, “The Son of man shall be delivered up into the hands of men, and they shall kill Him, and the third day He shall rise again,” they were “exceeding sorry,” (Mat_17:22-23) giving heed to the fact that He was about to be delivered up into the hands of men, and that He would be killed, as matters gloomy and calling for sorrow, but not attending to the fact that He would rise on the third day, as He needed no longer time “to bring to nought through death him that had the power of death.” (Heb_2:14)

 

10. Concerning Those Who Demanded the Half-Shekel.

“And when they were come to Capernaum, they that received the half-shekel came to Peter.” (Mat_17:24) There are certain kings of the earth, and the sons of these do not pay toll or tribute; and there are others, different from their sons, who are strangers to the kings of the earth, from whom the kings of the earth receive toll or tribute. And among the kings of the earth, their sons are free as among fathers; but those who are strangers to them, while they are free in relation to things beyond the earth, are as slaves in respect of those who lord it over them and keep them in bondage; as the Egyptians lorded it over the children of Israel, and greatly afflicted their life and violently held them in bondage. (Exo_1:13, Exo_1:14) It was for the sake of those who were in a bondage, corresponding to the bondage of the Hebrews, that the Son of God took upon Him only the form of a slave, (Phi_2:7) doing no work that was foul or servile. As then, having the form of that slave, He pays toll and tribute not different from that which was paid by His disciple; for the same stater sufficed, even the one coin which was paid for Jesus and His disciple. But this coin was not in the house of Jesus, but it was in the sea, and in the mouth of a fish of the sea which, in my judgment, was benefited when it came up and was caught in the net of Peter, who became a fisher of men, in which net was that which is figuratively called a fish, in order also that the coin with the image of Caesar might be taken from it, and that it might take its place among those which were caught by them who have learned to become fishers of men. Let him, then, who has the things of Caesar render them to Caesar, (Mar_12:17; Luk_20:25) that afterwards he may be able to render to God the things of God. But since Jesus, who was “the image of the invisible God,” (Col_1:15) had not the image of Caesar, for “the prince of this age had nothing in Him,” (Joh_14:31) on this account He takes from its own place, the sea, the image of Caesar, that He may give it to the kings of the earth for Himself and His disciple, so that those who receive the half-shekel might not imagine that Jesus was the debtor of them and of the kings of the earth; for He paid the debt, not having taken it up, nor having possessed it, nor having acquired it, nor at any time having made it His own possession, so that the image of Caesar might never be along with the image of the invisible God.

 

11. The Freedom of Sons.

And this may be put in another way. There are some who are kings’ sons on the earth, and yet they are not sons of those kings, but sons, and sons absolutely; but others, because of their being strangers to the sons of the kings of the earth, and sons of no one of those upon the earth, but on this very account are sons, whether of God or of His Son, or of some one of those who are God’s. If, then, the Saviour inquires of Peter, saying, “The kings of the earth from whom do they receive toll or tribute – from their own sons or from strangers?” (Mat_17:25) and Peter replies not from their own sons, but “from strangers,” then Jesus says about such as are strangers to the kings of the earth, and on account of being free are sons, “Therefore the sons are free;” (Mat_17:26) for the sons of the kings of the earth are not free, since “every one that committeth sin is the bond-servant of sin,” (Joh_8:34) but they are free who abide in the truth of the word of God, and on this account, know the truth, that they also may become free from sin. If, any one then, is a son simply, and not in this matter wholly a son of the kings of the earth, he is free. And nevertheless, though he is free, he takes care not to offend even the kings of the earth, and their sons, and those who receive the half-shekel; wherefore He says, “Let us not cause them to stumble, but go thou and cast thy net, and take up the fish that first cometh up,” (Mat_17:27) etc. But I would inquire of those who are pleased to make myths about different natures, of what sort of nature they were, whether the kings of the earth, or their sons, or those who receive the half-shekel, whom the Saviour does not wish to offend; it appears of a verity, ex hypothesi, that they are not of a nature worthy of praise, and yet He took heed not to cause them to stumble, and He prevents any stumbling-block being put in their way, that they may not sin more grievously, and that with a view to their being saved – if they will – even by receiving Him who has spared them from being caused to stumble. And as in a place verily of consolation, – for such is, by interpretation, Capernaum, – comforting the disciple as being both free and a son, He gives to him the power of catching the fish first, that when it came up Peter might be comforted by its coming up and being caught, and by the stater being taken from its mouth, in order to be paid to those whose the stater was, and who demanded as their own such a piece of money.

 

12. The Stater Allegorized.

But you might sometimes gracefully apply the passage to the lover of money, who has nothing in his mouth but things about silver, when you behold him healed by some Peter, who takes the stater, which is the symbol of all his avarice, not only from his mouth and words, but from his whole character. For you will say that such an ode was in the sea, and in the bitter affairs of life, and in the waves of the cares and anxieties of avarice, having the stater in his mouth when he was unbelieving and avaricious, but that he came up from the sea and was caught in the rational net, and being benefited by some Peter who has taught him the truth, no longer has the stater in his mouth, but in place of it those things which contain His image, the oracles of God.

 

13. The Sacred Half-Shekel.

Moreover to the saying, “They that received the half-shekel came to Peter,” (Mat_17:24) you will adduce from Numbers that, for the saints according to the law of God, is paid not a half-shekel simply, but a sacred half-shekel. For it is written, “And thou shale take five shekels per head, according to the sacred half-shekel.” (Num_3:47) But also on behalf of all the sons of Israel is given a sacred half-shekel per head. Since then it was not possible for the saint of God to possess along with the sacred half-shekels the profane shekels, so to speak, on this account, to them who do not receive the sacred half-shekels, and who asked Peter and said, “Doth not your master pay the half-shekel?” the Saviour commands the stater to be paid, in which was the half-shekel which was found in the mouth of the first fish that came up, in order that it might be given for the Teacher and the disciple.

 

14. Concerning Those Who Said, Who Is the Greatest? And Concerning the Child That Was Called by Jesus.

“In that day came the disciples unto Jesus saying, Who then is greatest in the kingdom of heaven?” (Mat_18:1) In order that we might be taught what it was that the disciples came to Jesus and asked to learn of Him, and how He answered to their inquiry, Matthew, though he might have given an account of this very thing only, has added, according to some manuscripts, “In that hour the disciples came unto Jesus,” but, according to others, “In that day;” and it is necessary that we should not leave the meaning of the evangelist without examination. Wherefore giving attention to the words preceding “in that day,” or “hour,” let us see if it is possible from them to find a way to understand, as being necessary, the addition, “in that day,” or “hour.” Jesus then had come to Capernaum along with His disciples, where “they that received the half-shekel came to Peter,” and asked and said, “Doth not your Master pay the half-shekel?” Then, when Peter answered and said to them, Yea, Jesus giving further a defence with reference to the giving of the half-shekel, sends Peter to drag up the fish into the net, in the mouth of which He said that a stater would be found which was to be given for Himself and Peter. It seems to me, then, that thinking that this was a very great honour which had been bestowed on Peter by Jesus, who judged that he was greater than the rest of His friends, they wished to learn accurately the truth of their suspicion, by making inquiry of Jesus and hearing from Him, whether, as they supposed, He had judged that Peter was greater than they; and at the same time also they hoped to learn the ground on which Peter had been preferred to the rest of the disciples. Matthew then, I think, wishing to make this plain, has subjoined to the words “that take” – the stater, to-wit – “and give unto them for thee and me,” the words, “In that day came the disciples unto Jesus, saying, Who then is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven?” (Mat_17:27; Mat_18:1) And, perhaps, they were also in doubt because of the preference which had been given to the three at the transfiguration, and they were in doubt about this – which of the three was judged by the Lord to be greatest. For John reclined on His breast through love, and we may conclude that before the Supper they had seen many tokens of special honour given by Jesus to John; but Peter on his confession was called blessed in their hearing, because of his saying, “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God;” (Mat_16:16, Mat_16:17) but again because of the saying, “Get thee behind Me, Satan; thou art a stumbling-block unto Me, for thou mindest not the things of God but the things of men,” (Mat_16:23) they were distracted in mind as to whether it was not he but one of the sons of Zebedee, that was the greatest. So much for the words “in that day” or “hour,” on which took place the matters relating to the stater.

 

15. Greatness Varies in Degree.

But next we must seek to understand this: the disciples came to Him, as disciples to a teacher proposing difficult questions, and making inquiry, Who then is greatest in the kingdom of heaven? (Mat_18:1) And, in this respect, we must imitate the disciples of Jesus; for if, at any time, any subject of investigation among us should not be found out let us go with all unanimity in regard to the question in dispute to Jesus, who is present where two or three are gathered together in His name, (Mat_18:20) and is ready by His presence with power to illumine the hearts of those who truly desire to become His disciples, with a view to their apprehension of the matters under inquiry. And likewise it would be nothing strange for us to go to any of those who have been appointed by God as teachers in the church, and propose any question of a like order to this, “Who, then, is greatest in the kingdom of heaven?” What, then, was already known to the disciples of the matters relating to this question? And what was the point under inquiry? That there is not equality in regard to those who are deemed worthy of the kingdom of heaven they had apprehended, and that, as there was not equality, some one was greatest, and so in succession down to the least: but of what nature was the greatest, and what was the way of life of him who was the least, and who occupied the middle position, they further desired to know; unless, indeed, it is more accurate to say that they knew who was least from the words, “Whosoever shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven;” but who was the greatest of all they did not know, even if they had grasped the meaning of the words, “Whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven;” (Mat_5:19) for as there were many great, it was not clear to them who was the greatest of the great, to use a human standard. And that many are great, but the great not equally great, will be manifest from the ascription of the epithet “great” to Isaac, “who waxed great, and became exceedingly great,” (Gen_26:13) and from what is said in the case of Moses, and John the Baptist, and the Saviour. And every one will acknowledge that even though all these were great according to the Scripture, yet the Saviour was greater than they. But whether John also than whom there was no greater among those born of women, (Mat_11:11) was greater than Isaac and Moses, or whether he was not greater, but equal to both, or to one of them, it would be hazardous to declare. And from the saying, “But Isaac, waxing great, became greater,” (Gen_26:13) until he became not simply great, but with the twice repeated addition, “exceedingly,” we may learn that there is a difference among the great, as one is great, and another exceedingly great, and another exceedingly exceedingly great. The disciples, therefore, came to Jesus and sought to learn, who was the greatest in the kingdom of heaven; and perhaps they wished to learn, hearing from Him sometimes like this, “A certain one is greatest in the kingdom of heaven;” but He gives a universal turn to the discourse, showing what was the quality of him who was greatest in the kingdom of heaven. Let us seek to understand, from what is written, to the best of our ability, who this is. “For Jesus called a little child,” (Mat_18:2 etc).

 

16. Why the Great Are Compared to Little Children.

But first we may expound it in simple fashion. One, expounding the word of the Saviour here after the simple method, might say that, if any one who is a man mortifies the lusts of manhood, putting to death by the spirit the deeds of the body, and “always bearing about in the body the putting to death of Jesus,” (2Co_4:10) to such a degree that he has the condition of the little child who has not tasted sensual pleasures, and has had no conception of the impulses of manhood, then such an one is converted, and has become as the little children. And the greater the advance he has made towards the condition of the little children in regard to such emotions, by so much the more as compared with those who are in training and have not advanced to so great a height of self-control, is he the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. But that which has been said about little children in respect of lustful pleasures, the same might also be said in regard to the rest of the affections and infirmities and sicknesses of the soul, into which it is not the nature of little children to fall, who have not yet fully attained to the possession of reason; as, for example, that, if any one be converted, and, though a man, such an one becomes as a child in respect of anger; and, as is the child in relation to grief, so that sometimes he laughs and plays at the very time that his father or mother or brother is dead, he who is converted would become such an one as little children; and, having received from the Word a disposition incapable of grief, so that he becomes like the little child in regard to grief. And the like you will say about what is called pleasure, in regard to which the wicked are irrationally lifted up, from which little children do not suffer, nor such as have been converted and become as little children. As, then, it has been accurately demonstrated also by others, that no passion is incident to the little children who have not yet attained to full possession of reason; and if no passion, clearly fear also; but, it there be anything corresponding to the passions, these are faint, and very quickly suppressed, and healed in the case of little children, so that he is worthy of love, who, being converted as the little children, has reached such a point as to have, as it were, his passions in subjection like the little children. And with regard to fear, therefore, similar things to those spoken might be conceived, that the little children do not experience the fear of the wicked, but a different thing, to which those who have an accurate knowledge of questions in regard to the passions and their names give the name of fear; as, for example, in the case of children there is a forgetfulness of their evils at the very time of their tears, for they change in a moment, and laugh and play along with those who were thought to grieve and terrify them, but in truth had wrought in them no such emotion. So too, moreover, one will humble himself like the little child which Jesus called; for neither haughtiness, nor conceit in respect of noble birth, or wealth, or any of those things which are thought to be good, but are not, comes to a little child. Wherefore you may see those who are not altogether infants, up to three or four years of age, like to those who are of mean birth, though they may seem to be of noble birth, and not appearing at all to love rich children rather than the poor. If, therefore, in the same way as according to their age children are affected towards those passions which exalt the senseless, the disciple of Jesus under the influence of reason54 has humbled himself like the little child which Jesus showed, not being exalted because of vainglory, nor puffed up on the ground of wealth, or raiment, nor elated because of noble birth, in particular are they to be received and imitated in the name of Jesus, who have been converted as the Word showed, like the little child which Jesus took to Him; since especially in such the Christ is, and therefore He says, “Whosoever shall receive one such little child in My name receiveth Me.” (Mat_18:5)

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

52 The text is uncertain.

53 Lam_3:38. Origen reads τὰ καλὰ instead of τὰ κακὰ.

54 Or, the Word.



Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Book 13, Part 2

Commentaries of Origen (Cont.)

Book XIII. (Cont.)

17. The Little Ones and Their Stumbling-Blocks.

But it is a hard task to expound what follows in logical harmony with what has already been said; for one might say, how is it that he who is converted and has become as the little children, is a little one among such as believe in Jesus, and is capable of being caused to stumble? And likewise let us attempt to explain this coherently. Every one that gives his adherence to Jesus as the Son of God according to the true history concerning Him, and by deeds done according to the Gospel, is on the way to living the life which is according to virtue, is converted and is on the way towards becoming as the little children; and it is impossible for him not to enter into the kingdom of heaven. There are, indeed, many such; but not all, who are converted with a view to becoming like the little children, have reached the point of being made like unto little children; but each wants so much of the likeness to the little children, as he falls short of the disposition of little children towards the passions, of which we have spoken. In the whole multitude, then, of believers, are also those who, having been, as it were, just converted in regard to their becoming as the little children, at the very point of their conversion that they may become as the little children, are called little; and those of them, who are converted that they may become as the little children, but fall far short of having truly become as the little children, are capable of being caused to stumble; each of whom falls so far short of the likeness to them, as he falls short of the disposition of children towards the passions, of which we have spoken, to whom we ought not to give occasions of stumbling-block; but, if it be otherwise, he who has caused him to stumble will require, as contributing towards his cure, to have “an ass’s millstone hanged about his neck, and be sunk into the depths of the sea.” (Mat_18:6) For, in this way, when he has paid the due penalty in the sea, where is “the dragon which God formed to play in it,” (Psa_104:26) and, so far as is expedient for the end in view, has been punished and undergone suffering, he shall then55 have his part in those troubles which belong to the depths of the sea, which he endured when he was dragged down by the ass’s millstone. For there are also differences of millstones, so that one of them may be, so to call it, the millstone of a man, and another that of an ass; and that is human, about which it is written, “Two women shall be grinding at the mill; one is taken and one is left;” (Mat_24:41) but the millstone of the ass is that which shall be put round him who has given occasion of stumbling-block. But some one might say – I know not whether he would speak soundly or erroneously – that the ass’s millstone is the heavy body of the wicked man, which is sunken downwards, and which he will receive at the resurrection that he may be sunk in the abyss which is called the depth of the sea, where “is the dragon which God formed to play therein.” (Psa_104:26) But another will refer the creating of a stumbling-block to one of the little ones to the powers that are unseen by men; for from these arise many stumbling-blocks to the little ones pointed out by Jesus. But when they cause to stumble one of the little ones pointed out by Jesus, who are believers in Him, he shall assume an ass’s millstone, the corruptible body which presses heavily on the soul, which is itself hung from the neck, which is dragged down to the affairs in this life, that by means of these their conceit may be taken away, and having paid the penalty, they shall come, through means of the ass’s millstone, to the condition expedient for them.

 

18. Who Was the Little Child Called by Jesus.

Now another interpretation different from what is called the simpler may be uttered; whether as dogma, or for the sake of exercise, so to speak, let us also inquire what was the little child who was called by Jesus and set in the midst of the disciples. Now consider if you can say that the little child, whom Jesus called, was the Holy Spirit who humbled Himself, when He was called by the Saviour, and set in the midst of the reason of the disciples of Jesus; if, indeed, He wishes us, being turned away from everything else, to be turned towards the examples suggested by the Holy Spirit, so that we may so become as the little children, who are themselves also turned and likened to the Holy Spirit; which little children God gave to the Saviour, according to what is said in Isaiah, “Behold, I and the little children which God has given to me.” (Psa_8:1-9:18) And it is not possible for any one to enter into the kingdom of heaven, who has not been turned away from the affairs of this world, and made like unto the little children who possess the Holy Spirit; which Holy Spirit was called by Jesus, and, descending from His own perfection to men as a little child, was set by Jesus in the midst of the disciples. It is necessary, then, for him who has turned away from the desires of this world to humble himself not simply as the little child, but, according to what is written, “as this little child.” (Mat_18:4) But to humble oneself as that little child is to imitate the Holy Spirit, who humbled Himself for the salvation of men. Now, that the Saviour and the Holy Spirit were sent by the Father for the salvation of men has been declared in Isaiah, in the person of the Saviour, saying, “And now the Lord hath sent me and His Spirit.” (Isa_48:16) You must know, however, that this expression is ambiguous; for either God sent, but also the Holy Spirit sent, the Saviour; or, as we have taken it, the Father sent both – the Saviour and the Holy Spirit. He, therefore, who has humbled himself more than all those who have humbled themselves in imitation of that little child, is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. For there are many who are willing to humble themselves as that little child; but the man, who in every respect has become like to the little child who humbled himself, in the name of Jesus – especially in Jesus Himself, – in reality, would be found to be he who is named greater than all in the kingdom of heaven. But as he receives Jesus, whosoever receives one such of the little children in His name, so he rejects Jesus and casts Him out, who does not wish to receive one such little child in the name of Jesus. But if, also, there is a difference in those who are deemed worthy of the Holy Spirit, as believers receive more or less of the Holy Spirit, there would be some little ones among those who believe in God who can be made to stumble: to avenge whose being made to stumble the Word says, with reference to those who had caused them to stumble, “It is profitable for him that an ass’s millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be sunk in the depth of the sea.” (Mat_18:6) Let these things be said in regard to the passage of Matthew before us.

 

19. The Parallel Passages in Mark and Luke.

But let us consider also the like account in the other Evangelists. Mark, (Mar_9:33, Mar_9:34) then, says, that the Twelve reasoned in the way as to which of them was the greatest. Wherefore He sat down, and called them, and teaches who is the greatest, saying, that he who became last of all by means of his moderation and gentleness, would as the greatest obtain the first place, so that he did not receive the place of one who was being ministered unto, but the place of one who ministered, and that not to some but not to others, but to all absolutely; for attend to the words, “If any man would be first he shall be last of all, and minister of all.” (Mar_9:35) And next to that He says, that “He,” – Jesus to-wit – “took a little child, and set him in the midst of His own disciples, and taking him in His arms, He said unto them, Whosoever shall receive one of the little children in My name receiveth Me.” (Mar_9:36, Mar_9:37) But what was the little child which Jesus took and placed in His arms, according to the deeper meaning in the passage? it the Holy Spirit? And to this little child, indeed, some were likened, of whom He said, “Whosoever shall receive one of such little children in My name receiveth Me.” According to Luke, however, the reasoning did not arise spontaneously in the disciples, but was suggested to them by the question, “which of them should be greatest.” (Luk_9:46) And Jesus, seeing the reasoning of their heart, as He had eyes that see the reasonings of hearts, – seeing the reasoning of their heart, – without being questioned, according to Luke, “took the little child and set him,” not in the midst alone, as Matthew and Mark have said, but now, also, “by His side,” and said to the disciples, not only, “Whosoever shall receive one such little child,” or, “Whosoever shall receive one of such little ones in My name receiveth Me,” but, now going even a step higher, “Whosoever shall receive this little child in My name receiveth Me.” (Luk_9:47, Luk_9:48) It is necessary, therefore, according to Luke, to receive in the name of Jesus that very little child which Jesus took and placed by His side. And I know not if there be any one who can interpret figuratively the word, “Whosoever shall receive this little child in My name.” For it is necessary that each of us should receive in the name of Jesus that little child which Jesus then took and set by His side; for he lives as immortal, and we must receive him from Jesus Himself in the name of Jesus; and without being separated from him, Jesus is with him who receives the little child, so that according to this it is said, “Whosoever shall receive this little child in My name receiveth Me.” Then, since the Father is inseparable from the Son, He is with him who receives the Son. Wherefore it is said, “And whosoever shall receive Me receives Him that sent Me.” (Luk_9:48) But he who has received the little child, and the Saviour, and Him that sent Him, is least of all the disciples of Jesus, making himself little. But, so far as he belittles himself, to that extent does he become great; as that very thing, which caused him the more to make himself little, contributes to his advance in greatness; for attend to what is said, “He that is least among you all the same is great;” but in other manuscripts we read, “The same shall be great.” Now, according to Luke, “If any one shall not receive the kingdom of God as the little child, he shall in no wise enter therein.” (Luk_18:17) And this expression is ambiguous; for either it means that he who receives the kingdom of God may become as a little child, or, that he may receive the kingdom of God, which has become to him as a little child. And perhaps here those who receive the kingdom of God receive it, when it is as a little child, but in the world to come no longer as a little child; and they receive the greatness of the perfection in the spiritual manhood, so to speak, which perfection is manifested to all who in the present time receive it, when it is here as a little child.

 

20.The World and Offences. Various Meanings of World.

“Woe unto the world because of occasions of stumbling.” (Mat_18:7) The expression “cosmos,” is used in itself and absolutely in the passage, “He was in the cosmos and the cosmos knew Him not,” (Joh_1:10) but it is used relatively and in respect of its connection with that of which it is the cosmos, in the words, “Lest you look up to the heaven, and seeing the sun, and the moon, and all the cosmos of the heavens, you should stray and bow down to them and worship them.” (Deu_4:19) And the like you will find in the Book of Esther, spoken about her, when it is written, stripping off all her “cosmos.”56 For the word “cosmos,” simply, is not the same as the “cosmos” of heaven, or the “cosmos” of Esther; and this which we are now investigating is another. I think, then, that the world is not this compacted whole of heaven and earth according to the Divine Scriptures, but only the place which is round about the earth, and this is not to be conceived in respect of the whole earth, but only in respect of ours which is inhabited; for the true light “was in the world,” that is, in the place which is around, conceived in relation to our part of the earth; “and the world knew Him not,” (Joh_1:10) that is, the men in the region round about, and perhaps also the powers that have an affinity to this place. For it is monstrous to understand by the world here the compacted whole formed of heaven and earth, and those in it; so that it could be said, that the sun and moon and the choir of the stars and the angels in all this world, did not know the true light, and, though ignorant of it, preserved the order which God had appointed for them. But when it is said by the Saviour in the prayer to the Father, “And, now, glorify me, O Father, with Thine own self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was,” (Joh_17:5) you must understand by the “world,” that which is inhabited by us on the earth; for it was from this world that the Father gave men to the Son, in regard to whom alone the Saviour beseeches His Father, and not for the whole world of men. Moreover, also, when the Saviour says, “And I come to thee and am no longer in the world,” (Joh_17:11) He speaks of the terrestrial world; for it is not to be supposed that He spoke things contradictory when He said, “And I come to thee, and I am no longer in the world,” and “I am in the world.” But also in this, “And these things I speak in the world,” (Joh_17:13) we must think of the place round about the earth. And this is clearly indicated also by the words, “And the world hated them, because they are not of the world.” (Joh_17:14) For it hated us from the time when we no longer “look at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen,” (2Co_4:18) because of the teaching of Jesus; not the world of heaven and earth and them that are therein, all compacted together but the men on the earth along with us. And the saying, “They are not of the world,” (Joh_17:21) is equivalent to, They are not of the place round about the earth. And so also the disciples of Jesus are not of this world, as He was not of the world. And further also the saying, “That the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me,” (Joh_17:21, Joh_17:23) twice spoken in the Gospel according to John, does not refer to the things that are superior to men, but to men who need to believe that the Father sent the Son into the world here. Yea, and also in the Apostle, “Your faith is proclaimed in the whole world.” (Rom_1:8)

 

21. The “Woe” Does Not Apply to the Disciples of Jesus.

But if there is woe unto men everywhere on the earth, because of occasions of stumbling to those who are laid hold of by them; but the disciples are not of the world, as they do not look at things seen, like as the Master is not of this world; to no one of the disciples of Jesus does the “woe because of occasions of stumbling” apply, since “great peace have they who love the law of God, and there is to them no occasion of stumbling.” (Psa_119:165) But if any one seems to be called a disciple, but yet is of the world, because of his loving the world, and the things therein, – I mean, the life in the place round about the earth, and the property in it, or the possessions, or any form of wealth whatsoever, – so that the saying, “they are not of the world,” (Joh_17:16) does not fit him; to him, as being really of the world, shall come that which happens to the world, the “woe, because of occasions of stumbling.” But let him who wishes to avoid this woe not be a lover of life, but let him say with Paul,” “The world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.” (Gal_6:14) For the saints while “in the tabernacle, do groan being burdened” (2Co_5:4) with “the body of humiliation,” and do all things that they may become worthy to be found in the mystery of the resurrection, when God shall fashion anew the body of humiliation not of all, but of those who have been truly made disciples to Christ, so that it may be conformed to the body of the glory of Christ. (Phi_3:21) For as none of the “woes” happen to any of the disciples of Christ, so does not this “woe, because of occasions of stumbling;” for, supposing that thousands of occasions should arise, they shall not touch those who are no longer of the world. But if any one, because of his faith wanting ballast, and the instability of his submission in regard to the Word of God, is capable of being caused to stumble, let him know that he is not called by Jesus His disciple. Now we must suppose that so many stumbling-blocks come, that, as a result, the woes extend not to some parts of the earth, but to the whole “world” which is in it.

 

22.What the “Occasions of Stumbling” Are.

“And it must needs be that occasions of stumbling come,” (Mat_17:7) which I take to be different from the men by whom they come. The occasions then which come are an army of the devil, his angels, and a wicked band of impure spirits, which, seeking out instruments through whom they will work, often find men altogether strangers to piety, and sometimes even some of those who are thought to believe the Word of God, for whom exists a worse woe than that which comes to him who is caused to stumble, just as also it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment, (Mat_11:22) than for the places where Jesus did signs and wonders, and yet was not believed. But as one might undertake to make a collection from the Scriptures of those who are pronounced blessed, and of the things in respect of which they are so called, so also he might undertake to do with the woes which are written, and those in whose case the woes are spoken. But that the woe is worse in the case of him who causes to stumble, than in him who is made to stumble, you may prove by the passage, “Whoso shall cause to stumble one of these little ones which believe in Me, it is profitable for him,” (Mat_17:6) etc.; for, while the little one who is made to stumble receives retribution from him who caused him to stumble, it is expedient that the severe and intolerable punishment which is written should befall the man who has caused the stumbling. But if we were to give more careful consideration to these things, we should be on our guard against sinning against the brethren, and wounding their conscience when it is weak, lest we sin against Christ; (1Co_8:11, 1Co_8:12) as often our brethren about us, “for whom Christ died,” perish, not only through our knowledge, but also through some other causes connected with us; in the case of whom, we, sinning against Christ, shall pay the penalty, the soul of them who perish through us being required of us.

 

23. In What Sense “Necessary.”

Next we must test accurately the meaning of the word “necessity” in the passage, “For there is a necessity that the occasions come,” (Mat_18:7) and to the like effect in Luke, “It is ‘inadmissible’ but that occasions of stumbling should come,” (Luk_18:1) instead of “impossible.” And as it is necessary that that which is mortal should die, and it is impossible but that it should die, and as it must needs be that he who is in the body should be fed, for it is impossible for one who is not fed to live, so it is necessary and impossible but that occasions of stumbling should arise, since there is a necessity also that wickedness should exist before virtue in men, from which wickedness stumbling-blocks arise; for it is impossible that a man should be found altogether sinless, and who, without sin, has attained to virtue. For the wickedness in the evil powers, which is the primal source of the wickedness among men, is altogether eager to work through certain instruments against the men in the world. And perhaps also the wicked powers are more exasperated when they are cast out by the word of Jesus, and their worship is lessened, their customary sacrifices not being offered unto them; and there is a necessity that these offences come; but there is no necessity that they should come through any particular one; wherefore the “woe” falls on the man through whom the stumbling-block comes, as he has given a place to the wicked power whose purpose it is to create a stumbling-block. But do not suppose that by nature, and from constitution, there are certain stumbling-blocks which seek out men through whom they come; for as God did not make death, so neither did He create stumbling-blocks; but free-will begot the stumbling-blocks in some who did not wish to endure toils for virtue.

 

24. The Offending Hand, or Foot, or Eye.

And it is well, then, if the eye and the hand are deserving of praise, that the eye cannot with reason say to the hand, “I have no need of thee.” (1Co_12:21) But if any one in the whole body of the congregations of the church, who because of his practical girls has the name of hand, should change and become a hand causing to stumble, let the eye say to such a hand, “I have no need of thee,” and, saying it, let him cut it off and cast it from him. (Mat_18:8) And so it is well, if any head be blessed, and the feet worthy of the blessed head, so that the head observing the things which are becoming to itself, may not be able to say to the feet, “I have no need of you.” If, however, any foot be found to become a stumbling-block to the whole body, let the head say to such a foot, “I have no need of thee,” and having cat it off, let him cast it from himself; for even it is much better that the rest of the body should enter into life, wanting the foot or the hand which caused the stumbling-block, rather than, when the stumbling-block has spread over the whole body, it should be cast into the hell of fire with the two feet or the two hands. And so it is well, that he who can become the eye of the whole body should be worthy of Christ and of the whole body; but if such an eye should ever change, and become a stumbling-block to the whole body, it is well to take it out and cast it outside the whole body, and that the rest of the body without that eye should be saved, rather than that along with it, when the whole body has been corrupted, the whole body should be cast into the hell of fire. (Mat_18:9) For the practical faculty of the soul, if prone to sin, and the walking faculty of the soul, so to speak, if prone to sin, and the faculty of clear vision, if prone to sin, may be the hand that causes to stumble, and the foot that causes to stumble, and the eye that causes to stumble, which things it is better to cast away, and having put them aside to enter into life without them, like as one halt, or maimed, or one-eyed, rather than along with them to lose the whole soul. And likewise in the case of the soul it is a good and blessed thing to use its power for the noblest ends; but if we are going to lose one for any cause, it is better to lose the use of it, that along with the other powers we may be saved.

 

25. The Eye or Hand Allegorized.

And it is possible to apply these words also to our nearest kinsfolk, who are our members, as it were; being considered to be our members, because of the close relationship; whether by birth, or from any habitual friendship, so to speak; whom we must not spare if they are injuring our soul. For let us cut off from ourselves as a hand or a foot or an eye, a father or mother who wishes us to do that which is contrary to piety, and a son or daughter who, as far as in them lies, would have us revolt from the church of Christ and the love of Him. But even if the wife of our bosom, or a friend who is kindred in soul, become stumbling-blocks to us, let us not spare them, but let us cut them out from ourselves, and cast them outside of our soul, as not being truly our kindred but enemies of our salvation; for “whosoever hates not his father, and mother,” (Luk_14:26) and the others subjoined, when it is the fitting season to hate them as enemies and assailants, that he may be able to win Christ, this man is not worthy of the Son of God. And in respect of these we may say, that from a critical position any lame one, so to speak, is saved, when he has lost a foot – say a brother – and alone obtains the inheritance of the kingdom of God; and a maimed one is saved, when his father is not saved, but they perish, while he is separated from them, that he alone may obtain the benedictions. And so also any one is saved with one eye, who has cut out the eye of his own house, his wife, if she commit fornication, lest having two eyes he may go away into the hell of fire.

 

26. The Little Ones and Their Angels.

“See that ye despise not one of these little ones.” (Mat_18:10) It seems to me that as among the bodies of men there are differences in point of size, – so that some are little, and others great, and others of middle height, and, again, there are differences among the little, as they are more or less little, and the same holds of the great, and of those of middle height, – so also among the souls of men, there are some things which give them the stamp of littleness, and other things the stamp of greatness, so to speak, and generally, after the analogy of things bodily, other things the stamp of mediocrity. But in the case of bodies, it is not due to the action of men but to the spermatic principles, that one is short and little, another great, and another of middle height; but in the case of souls, it is our free-will, and actions of such a kind, and habits of such a kind, that furnish the reason why one is great, or little, or of middle height; and it is of our free-will either by advancing in stature to increase our size, or not advancing to be short. And so indeed I understand the words about Jesus having assumed a human soul, “Jesus advanced;” (Luk_2:52) for as from the free-will there was an advance of His soul in wisdom and grace, so also in stature. And the Apostle says, “Until we all attain unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ;” (Eph_4:13) for we must think that he attains unto a man, and that full-grown, according to the inner man, who has gone through the things of the child, and has reached the stage of the man, and has put away the things of the child, and generally, has perfected the things of the man. (1Co_13:11) And so we must suppose that there is a certain measure of spiritual stature unto which the most perfect soul can attain by magnifying the Lord, and become great. Thus, then, these became great, of whom this is written, Isaac, and Moses, and John, and the Saviour Himself above all; for also about Him Gabriel said, “He shall be great;” (Luk_1:32) but the little ones are “the newborn babes which long for the reasonable milk which is without guile,” (1Pe_2:1) such as stand in need of nursing-fathers and nursing-mothers, spoken of in Isaiah when he says, about the calling from the Gentiles, “And they shall bring the sons in the bosom, and take their daughters on the shoulders, and kings shall be thy nursing-fathers and their princesses thy nursing-mothers.” (Isa_49:22, Isa_49:23) For these reasons you will, then, attend to the word, “Do not despise one of these little ones,” (Mat_18:10) and consider whether it is their angels who bring them in their bosom, since they have become sons, and also take on their shoulders what are called daughters, and whether from them are the nursing-fathers who are called kings, and the nursing-mothers who are called princesses. And since the little ones, pointed out by our Saviour, are under the stewardship as of nursing-fathers and nursing-mothers, on this account I think that Moses, who believed that he had been already assigned a place among the ranks of the great, said, with regard to the promise, “My angel shall go before you,” (Exo_32:34) “If thou thyself do not go along with me, carry me not up hence.” (Exo_33:15) For though the little one even be an heir, yet as being a child he differs nothing from a servant when he is a child, (Gal_4:1) and to the extent to which he is little “has the spirit of bondage to fear;” (Rom_8:15) but he who is not at all any longer such has no longer the spirit of bondage, but already the spirit of adoption, when “perfect love casteth out fear;” (1Jo_4:18) it will be plain to thee, how that according to these things “the angel of the Lord” is said “to encamp round about them that fear Him, and to save them.” (Psa_34:7) But you will consider, according to these things also, whether these are indeed angels of the little ones “who are led by the spirit of bondage to fear,” “when the angel of the Lord encamps round about them that fear Him and delivereth them;” but of the great, whether it is the Lord who is greater than the angels, who might say about each of them, “I am with him in affliction;” (Psa_91:15) and, so long as we are imperfect, and need one to assist us that we may be delivered from evils, we stand in need of an angel of whom Jacob said, “The angel who delivered me from all the evils;” (Gen_48:16) but, when we have become perfected, and have passed through the stage of being subject to nursing-fathers and nursing-mothers and guardians and stewards, (Gal_4:4) we are meet to be governed by the Lord Himself. 

 

27. When the Little Ones Are Assigned to Angels.

Then again one might inquire at what time those who are called their angels assume guardianship of the little ones pointed out by Christ; whether they received this commission to discharge concerning them, from what time “by the laver of regeneration,” (Tit_3:5) through which they were born “as new-born babes, they long for the reasonable milk which is without guile,” (1Pe_2:1) and no longer are in subjection to any wicked power; or, whether from birth they had been appointed, according to the foreknowledge and predestination of God, over those whom God also foreknew, and foreordained to be conformed to the glory of the Christ. (Rom_8:29) And with reference to the view that they have angels from birth, one might quote, “He who separated me from my mother’s womb,” (Gal_1:15) and, “From the womb of my mother thou hast been my protector,” (Psa_71:6) and, “He has assisted me from my mother’s womb,” (Psa_139:13) and, “Upon thee I was cast from my mother,” (Psa_22:10) and in the Epistle of Jude, “To them that are beloved in God the Father and are kept for Jesus Christ, being called,” (Jud_1:1) – kept completely by the angels who keep them.

 

28. Close Relationship of Angels to Their “Little Ones.”

With reference to the words, “When through the layer I became a child in Christ,” (Tit_3:5; 1Pe_2:2) it may be said, that there is no holy angel present with those who are still in wickedness, but that during the period of unbelief they are under the angels of Satan;57 but, after the regeneration, He who has redeemed us with His own blood consigns us to a holy angel, who also, because of his purity, beholds the face of God. And a third exposition of this passage might be something like the following, which would say, that as it is possible for a man to change from unbelief to faith, and from intemperance to temperance, and generally from wickedness to virtue, so also it is possible that the angel, to whom any soul has been entrusted at birth, may be wicked at the first, but afterwards may at some time believe in proportion as the man believes, and may make such advance that he may become one of the angels who always behold the face of the Father in heaven, (Mat_18:10) beginning from the time that he is yoked along with the man who was foreknown and foreordained to believe at that time, the judgments of God, which are unspeakable and unsearchable and like to the depths, fitly bringing together all this harmonious relationship – angels with men. And it may be that as when a man and his wife are both unbelievers, sometimes it is the man who first believes and in time saves his wife, and sometimes the wife who begins and afterwards in time persuades her husband, so it happens with angels and with men. If, however, anything of this kind takes place in the case of other angels or not, you may seek out for yourself. But consider whether it may not be appropriate to say something of this kind in regard to each angel who is so honoured according to the word of the Saviour, that he is said to behold always the face of the Father who is in heaven. But since in what we said above, that the little ones have angels, but that the great have passed beyond such a position, some one will quote in opposition to us from the Acts of the Apostles, where it is written, that a certain maid Rhoda, when Peter knocked at the door, came to answer, and recognizing the voice of Peter, ran in and announced that Peter stood before the gate; but when they who were gathered together in the house wondered, and thought that it was quite impossible that Peter verily stood before the gate, they said, It is his angel. (Act_12:13-15) For the objector will say that, as they had learned once for all that each of the believers had some definite angel, they knew that Peter also had one. But he, who adheres to what we have previously said, will say that the word of Rhoda was not necessarily a dogma, and perhaps also the word of those who did not accurately know, when one as being little and God-fearing is governed by angels, and when now by the Lord Himself. After this, in order to establish our conception of the little one which we have brought forward, it will be said that we need no command about “not despising” in the case of the great, but we do need it in the case of the little; wherefore it is not merely said, “Do not despise one of these,” pointing to all the disciples, but “one of these little ones,” (Mat_18:10) pointed out by Him, who sees the littleness and the greatness of the soul. 

 

29. The Little Ones and the Perfect.

But another might say that the perfect man is here called little, applying the word, “For he that is least among you all, the same is great,” (Luk_9:48) and will affirm that he who humbles himself and becomes a child in the midst of all that believe, though he be an apostle or a bishop, and becomes such “as when a nurse cherisheth her own children,” (1Th_2:7) is the little one pointed out by Jesus, and that the angel of such an one is worthy to behold the face of God. For to say that the little are here called perfect, according to the passage, “He that is least among you all, the same is great.” (Luk_9:48) and as Paul said, “Unto me who am less than the least of all saints was this grace given,” (Eph_3:8) will seem to be in harmony with the saying, “Whoso shall cause one of these little ones to stumble,” (Mat_18:6) and “So it is not the will of My Father in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish.” (Mat_18:14) For he, as has been stated, who is now little, could not be made to stumble nor perish, for “great peace have they who love the law of God, and there is no stumbling-block to them;” (Psa_119:165) and he could not perish, who is least of all among all the disciples of Christ, and on this account becomes great; and, since he could not perish, he could say, “Who shall separate us from the love,” (Rom_8:35 etc.) But he who wishes to maintain this last exposition will say that the soul even of the just man is changeable, as Ezekiel also testifies, saying, that the righteous man may abandon the commandments of God, so that his former righteousness is not reckoned unto him; (Eze_33:12) wherefore it is said, “Whoso shall cause to stumble one of these little ones,” and, “It is not the will of My Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish.” (Mat_18:14)

[As for the exposition of the matters relating to “the hundred sheep,” you may consult the homilies on Luke. (Mat_18:12-14)]

 

30. The Sinning Brother.

“If thy brother sin against thee, go, shew him his fault between thee and him alone.” (Mat_18:15) He, then, who attends closely to the expression, in proof of the surpassing philanthropy of Jesus, will say, that as the words do not suggest a difference of they will act in a singular manner and contrary to the goodness of Jesus, who supply the thought, that these words are to be understood as being limited in their application to lesser sins. But another, also attending closely to the expression, and not wishing to introduce these extraneous thoughts, nor admitting that it is spoken about every sin, will say, that he who commits those great sins is not a brother, even if he be called a brother, as the Apostle says, “If any one that is named a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, etc., with such an one not to eat;” (1Co_5:11) for no one who is all idolater, or a fornicator, or covetous, is a brother; for if he, who seems to bear the name of Christ, though he is named a brother, has something of the features of these, he would not rightly be called a brother. As then he, who says that such words are spoken about every sin, whether the sin be murder, or poisoning, or paederasty, or anything of that sort, would give occasion of injury to the exceeding goodness of Christ, so, on the contrary, he who distinguishes between the brother and him who is called the brother, might teach that, in the case of the least of the sins of men, he who has not repented after the telling of the fault is to be reckoned as a Gentile and a publican, for sins which are “not unto death,” 1 (Joh_5:16) or, as the law has described them in the Book of Numbers, not “death-bringing.” (Num_18:22) This would seem to be very harsh; for I do not think that any one will readily be found who has not been censured thrice for the same form of sin, say, reviling, with which revilers abuse their neighbours, or those who are carried away by passion, or for over-drinking, or lying and idle words, or any of those things which exist in the masses. You will inquire, therefore, whether any observation of the passage has escaped the notice of those, who are influenced by their conception of the goodness of the Word, and grant pardon to those who have committed the greatest sins, as well as of those who teach that, in the case of the very least sins, he is to be reckoned as a Gentile and a publican, making him a stranger to the church, after he has committed three very trivial transgressions. But the following seems to me to have been overlooked by both of them, namely, the words, “Thou hast gained thy brother.” (Mat_18:15) It is assigned by the Word to him only who heard, and He no longer applies it in the case of him who has stumbled twice or thrice and been censured; but that which was to be said about him who was censured twice or thrice, corresponding to the saying, “Thou hast gained thy brother,” He has left in the air, so to speak. He is not, therefore, altogether gained, nor will he altogether perish, or he will receive stripes. And attend carefully to the first passage, “If he hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother,” and to the second passage, which is literally, “If he hear thee not, take with thyself one or two more, that at the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established.” (Mat_18:15, Mat_18:16) What, then, will happen to him who has been censured for the second time, after every word has been established by two or three witnesses, He has left us to conceive. And, again, “If he refuse to hear them” – manifestly, the witnesses who have been taken – “tell it,” he says, “to the church;” (Mat_18:17) and He does not say what he will suffer if he does not hear the church, but He taught that if he refused to hear the church, then he who had thrice admonished, and had not been heard, was to regard him for the future as the Gentile and the publican. (Mat_18:17) Therefore he is not altogether gained, nor will he altogether perish. But what at all he will suffer, who at first did not hear, but required witnesses, or even refused to hear these, but was brought to the church, God knows; for we do not declare it, according to the precept, “Judge not that ye be not judged,” (Mat_7:1) “until the Lord come, who will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness and make manifest the counsels of the hearts.” (1Co_4:5) But, with reference to the seeming harshness in the case of those who have committed less sins, one might say that it is not possible for him who has not heard twice in succession to hear the third time, so as, on this account, no longer to be as a Gentile or a publican, or no longer to stand in need of the censure in presence of all the church. For we must bear in mind this, “So it is not the will of My Father in heaven that one of these little ones should perish.” (Mat_18:14) For if “we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad,” (2Co_5:10) let each one with all his power do what he can so that he may not receive punishment for more evil things done in the body, even if he is going to receive back for all the wrongs which he has done; but it should be our ambition to procure the reward for a greater number of good deeds, since “with what measure we mete, it shall be measured to us,” (Mat_7:2) and, “according to the works of our own hands shall it happen unto us,” (Isa_3:11) and not in infinite wise, but either double or sevenfold shall sinners receive for their sins from the hand of the Lord; since He does not render unto any one according to the works of his hands, but more than that which he has done, for “Jerusalem,” as Isaiah taught, “received from the hand of the Lord double for her sins;” (Isa_40:2) but the neighbours of Israel, whoever they may be, will receive sevenfold, according to the following expression in the Psalms, “Render unto our neighbours sevenfold into their bosom the reproach with which they have reproached Thee, O Lord.” (Psa_79:12) And other forms of payment in return could be found, which, if we apprehend, we shall know that to repent after any sin, whatever its greatness, is advantageous, in order that, in addition to our not being punished for more offences, there may be some hope left to us concerning good deeds done afterwards at some time, even though, before them, thousands of errors have been committed by anyone of us. For it would be strange that evil deeds should be reckoned to any one, but the better which are done after the bad should profit nothing; which may also be learned from Ezekiel, (Eze_33:1-33) by those who pay careful consideration to the things said about such cases.

 

31. The Power to Bind on Earth and in Heaven.

But to me it seems that, to the case of him who after being thrice admonished was adjudged to be as the Gentile and the publican, it is fitly subjoined, “Verily, I say unto you,” – namely, to those who have judged any one to be as the Gentile and the publican, – “and what things soever ye shall bind on the earth,” (Mat_18:18 etc.); for with justice has he, who has thrice admonished and not been heard, bound him who is judged to be as a Gentile and a publican; wherefore, when such an one is bound and condemned by one of this character, he remains bound, as no one of those in heaven overturns the judgment of the man who bound him. And, in like manner, he who was admonished once for all, and did things worthy of being gained, having been set free by the admonition of the man who gained him, and no longer bound by the cords of his own sins, (Pro_5:22) for which he was admonished, shall be adjudged to have been set free by those in heaven. Only, it seems to be indicated that the things, which above were granted to Peter alone, are here given to all who give the three admonitions to all that have sinned; so that, if they be not heard, they will bind on earth him who is judged to be as a Gentile and a publican, as such an one has been bound in heaven. But since it was necessary, even if something in common had been said in the case of Peter and those who had thrice admonished the brethren, that Peter should have some element superior to those who thrice admonished, in the case of Peter, this saying “I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of the heavens,” (Mat_16:19) has been specially set before the words, “And what things soever ye shall bind on earth,” etc. And, indeed, if we were to attend carefully to the evangelical writings, we would also find here, and in relation to those things which seem to be common to Peter and those who have thrice admonished the brethren, a great difference and a pre-eminence in the things said to Peter, compared with the second class. For it is no small difference that Peter received the keys not of one heaven but of more, and in order that whatsoever things he binds on the earth may be bound not in one heaven but in them all, as compared with the many who bind on earth and loose on earth, so that these things are bound and loosed not in the heavens, as in the case of Peter, but in one only; for they do not reach so high a stage, with power as Peter to bind and loose in all the heavens. (Mat_16:19) The better, therefore, is the binder, so much more blessed is he who has been loosed, so that in every part of the heavens his loosing has been accomplished.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

55 Or, free from. The Vetus Inter. has “extra dolores.” It has had ὲξο instead of ὲξῆς.

56 Lomm., following Heut. Refers to The Additions to Esther 14:2. But the word κόσμος does not occur in this passage. See Judith 10:4; 1 Maccabees 2:11.

57 The text is corrupt.



Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew; Book 14, Part 1

Commentaries of Origen (Cont.)

Book XIV.

1. The Power of Harmony in Relation to Prayer.

“Again I say unto you that if two of you shall agree58 on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them.” (Mat_18:19) The word symphony is strictly applied to the harmonies of sounds in music. And there are indeed among musical sounds some accordant and others discordant. But the Evangelic Scripture is familiar with the name as applied to musical matters in the passage, “He heard a symphony and dancing.” (Luk_15:25) For it was fitting that when the son who had been lost and found came by penitence into concord with his father a symphony should be heard on the occasion of the joyous mirth of the house. But the wicked Laban was not acquainted with the word symphony in his saying to Jacob, “And if thou hadst told me I would have sent thee away with mirth and with music and with drums and a harp.” (Gen_31:27) But akin to the symphony of this nature is that which is written in the second Book of Kings when “the brethren of Aminadab went before the ark, and David and his son played before the Lord on instruments artistically fitted with might and with songs;” (2Sa_6:4, 2Sa_6:5) for the instruments thus fitted with might and with songs, had in themselves the musical symphony which is so powerful that when two only, bring along with the symphony which has relation to the music that is divine and spiritual, a request to the Father in heaven about anything whatsoever, the Father grants the request to those who ask along with the symphony on earth, – which is most miraculous, – those things which those who have made the symphony spoken of may have asked. So also I understand the apostolic saying “Defraud ye not one the other except it be by agreement for a season that ye may give yourselves unto prayer.” (1Co_7:5) For since the word harmony is applied to those who marry according to God in the passage from Proverbs which is as follows: “Fathers will divide their house and substance to their sons, but from God the woman is married to the man,”59 it is a logical consequence of the harmony being from God, that the name and the deed should enjoy the agreement with a view to prayer, as is indicated in the word, “unless it be by agreement.” (1Co_7:5) Then the Word repeating that the agreeing of two on the earth is the same thing as the agreeing with Christ, adds, “For where two or three are gathered together in My name.” (Mat_18:20) Therefore the two or three who are gathered together in the name of Christ are those who are in agreement on earth, not two only but sometimes also three. But he who has the power will consider whether this agreement and a congregation of this sort in the midst of which Christ is, can be found in more, since “narrow and straightened is the way that leadeth unto life, and few be they that find it.” (Mat_7:14) But perhaps also not even few but two or three make a symphony as Peter and James and John, to whom as making a symphony the Word of God showed His own glory. But two made a symphony, Paul and Sosthenes, when writing the first Epistle to the Corinthians; (1Co_1:1) and after this Paul and Timothy when sending the second Epistle to the same. (2Co_1:1) And even three made a symphony when Paul and Silvanus and Timothy gave instruction by letter to the Thessalonians. (1Th_1:1) But if it be necessary also from the ancient Scriptures to bring forward the three who made a symphony on earth, so that the Word was in the midst of them making them one, attend to the superscription of the Psalms, as for example to that of the forty-first, which is as follows: “Unto the end, unto understanding, for the sons of Korah.” (Psa_42:1-11) For though there were three sons of Korah whose names we find in the Book of Exodus, (Exo_6:24) Aser, which is, by interpretation, “instruction,” and the second Elkana, which is translated, “possession of God,” and the third Abiasaph, which in the Greek tongue might be rendered, “congregation of the father,” yet the prophecies were not divided but were both spoken and written by one spirit, and one voice, and one soul, which wrought with true harmony, and the three speak as one, “As the heart panteth after the springs of the water, so panteth my soul alter thee, O God.” (Psa_42:1) But also they say in the plural in the forty-fourth Psalm, “O God, we have heard with our ears.” (Psa_44:1) But if you wish still further to see those who are making symphony on earth look to those who heard the exhortation, “that ye may be perfected together in the same mind and in the same judgment.” (1Co_1:10) and who strove after the goal, “the soul and the heart of all the believers were one.” (Act_4:32) who have become such, if it be possible for such a condition to be found in more than two or three, that there is no discord between them, just as there is no discord between the strings of the ten-stringed psaltery with each other. But they were not in symphony in earth who said, “I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ,” (1Co_1:12) but there were schisms among them, upon the dissolution of which they were gathered together in company with the spirit in Paul, with the power of the Lord Jesus Christ, (1Co_5:4) that they might no longer “bite and devour one another so that they were consumed by one another;” (Gal_5:15) for discord consumes, as concord brings together, and admits60 the Son of God who comes in the midst of those who have become at concord. And strictly, indeed, concord takes place in two things generic, through the perfecting together, as the Apostle has called it, of the same mind by an intellectual grasp of the same opinions, and through the perfecting together of the same judgment, by a like way of living. But if whenever two of us agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of the Father of Jesus who is in heaven, (Mat_18:19) plainly when this is not done for them of the Father in heaven as touching anything that they shall ask, there the two have not been in agreement on earth; and this is the cause why we are not heard when we pray, that we do not agree with one another on earth, neither in opinions nor in life. But further also if we are the body of Christ and God hath set the members each one of them in the body that the members may have the same care one for another, and may agree with one another, and when one member suffers, all the members suffer with it, and if one be glorified, they rejoice with it, (1Co_12:18, 1Co_12:25, 1Co_12:26) we ought to practise the symphony which springs from the divine music, that when we are gathered together in the name of Christ, He may be in the midst of us, the Word of God, and the Wisdom of God, and His Power. (1Co_1:2, 1Co_1:4)

 

2. The Harmony of Husband and Wife.

So much then for the more common understanding of the two or three whom the Word exhorts to be in agreement. But now let us also touch upon another interpretation which was uttered by some one of our predecessors, exhorting those who were married to sanctity and purity; for by the two, he says, whom the Word desires to agree on earth, we must understand the husband and wife, who by agreement defraud each other of bodily intercourse that they may give themselves unto prayer; (1Co_7:5) when if they pray for anything whatever that they shall ask, they shall receive it, the request being granted to them by the Father in heaven of Jesus Christ on the ground of such agreement. And this interpretation does not appear to me to cause dissolution of marriage, but to be an incitement to agreement, so that if the one wished to be pure, but the other did not desire it, and on this account he who willed and was able to fulfil the better part, condescended to the one who had not the power or the will, they would not both have the accomplishment from the Father in heaven of Jesus Christ, of anything whatever that they might ask.

 

3. The Harmony of Body, Soul, and Spirit.

And next to this about the married, I am familiar also with another interpretation of the agreement between the two which is as follows. In the wicked, sin reigns over the soul, being settled as on its own throne in this mortal body, so that the soul obeys the lusts thereof; (Rom_6:12) but in the case of those, who have stirred up the sin which formerly reigned over the body as from a throne and who are in conflict with it, “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh;” (Gal_5:17) but in the case of those who have now become perfected, the spirit has gained the mastery and put to death the deeds of the body, and imparts to the body of its own life, so that already this is fulfilled, “He shall quicken also your mortal bodies because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you;” (Rom_8:11) and there arises a concord of the two, body and spirit, on the earth, on the successful accomplishment of which there is sent up a harmonious prayer also of him who “with the heart believes unto righteousness, but with the mouth maketh confession unto salvation.” (Rom_10:10) so that the heart is no longer far from God, and along with this the righteous man draws nigh to God with his own lips and mouth. But still more blessed is it if the three be gathered together in the name of Jesus that this may be fulfilled, “May God sanctify you wholly, and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” (1Th_5:23) But some one may inquire with regard to the concord of spirit and body spoken of, if it is possible for these to be at concord without the third being so, – I mean the soul – and whether it does not follow from the concord of these on the earth after the two have been gathered together in the name of Christ, that the three also are already gathered together in His name, in the midst of whom comes the Son of God as all are dedicated to Him, – I mean the three, – and no one is opposed to Him, there being no antagonism not only on the part of the spirit, but not even of the soul, nor further of the body.

 

4. Harmony of the Old and New Covenants.

And likewise it is a pleasant thing to endeavour to understand and exhibit the fact of the concord of the two covenants, – of the one before the bodily advent of the Saviour and of the new covenant; for among those things in which the two covenants are at concord so that there is no discord between them would be found prayers, to the effect that about anything whatever they shall ask it shall be done to them from the Father in heaven. And if also you desire the third that unites the two, do not hesitate to say that it is the Holy Spirit, since “the words of the wise,” whether they be of those before the advent, or at the time of the advent, or after it, “are as goads, and as nails firmly fixed, which were given by agreement from one shepherd.” (Ecc_12:11) And do not let this also pass unobserved, that He did not say, where two or three are gathered together in My name, there “shall I be” in the midst of them, but “there am I,” (Mat_18:20) not going to be, not delaying, but at the very moment of the concord being Himself found, and being in the midst of them.

 

5. The Limit of Forgiveness.

“Then came Peter and said unto Him, Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me and I forgive him?” (Mat_18:21) The conception that these things were said in a simple sense by Peter, as if he were inquiring whether he was to forgive his brother when he sinned against him seven times, but no longer if he sinned an eighth time, and by the Saviour, as if He thought that one should sit still and reckon up the sins of his neighbours against him in order that he might forgive seventy times and seven, but that from the seventy-eighth he should not forgive the man who wronged him, seems to me altogether silly and unworthy alike of the progress which Peter had made in the company of Jesus and of the divine magnanimity of Jesus. Perhaps, then, these things also border on an obscurity akin to the words, “Hear My voice, ye wives of Lamech,” (Gen_4:23 etc.) If any one has already become a friend of Jesus so as to be taught by His spirit which illumines the reason of him who has advanced so far according to his desert, he might know the true meaning, therefore, in regard to these things, and such as Jesus Himself would have clearly expounded it; but we who fall short of the greatness of the friendship of Jesus must be content if we can babble a little about the passage. The number six, then, appears to be working and toilsome, but the number seven to contain the idea of repose. And consider if you can say that he, who loves the world and works the things of the world, and does those things which are material, sins six times, and that the number seven is the end of sin in his case, so that Peter with some such thought in his mind wished to pardon seven sins of those which his brother had committed against him. But since as units the tens and the hundreds have a certain common measure of proportion to the number which is in units, and Jesus knew that the number might be exceeded, on this account, I think, that He added to the number seven also the seventy, (Mat_18:22) and said that there ought to be forgiveness to brethren here, and to them who have sinned in respect to things here. But if any one going beyond the things about the world and this age were to commit sin, even if it were trifling, he could not longer reasonably have forgiveness of sins; for forgiveness extends to the things here, and in relation to the sins committed here, whether the forgiveness comes late or soon; but there is no forgiveness, not even to a brother, who has sinned beyond the seven and seventy times. But you might say that he who has sinned in such wise, whether as against Peter his brother, or as against Peter, against whom the gates of Hades do not prevail, is by sins of this kind in the smaller number of the sin, but according to sins still worse is in the number which has no forgiveness of sins.

 

6. Concerning the King Who Made a Reckoning with His Own Servants, to Whom Was Brought a Man Who Owed Ten Thousand Talents.

“Therefore I say unto you the kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king, who wished to make a reckoning with his own servants.” (Mat_18:23) The general conception of the parable is to teach us that we should be inclined to forgive the sins committed against us by those who have wronged us, and especially if after the wrongdoing he who has done it supplicates him who has been wronged, asking forgiveness for the sins which he has committed against him. And this the parable wishes to teach us by representing that even when forgiveness has been granted by God to us of the sins in respect of which we have received remission, exaction will be demanded even after the remission, unless we forgive the sins of those who have wronged us, so that there is no longer left in us the least remembrance of the wrong that was done, but the whole heart, assisted by the spirit of forgetfulness of wrongs, which is no common virtue, forgives him who has wronged us those things which have been wickedly done against any of us by him, even treacherously. But next to the general conception of the parable, it is right to examine the whole of it more simply according to the letter, so that he who advances with care to the right investigation of each detail of the things previously written may derive profit from the examination of what is said. Now there is, as is probable, an interpretation, transcendental and hard to trace, as it is somewhat mystical, according to which, after the analogy of the parables which are interpreted by the Evangelists, one would investigate each of the details in this; as, for example, who the king was, and who the servants were, and what was the beginning of his making a reckoning, and who was the one debtor who owed many talents, and who was his wife and who his children, and what were the “all things” spoken of besides those which the king ordered to be sold in order that the debt might be paid out of his belongings, and what was meant by the going out of the man who had been forgiven the many talents, and who was the one of the servants who was found and was a debtor not to the householder, but to the man who had been forgiven, and what is meant by the number of the hundred pence, and what by the word, “He took him by the throat saying, Pay what thou owest,” and what is the prison into which he who had been forgiven all the talents went out and cast his fellow-servant, and who were the fellow-servants who were grieved and told the lord all that had been done, and who were the tormentors to whom he who had cast his fellow-servant into prison was delivered, and how he who was delivered to the tormentors paid all that was due, so that he no longer owed anything. (Mat_18:23-24) But it is probable also that some other things could be added to the number by a more competent investigator, the exposition and interpretation of which I think to be beyond the power of man, and requiring the Spirit of Christ who spoke them in order that Christ may be understood as He spoke; for as “no one among men knows the things of the man, save the spirit which is in him,” and “no one knows the things of God, save the Spirit of God,” (1Co_2:11) so no one knows after God the things spoken by Christ in proverbs and parables save the Spirit of Christ, in which he who participates in Christ not only so far as He is Spirit, but in Christ as He is Wisdom, as He is Word, would behold the things which were revealed to him in this passage. But with regard to the interpretation of the loftiest type, we make no profession; nor on the other hand with the assistance of Christ who is the Wisdom of God do we despair of apprehending the things signified in the parable; but whether it shall be the case that such things shall be dictated to us in connection with this Scripture or not, may God in Christ suggest the doing of that which is pleasing to Him, if only there be granted to us also concerning these things, the word of wisdom which is given from God through the Spirit, and the word of knowledge which is supplied according to the Spirit. (1Co_12:8)

 

7. Exposition Continued: the King and the Servants.

“The kingdom of heaven,” He says, “is likened,” (Mat_18:23 etc). But if it be likened to such a king, and one who has done such things, who must we say that it is but the Son of God? For He is the King of the heavens, and as He is absolute Wisdom and absolute Righteousness and absolute Truth, is He not so also absolute Kingdom? But it is not a kingdom of any of those below, nor of a part of those above, but of all the things above, which were called heavens. But if you enquire into the meaning of the words, “Theirs is the kingdom of heaven,” (Mat_5:3) you may say that Christ is theirs in so far as He is absolute Kingdom, reigning in every thought of the man who is no longer under the reign of sin which reigns in the mortal body of those who have subjected themselves to it. (Rom_6:12) And if I say, reigning in every thought, I mean something like this, reigning as Righteousness and Wisdom and Truth and the rest of the virtues in him who has become a heaven, because of bearing the image of the heavenly, and in every power, whether angelic, or the rest that are named saints, not only in this age, but also in that which is to come, and who are worthy of a kingdom of such a kind. Accordingly this kingdom of heaven when it was made “in the likeness of sinful flesh,” (Rom_8:3) that for sin it might condemn sin, when God made “Him who knew no sin to be sin on behalf of us,” (2Co_5:21) who bear the body of our sin, is likened to a certain king who is understood in relation to Jesus being united to Him, if we may dare so to speak, having more capacity towards being united and becoming entirely one with the “First-born of all creation,” (Col_1:15) than he, who, being joined to the Lord, becomes one spirit with Him. (1Co_6:17) Now of this kingdom of the heavens which is likened unto a certain king, according to the conception of Jesus, and is united to Him, it is said by anticipation that he wished to make a reckoning with his servants. But he is about to make a reckoning with them in order that it may be manifested how each has employed the tried money of the householder and his rational coins. And the image in the parables was indeed taken from masters who made a reckoning with their own servants; but we shall understand more accurately what is signified by this part of the parable, if we fix our thought on the things done by the slaves who had administered their master’s goods, and who were asked to give a reckoning concerning them. For each of them, receiving in different measure from his master’s goods, has used them either for that which was right so as to increase the goods of his master, or consumed it riotously on things which he ought not, and spent profusely without judgment and without discretion that which had been put into his hands. But there are those who have wisely administered these goods and goods so great, but have lost others, and whenever they give the reckoning when the master makes a reckoning with them, there is gathered together how much loss each has incurred, and there is reckoned up how much gain each has brought, and according to the worthiness of the way in which he has administered it, he is either honoured or punished, or in some cases the debt is forgiven, but in others the talents are taken away. Well, then, from what has been said, let us first look at the rational coins and the tried money of the householder, of which one receives more and another less, for according to the ability of each, to one are given five talents as he has the ability to administer so many, but to another two as not being able to receive the amount of the man before him, and to another one as being also inferior to the second. (Mat_25:15) Are these, then, the only differences, or are we to recognize these differences in the case of certain persons of whom the Gospel goes on to speak while there are also others besides these: In other parables also are found certain persons, as the two debtors, the one who owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty; (Luk_7:41) but whether these had been entrusted with them and had administered them badly as being inferior in ability to him who had been entrusted with a talent, or had received them, we have not learned; but that they owed so much, we seem to be taught from the parable. And there are found other ten servants who were each entrusted with a pound separately. (Luk_19:13) And if any one understood the varied character of the human soul and the wide differences from each other in respect of natural aptitude, or want of aptitude for more or fewer of the virtues, and for these virtues or for those, perhaps he would comprehend how each soul has come with certain coins of the householder which come to light with the full attainment of reason, and with the attention which follows the full attainment of reason, and with exercise in things that are right, or with diligence and exercise in other things, whether they be useful as pursuits, or in part useful and in part not useful, such as the opinions which are not wholly true nor wholly false.

 

8. The Principle of the Reckoning.

But you will here inquire whether all men can be called servants of the king, or some are servants whom he foreknew and fore-ordained, while there are others who transact business with the servants, and are called bankers. (Mat_25:27) And in like manner you will inquire if there are those outside the number of the slaves from whom the householder declares that he will exact his own with usury, not only men alien from piety, but also some of the believers. Now the servants alone are the stewards of the Word, but the king, making a reckoning with the servants, demands from those who have borrowed from the servants, whether a hundred measures of wheat or a hundred measures of oil, (Luk_16:6, Luk_16:7) or whatever in point of fact those who are outside of the household of the king have received; for he who owed the hundred measures of wheat or the hundred measures of oil is not found to be, according to the parable, a fellow-servant of the unjust steward, as is evident from the question – how much owest thou to my lord? (Luk_16:5) But mark with me that each deed which is good or seemly is like a gain and an increment, but a wicked deed is like a loss; and as there is a certain gain when the money is greater and another when it is less, and as there are differences of more or less, so according to the good deeds, there is as it were a valuing of gains more or less. To reckon what work is a great gain, and what a less gain, and what a least, is the prerogative of him who alone knows to investigate such things, looking at them in the light of the disposition, and the word, and the deed, and from consideration of the things which are not in our power cooperating with those that are; and so also in the case of things opposite, it is his to say what sin, when a reckoning is made with the servants, is found to be a great loss, and what is less, and what, if we may so call it, is the loss of the very last mite, (Luk_12:59) or the last farthing. (Mat_5:26) The account, therefore, of the entire and whole life is exacted by that which is called the kingdom of heaven which is likened to a king, when “we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ that each one may receive the things done in the body according to what he hath done, whether good or bad;” (2Co_5:10) and then when the reckoning is being made, shall there be brought into the reckoning that is made also every idle word that men shall speak, (Mat_12:36) and Guy cup of cold water only which one has given to drink in the name of a disciple. (Mat_10:42)

 

9. The Time Occupied by the Reckoning.

And these things will take place whenever that happens which is written in Daniel, “The books were opened and the judgment was set;” (Dan_7:10) for a record, as it were, is made of all things that have been spoken and done and thought, and by divine power every hidden thing of ours shall be manifested, and everything that is covered shall be revealed, (Mat_10:26; Luk_12:2) in order that when any one is found who has not “given diligence to be freed from the adversary,” he may go in succession through the hands of the magistrate, and the judge, and the attendant into the prison, until he pays the very last mite; (Luk_12:58, Luk_12:59) but when one has given diligence to be freed from him and owes nothing to any one, and already has made the pound ten pounds or five pounds, or doubled the five talents, or made the two four, he may obtain the due recompense, entering into the joy of his Lord, either being set over all His possessions, (Mat_24:47) or hearing the word, “Have thou authority over ten cities,” (Luk_19:17) or “Have thou authority over five cities.”61 But we think that these things are spoken of as if they required a long period of time, in order that an account may be made by us of the whole times of the earthly life, so that we might suppose that when the king makes a reckoning with each one of his many servants the matter would require so vast a period of time, until these things come to an end which have existed from the beginning of the world down to the consummation of the age, not of one age, but of many ages. But the truth is not so; for when God wished all at once to rekindle in the memories of all everything that had been done by each one throughout the whole time, in order that each might become conscious of his own doings whether good or bad, He would do it by His ineffable power. For it is not with God as with us; for if we wish to call some things to remembrance, we require sufficient time for the detailed account of what has been said by us, and to bring to our remembrance the things which we wish to remember; but if He wished to call to our memory the things which have been done in this life, in order that becoming conscious of what we have done we may apprehend for what we are punished or honoured, He could do so. But if any one disbelieves the swiftness of the power of God in regard to these matters, he has not yet had a true conception of the God who made the universe, who did not require times to make the vast creation of heaven and earth and the things in them; for, though He may seem to have made these things in six days, there is need of understanding to comprehend in what sense the words “in six days” are said, on account of this, “This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth,” (Gal_2:4 etc). Therefore it may be boldly affirmed that the season of the expected judgment does not require times, but as the resurrection is said to take place “in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye,” (1Co_15:52) so I think will the judgment also be.

 

10. The Man Who Owed Many Talents.

Next we must speak in regard to this, “And when he had begun to reckon, there was brought unto him one which owed many talents.” (Mat_18:24) The sense of this appears to me to be as follows: The season of beginning the judgment is with the house of God, who says, as also it is written in Ezekiel, to those who are appointed to attend to punishments, “Begin ye with My saints;” (Eze_9:6) and it is like “the twinkling of an eye;” but, the time of making a reckoning includes the same “twinkling,” ideally apprehended, for we are not forgetful of what has been previously said of those who owe more. Wherefore it is not written, when he was making reckoning, but it is said, “When he began to reckon,” there was brought, at the beginning of his making a reckoning, one who owed many talents; he had lost tens of thousands of talents, having been entrusted with great things, and having had many things committed to his care, but he had brought no gain to his master, but had lost tens of thousands so that he owed many talents; and, perhaps on this account, he owed many talents, seeing that he followed often the woman, who was sitting upon the talent of lead, whose name is wickedness. (Zec_5:7, Zec_5:8) But observe here that every great sin is a loss of the talents of the master of the house, and such sins are committed by fornicators, adulterers, abusers of themselves with men, effeminate, idolaters, murderers. Perhaps then the one who is brought to the king owing many talents has committed no small sin but all that are great and heinous; and if you were to seek for him among men, perhaps you would find him to be “the man of sin, the son of perdition, he that opposeth and exalteth himself against every God or object of worship;” (2Th_2:3, 2Th_2:4) but if yon seek him outside the number of men, who can this be but the devil who has ruined so many who received him, who wrought sin in them. For “man is a great thing, and a pitiful man is precious,” (Pro_20:6) precious so as to be worthy of a talent, whether of gold like as the lamp which was equal to a talent of gold, (Exo_25:39) or of silver or of any kind of material whatsoever understood intellectually, the symbols of which are recorded in the Words of the Days, (1Ch_22:14) when David became enriched with many talents of which the number is mentioned, so many talents of gold, and so many of silver, and of the rest of the material there named, from which the temple of God was built.

 

11. The Servant Who Owed a Hundred Pence.

Only, though he cannot pay the talents, for he has lost them, he has a wife and children and other things, of which it is written, “All that he has.” (Mat_18:25) And it was possible that when he had been sold along with his own, he would have prospered if some one had bought him, and, by his worth and the things that were his, have paid the whole debt in full; and it was possible that he might no longer be the servant of the king, but become that of his purchaser. And he makes a request that he be not sold along with his own, but may continue to abide in the house of the king; wherefore he fell down and worshipped him, knowing that the king was God, and said, “Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all;” (Mat_18:26) for he was, as is probable, an active man, who knew that he could by a second course of action fill up the whole deficiency of the former loss of many talents. And this truly good king was moved with compassion for the man who owed him many talents and then released him, having bestowed upon him a favour greater than the request which had been made; for the debtor promised to the long-suffering master to pay all his debts, but the Lord moved with compassion for him did not merely forgive him with the idea of receiving his own back as a result of his patience, but even entirely released him and forgave him the whole debt. But this wicked servant, who had besought his master to have patience for his many talents, acted without mercy, for, having found one of his fellow-servants which owed him a hundred pence, he laid hold on him and took him by the throat, saying, “Pay if thou owest.” (Mat_18:28) And did he not exhibit the very excess of wickedness who laid hold of his fellow-servant for a hundred pence, and took him by the throat and deprived him of freedom to breathe, when he himself, for the many talents, had neither been laid hold of, nor seized by the throat, but at first was ordered to be sold along with his wife and children and all that was his own; but afterwards, when he had worshipped him, the master was moved with compassion for him, and he was released and forgiven in regard to the whole of the debt. But it were indeed a hard task to tell according to the conception of Jesus who is the one fellow-servant who was found to be owing a hundred pence, not to his own lord, but to him who owed many talents, and who are the fellow-servants who saw the one taking by the throat, and the other taken, and were exceedingly sorry, and represented clearly unto their own lord all that had been done. But what the truth in these matters is, I declare that no one can interpret unless Jesus, who explained all things to His own disciples privately, takes up His abode in his reason, and opens up all the treasures in the parable which are dark, hidden, unseen, and confirms by clear demonstrations the man whom He desires to illumine with the light of the knowledge of the things that are in this parable, that he may at once represent who is brought to the king as the debtor of many talents, and who is the other one who owes to him a hundred pence, etc.; whether he can be the man of sin previously mentioned, (2Th_2:3) or the devil, or neither of these, but some other, whether a man, or some one of these under the sway of the devil; for it is a work of the wisdom of God to exhibit the things have have been prophesied concerning those who are in themselves of a certain nature, or have been made according to such and such qualities, whether among visible powers or also among some men, in whatever way they may have been written by the Holy Spirit. But as we have not yet received the competent mind which is able to be blended with the mind of Christ, and which is capable of attaining to things so great, and which is able with the Spirit to “search all things, even the deep things of God,” (1Co_2:10) we, forming an impression still indefinitely with regard to the matters in this passage, are of opinion that the wicked servant indicated by the parable who is here represented in regard to the debt of many talents, refers to some definite one.

 

12. The Time of the Reckoning.

But it is fitting to examine at what time the man – the king – in the parable wished to make a reckoning with his own servants, and to what period we ought to refer the things that are said. For if it be after the consummation, or at it at the time of the expected judgment, how are we to maintain the things about him who owed a hundred pence, and was taken by the throat by the man who had been forgiven the many talents? But if, before the judgment, how can we explain the reckoning that was made before this by the king, with his own servants? But we ought to think in a general way about every parable, the interpretation of which has not been recorded by the evangelists, even though Jesus explained all things to His own disciples privately; (Mar_4:34) and for this reason the writers of the Gospels have concealed the clear exposition of the parables, because the things signified by them were beyond the power of the nature of words to express, and every solution and exposition of such parables was of such a kind that not even the whole world itself could contain the books that should be written (Joh_21:25) in relation to such parables. But it may happen that a fitting heart be found, and, because of its purity, able to receive the letters of the exposition of the parable, so that they could be written in it by the Spirit of the living God. But some one will say that, perhaps, we act with impiety, who, because of the secret and mystical import of some of the Scriptures which are of heavenly origin, wish them to be symbolic, and endeavour to expound them, even though it might seem ex hypothesi that we had an accurate knowledge of their meaning. But to this we must say that, if there be those who have obtained the gift of accurate apprehension of these things, they know what they ought to do; but as for us, who acknowledge that we fall short of the ability to see into the depth of the things here signified, even though we obtain a somewhat crass perception of the things in the passage, we will say, that some of the things which we seem to find after much examination and inquiry, whether by the grace of God, or by the power of our own mind, we do not venture to commit to writing; but some things, for the sake of our own intellectual discipline, and that of those who may chance to read them, we will to some extent set forth. But let these things, then, be said by way of apology, because of the depth of the parable; but, with regard to the question at what time the man – the king – in the parable wished to make a reckoning with his own servants, we will say that it seems that this takes place about the time of the judgment which had been proclaimed. And this is confirmed by two parables, one at the close of the Gospel before us, (Mat_25:14-30) and one from the Gospel according to Luke. (Luk_19:12-27) And not to prolong the discussion by quoting the very letter, as any one who wishes can take it from the Scripture himself, we will say that the parable according to Matthew declares, “For it is as when a man going into another country called his own servants, and delivered unto them his own goods, and to one he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one talent;” (Mat_25:14, Mat_25:15) then they took action with regard to that which had been entrusted to them, and, after a long time, the lord of those servants cometh, and it is written in the very words, that he also makes a reckoning with them. (Mat_15:19) And compare the words, “And when he began to make a reckoning,” (Mat_18:24) and consider that he called the going of the householder into another country the time at which “we are at home in the body but absent from the Lord;” (2Co_5:6) but his advent, when, “after a long time the lord of those servants cometh,” (Mat_25:19) the time at the consummation in the judgment; for after a long time the lord of those servants cometh and makes a reckoning with them, and those things which follow take place. But the parable in Luke represents with more clearness, that “a certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return,” and when going, “he called ten servants, and gave to them ten pounds, and said unto them, Trade ye till I come.” (Luk_19:12, Luk_19:13) But the nobleman, being hated by his own citizens, who sent an ambassage after him, as they did not wish him to reign over them, came back again, having received the kingdom, and told the servants to whom he had given the money to be called to himself that he might know what they had gained by trading. And, seeing what they had done, to him who had made the one pound ten pounds, rendering praise in the words, “Well done, thou good servant, because thou wast found faithful in a very little,” (Luk_19:17) he gives to him authority over ten cities, to-wit, those which were under his kingdom. And to another, who had multiplied the pound fivefold, he did not render the praise which he assigned to the first, nor did he specify the word “authority,” as in the case of the first, but said to him, “Be thou also over five cities.”62 But to him who had tied up the pound in a napkin, he said, “Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee, thou wicked servant;” (Luk_19:22) and he said to them that stood by. Take from him the pound, and give it unto him that hath the ten pounds (Luk_19:24) Who, then, in regard to this parable, will not say that the nobleman, who goes into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom and to return, is Christ, going, as it were, into another country to receive the kingdoms of this world, and the things in it? And those who have received the ten talents are those who have been entrusted with the dispensation of the Word which has been committed unto them. And His citizens who did not wish Him to reign over them when He was a citizen in the world in respect of His incarnation, (Luk_19:14) are perhaps Israel who disbelieved Him, and perhaps also the Gentiles who disbelieved Him.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

58 συπφωνήσωσιν.

59 Pro_19:14, ἁρπόζεται.

60 Or reading χωρίζει, following the Vetus Inter, keeps apart.

61 Luk_19:19. In chap. 12 Origen reads: Be thou also over five cities – as W. & H., and comments on the difference of the reward. The mss. are therefore in error here.

62 Luk_19:19. Origen reads: Be thou also over five cities – as W. & H., and comments on the difference of the reward. The mss. are therefore in error here.



Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew; Book 14, Part 2

Commentaries of Origen (Cont.)

Book XIV.

1. The Power of Harmony in Relation to Prayer.

“Again I say unto you that if two of you shall agree58 on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them.” (Mat_18:19) The word symphony is strictly applied to the harmonies of sounds in music. And there are indeed among musical sounds some accordant and others discordant. But the Evangelic Scripture is familiar with the name as applied to musical matters in the passage, “He heard a symphony and dancing.” (Luk_15:25) For it was fitting that when the son who had been lost and found came by penitence into concord with his father a symphony should be heard on the occasion of the joyous mirth of the house. But the wicked Laban was not acquainted with the word symphony in his saying to Jacob, “And if thou hadst told me I would have sent thee away with mirth and with music and with drums and a harp.” (Gen_31:27) But akin to the symphony of this nature is that which is written in the second Book of Kings when “the brethren of Aminadab went before the ark, and David and his son played before the Lord on instruments artistically fitted with might and with songs;” (2Sa_6:4, 2Sa_6:5) for the instruments thus fitted with might and with songs, had in themselves the musical symphony which is so powerful that when two only, bring along with the symphony which has relation to the music that is divine and spiritual, a request to the Father in heaven about anything whatsoever, the Father grants the request to those who ask along with the symphony on earth, – which is most miraculous, – those things which those who have made the symphony spoken of may have asked. So also I understand the apostolic saying “Defraud ye not one the other except it be by agreement for a season that ye may give yourselves unto prayer.” (1Co_7:5) For since the word harmony is applied to those who marry according to God in the passage from Proverbs which is as follows: “Fathers will divide their house and substance to their sons, but from God the woman is married to the man,”59 it is a logical consequence of the harmony being from God, that the name and the deed should enjoy the agreement with a view to prayer, as is indicated in the word, “unless it be by agreement.” (1Co_7:5) Then the Word repeating that the agreeing of two on the earth is the same thing as the agreeing with Christ, adds, “For where two or three are gathered together in My name.” (Mat_18:20) Therefore the two or three who are gathered together in the name of Christ are those who are in agreement on earth, not two only but sometimes also three. But he who has the power will consider whether this agreement and a congregation of this sort in the midst of which Christ is, can be found in more, since “narrow and straightened is the way that leadeth unto life, and few be they that find it.” (Mat_7:14) But perhaps also not even few but two or three make a symphony as Peter and James and John, to whom as making a symphony the Word of God showed His own glory. But two made a symphony, Paul and Sosthenes, when writing the first Epistle to the Corinthians; (1Co_1:1) and after this Paul and Timothy when sending the second Epistle to the same. (2Co_1:1) And even three made a symphony when Paul and Silvanus and Timothy gave instruction by letter to the Thessalonians. (1Th_1:1) But if it be necessary also from the ancient Scriptures to bring forward the three who made a symphony on earth, so that the Word was in the midst of them making them one, attend to the superscription of the Psalms, as for example to that of the forty-first, which is as follows: “Unto the end, unto understanding, for the sons of Korah.” (Psa_42:1-11) For though there were three sons of Korah whose names we find in the Book of Exodus, (Exo_6:24) Aser, which is, by interpretation, “instruction,” and the second Elkana, which is translated, “possession of God,” and the third Abiasaph, which in the Greek tongue might be rendered, “congregation of the father,” yet the prophecies were not divided but were both spoken and written by one spirit, and one voice, and one soul, which wrought with true harmony, and the three speak as one, “As the heart panteth after the springs of the water, so panteth my soul alter thee, O God.” (Psa_42:1) But also they say in the plural in the forty-fourth Psalm, “O God, we have heard with our ears.” (Psa_44:1) But if you wish still further to see those who are making symphony on earth look to those who heard the exhortation, “that ye may be perfected together in the same mind and in the same judgment.” (1Co_1:10) and who strove after the goal, “the soul and the heart of all the believers were one.” (Act_4:32) who have become such, if it be possible for such a condition to be found in more than two or three, that there is no discord between them, just as there is no discord between the strings of the ten-stringed psaltery with each other. But they were not in symphony in earth who said, “I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ,” (1Co_1:12) but there were schisms among them, upon the dissolution of which they were gathered together in company with the spirit in Paul, with the power of the Lord Jesus Christ, (1Co_5:4) that they might no longer “bite and devour one another so that they were consumed by one another;” (Gal_5:15) for discord consumes, as concord brings together, and admits60 the Son of God who comes in the midst of those who have become at concord. And strictly, indeed, concord takes place in two things generic, through the perfecting together, as the Apostle has called it, of the same mind by an intellectual grasp of the same opinions, and through the perfecting together of the same judgment, by a like way of living. But if whenever two of us agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of the Father of Jesus who is in heaven, (Mat_18:19) plainly when this is not done for them of the Father in heaven as touching anything that they shall ask, there the two have not been in agreement on earth; and this is the cause why we are not heard when we pray, that we do not agree with one another on earth, neither in opinions nor in life. But further also if we are the body of Christ and God hath set the members each one of them in the body that the members may have the same care one for another, and may agree with one another, and when one member suffers, all the members suffer with it, and if one be glorified, they rejoice with it, (1Co_12:18, 1Co_12:25, 1Co_12:26) we ought to practise the symphony which springs from the divine music, that when we are gathered together in the name of Christ, He may be in the midst of us, the Word of God, and the Wisdom of God, and His Power. (1Co_1:2, 1Co_1:4)

 

2. The Harmony of Husband and Wife.

So much then for the more common understanding of the two or three whom the Word exhorts to be in agreement. But now let us also touch upon another interpretation which was uttered by some one of our predecessors, exhorting those who were married to sanctity and purity; for by the two, he says, whom the Word desires to agree on earth, we must understand the husband and wife, who by agreement defraud each other of bodily intercourse that they may give themselves unto prayer; (1Co_7:5) when if they pray for anything whatever that they shall ask, they shall receive it, the request being granted to them by the Father in heaven of Jesus Christ on the ground of such agreement. And this interpretation does not appear to me to cause dissolution of marriage, but to be an incitement to agreement, so that if the one wished to be pure, but the other did not desire it, and on this account he who willed and was able to fulfil the better part, condescended to the one who had not the power or the will, they would not both have the accomplishment from the Father in heaven of Jesus Christ, of anything whatever that they might ask.

 

3. The Harmony of Body, Soul, and Spirit.

And next to this about the married, I am familiar also with another interpretation of the agreement between the two which is as follows. In the wicked, sin reigns over the soul, being settled as on its own throne in this mortal body, so that the soul obeys the lusts thereof; (Rom_6:12) but in the case of those, who have stirred up the sin which formerly reigned over the body as from a throne and who are in conflict with it, “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh;” (Gal_5:17) but in the case of those who have now become perfected, the spirit has gained the mastery and put to death the deeds of the body, and imparts to the body of its own life, so that already this is fulfilled, “He shall quicken also your mortal bodies because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you;” (Rom_8:11) and there arises a concord of the two, body and spirit, on the earth, on the successful accomplishment of which there is sent up a harmonious prayer also of him who “with the heart believes unto righteousness, but with the mouth maketh confession unto salvation.” (Rom_10:10) so that the heart is no longer far from God, and along with this the righteous man draws nigh to God with his own lips and mouth. But still more blessed is it if the three be gathered together in the name of Jesus that this may be fulfilled, “May God sanctify you wholly, and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” (1Th_5:23) But some one may inquire with regard to the concord of spirit and body spoken of, if it is possible for these to be at concord without the third being so, – I mean the soul – and whether it does not follow from the concord of these on the earth after the two have been gathered together in the name of Christ, that the three also are already gathered together in His name, in the midst of whom comes the Son of God as all are dedicated to Him, – I mean the three, – and no one is opposed to Him, there being no antagonism not only on the part of the spirit, but not even of the soul, nor further of the body.

 

4. Harmony of the Old and New Covenants.

And likewise it is a pleasant thing to endeavour to understand and exhibit the fact of the concord of the two covenants, – of the one before the bodily advent of the Saviour and of the new covenant; for among those things in which the two covenants are at concord so that there is no discord between them would be found prayers, to the effect that about anything whatever they shall ask it shall be done to them from the Father in heaven. And if also you desire the third that unites the two, do not hesitate to say that it is the Holy Spirit, since “the words of the wise,” whether they be of those before the advent, or at the time of the advent, or after it, “are as goads, and as nails firmly fixed, which were given by agreement from one shepherd.” (Ecc_12:11) And do not let this also pass unobserved, that He did not say, where two or three are gathered together in My name, there “shall I be” in the midst of them, but “there am I,” (Mat_18:20) not going to be, not delaying, but at the very moment of the concord being Himself found, and being in the midst of them.

 

5. The Limit of Forgiveness.

“Then came Peter and said unto Him, Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me and I forgive him?” (Mat_18:21) The conception that these things were said in a simple sense by Peter, as if he were inquiring whether he was to forgive his brother when he sinned against him seven times, but no longer if he sinned an eighth time, and by the Saviour, as if He thought that one should sit still and reckon up the sins of his neighbours against him in order that he might forgive seventy times and seven, but that from the seventy-eighth he should not forgive the man who wronged him, seems to me altogether silly and unworthy alike of the progress which Peter had made in the company of Jesus and of the divine magnanimity of Jesus. Perhaps, then, these things also border on an obscurity akin to the words, “Hear My voice, ye wives of Lamech,” (Gen_4:23 etc.) If any one has already become a friend of Jesus so as to be taught by His spirit which illumines the reason of him who has advanced so far according to his desert, he might know the true meaning, therefore, in regard to these things, and such as Jesus Himself would have clearly expounded it; but we who fall short of the greatness of the friendship of Jesus must be content if we can babble a little about the passage. The number six, then, appears to be working and toilsome, but the number seven to contain the idea of repose. And consider if you can say that he, who loves the world and works the things of the world, and does those things which are material, sins six times, and that the number seven is the end of sin in his case, so that Peter with some such thought in his mind wished to pardon seven sins of those which his brother had committed against him. But since as units the tens and the hundreds have a certain common measure of proportion to the number which is in units, and Jesus knew that the number might be exceeded, on this account, I think, that He added to the number seven also the seventy, (Mat_18:22) and said that there ought to be forgiveness to brethren here, and to them who have sinned in respect to things here. But if any one going beyond the things about the world and this age were to commit sin, even if it were trifling, he could not longer reasonably have forgiveness of sins; for forgiveness extends to the things here, and in relation to the sins committed here, whether the forgiveness comes late or soon; but there is no forgiveness, not even to a brother, who has sinned beyond the seven and seventy times. But you might say that he who has sinned in such wise, whether as against Peter his brother, or as against Peter, against whom the gates of Hades do not prevail, is by sins of this kind in the smaller number of the sin, but according to sins still worse is in the number which has no forgiveness of sins.

 

6. Concerning the King Who Made a Reckoning with His Own Servants, to Whom Was Brought a Man Who Owed Ten Thousand Talents.

“Therefore I say unto you the kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king, who wished to make a reckoning with his own servants.” (Mat_18:23) The general conception of the parable is to teach us that we should be inclined to forgive the sins committed against us by those who have wronged us, and especially if after the wrongdoing he who has done it supplicates him who has been wronged, asking forgiveness for the sins which he has committed against him. And this the parable wishes to teach us by representing that even when forgiveness has been granted by God to us of the sins in respect of which we have received remission, exaction will be demanded even after the remission, unless we forgive the sins of those who have wronged us, so that there is no longer left in us the least remembrance of the wrong that was done, but the whole heart, assisted by the spirit of forgetfulness of wrongs, which is no common virtue, forgives him who has wronged us those things which have been wickedly done against any of us by him, even treacherously. But next to the general conception of the parable, it is right to examine the whole of it more simply according to the letter, so that he who advances with care to the right investigation of each detail of the things previously written may derive profit from the examination of what is said. Now there is, as is probable, an interpretation, transcendental and hard to trace, as it is somewhat mystical, according to which, after the analogy of the parables which are interpreted by the Evangelists, one would investigate each of the details in this; as, for example, who the king was, and who the servants were, and what was the beginning of his making a reckoning, and who was the one debtor who owed many talents, and who was his wife and who his children, and what were the “all things” spoken of besides those which the king ordered to be sold in order that the debt might be paid out of his belongings, and what was meant by the going out of the man who had been forgiven the many talents, and who was the one of the servants who was found and was a debtor not to the householder, but to the man who had been forgiven, and what is meant by the number of the hundred pence, and what by the word, “He took him by the throat saying, Pay what thou owest,” and what is the prison into which he who had been forgiven all the talents went out and cast his fellow-servant, and who were the fellow-servants who were grieved and told the lord all that had been done, and who were the tormentors to whom he who had cast his fellow-servant into prison was delivered, and how he who was delivered to the tormentors paid all that was due, so that he no longer owed anything. (Mat_18:23-24) But it is probable also that some other things could be added to the number by a more competent investigator, the exposition and interpretation of which I think to be beyond the power of man, and requiring the Spirit of Christ who spoke them in order that Christ may be understood as He spoke; for as “no one among men knows the things of the man, save the spirit which is in him,” and “no one knows the things of God, save the Spirit of God,” (1Co_2:11) so no one knows after God the things spoken by Christ in proverbs and parables save the Spirit of Christ, in which he who participates in Christ not only so far as He is Spirit, but in Christ as He is Wisdom, as He is Word, would behold the things which were revealed to him in this passage. But with regard to the interpretation of the loftiest type, we make no profession; nor on the other hand with the assistance of Christ who is the Wisdom of God do we despair of apprehending the things signified in the parable; but whether it shall be the case that such things shall be dictated to us in connection with this Scripture or not, may God in Christ suggest the doing of that which is pleasing to Him, if only there be granted to us also concerning these things, the word of wisdom which is given from God through the Spirit, and the word of knowledge which is supplied according to the Spirit. (1Co_12:8)

 

7. Exposition Continued: the King and the Servants.

“The kingdom of heaven,” He says, “is likened,” (Mat_18:23 etc). But if it be likened to such a king, and one who has done such things, who must we say that it is but the Son of God? For He is the King of the heavens, and as He is absolute Wisdom and absolute Righteousness and absolute Truth, is He not so also absolute Kingdom? But it is not a kingdom of any of those below, nor of a part of those above, but of all the things above, which were called heavens. But if you enquire into the meaning of the words, “Theirs is the kingdom of heaven,” (Mat_5:3) you may say that Christ is theirs in so far as He is absolute Kingdom, reigning in every thought of the man who is no longer under the reign of sin which reigns in the mortal body of those who have subjected themselves to it. (Rom_6:12) And if I say, reigning in every thought, I mean something like this, reigning as Righteousness and Wisdom and Truth and the rest of the virtues in him who has become a heaven, because of bearing the image of the heavenly, and in every power, whether angelic, or the rest that are named saints, not only in this age, but also in that which is to come, and who are worthy of a kingdom of such a kind. Accordingly this kingdom of heaven when it was made “in the likeness of sinful flesh,” (Rom_8:3) that for sin it might condemn sin, when God made “Him who knew no sin to be sin on behalf of us,” (2Co_5:21) who bear the body of our sin, is likened to a certain king who is understood in relation to Jesus being united to Him, if we may dare so to speak, having more capacity towards being united and becoming entirely one with the “First-born of all creation,” (Col_1:15) than he, who, being joined to the Lord, becomes one spirit with Him. (1Co_6:17) Now of this kingdom of the heavens which is likened unto a certain king, according to the conception of Jesus, and is united to Him, it is said by anticipation that he wished to make a reckoning with his servants. But he is about to make a reckoning with them in order that it may be manifested how each has employed the tried money of the householder and his rational coins. And the image in the parables was indeed taken from masters who made a reckoning with their own servants; but we shall understand more accurately what is signified by this part of the parable, if we fix our thought on the things done by the slaves who had administered their master’s goods, and who were asked to give a reckoning concerning them. For each of them, receiving in different measure from his master’s goods, has used them either for that which was right so as to increase the goods of his master, or consumed it riotously on things which he ought not, and spent profusely without judgment and without discretion that which had been put into his hands. But there are those who have wisely administered these goods and goods so great, but have lost others, and whenever they give the reckoning when the master makes a reckoning with them, there is gathered together how much loss each has incurred, and there is reckoned up how much gain each has brought, and according to the worthiness of the way in which he has administered it, he is either honoured or punished, or in some cases the debt is forgiven, but in others the talents are taken away. Well, then, from what has been said, let us first look at the rational coins and the tried money of the householder, of which one receives more and another less, for according to the ability of each, to one are given five talents as he has the ability to administer so many, but to another two as not being able to receive the amount of the man before him, and to another one as being also inferior to the second. (Mat_25:15) Are these, then, the only differences, or are we to recognize these differences in the case of certain persons of whom the Gospel goes on to speak while there are also others besides these: In other parables also are found certain persons, as the two debtors, the one who owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty; (Luk_7:41) but whether these had been entrusted with them and had administered them badly as being inferior in ability to him who had been entrusted with a talent, or had received them, we have not learned; but that they owed so much, we seem to be taught from the parable. And there are found other ten servants who were each entrusted with a pound separately. (Luk_19:13) And if any one understood the varied character of the human soul and the wide differences from each other in respect of natural aptitude, or want of aptitude for more or fewer of the virtues, and for these virtues or for those, perhaps he would comprehend how each soul has come with certain coins of the householder which come to light with the full attainment of reason, and with the attention which follows the full attainment of reason, and with exercise in things that are right, or with diligence and exercise in other things, whether they be useful as pursuits, or in part useful and in part not useful, such as the opinions which are not wholly true nor wholly false.

 

8. The Principle of the Reckoning.

But you will here inquire whether all men can be called servants of the king, or some are servants whom he foreknew and fore-ordained, while there are others who transact business with the servants, and are called bankers. (Mat_25:27) And in like manner you will inquire if there are those outside the number of the slaves from whom the householder declares that he will exact his own with usury, not only men alien from piety, but also some of the believers. Now the servants alone are the stewards of the Word, but the king, making a reckoning with the servants, demands from those who have borrowed from the servants, whether a hundred measures of wheat or a hundred measures of oil, (Luk_16:6, Luk_16:7) or whatever in point of fact those who are outside of the household of the king have received; for he who owed the hundred measures of wheat or the hundred measures of oil is not found to be, according to the parable, a fellow-servant of the unjust steward, as is evident from the question – how much owest thou to my lord? (Luk_16:5) But mark with me that each deed which is good or seemly is like a gain and an increment, but a wicked deed is like a loss; and as there is a certain gain when the money is greater and another when it is less, and as there are differences of more or less, so according to the good deeds, there is as it were a valuing of gains more or less. To reckon what work is a great gain, and what a less gain, and what a least, is the prerogative of him who alone knows to investigate such things, looking at them in the light of the disposition, and the word, and the deed, and from consideration of the things which are not in our power cooperating with those that are; and so also in the case of things opposite, it is his to say what sin, when a reckoning is made with the servants, is found to be a great loss, and what is less, and what, if we may so call it, is the loss of the very last mite, (Luk_12:59) or the last farthing. (Mat_5:26) The account, therefore, of the entire and whole life is exacted by that which is called the kingdom of heaven which is likened to a king, when “we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ that each one may receive the things done in the body according to what he hath done, whether good or bad;” (2Co_5:10) and then when the reckoning is being made, shall there be brought into the reckoning that is made also every idle word that men shall speak, (Mat_12:36) and Guy cup of cold water only which one has given to drink in the name of a disciple. (Mat_10:42)

 

9. The Time Occupied by the Reckoning.

And these things will take place whenever that happens which is written in Daniel, “The books were opened and the judgment was set;” (Dan_7:10) for a record, as it were, is made of all things that have been spoken and done and thought, and by divine power every hidden thing of ours shall be manifested, and everything that is covered shall be revealed, (Mat_10:26; Luk_12:2) in order that when any one is found who has not “given diligence to be freed from the adversary,” he may go in succession through the hands of the magistrate, and the judge, and the attendant into the prison, until he pays the very last mite; (Luk_12:58, Luk_12:59) but when one has given diligence to be freed from him and owes nothing to any one, and already has made the pound ten pounds or five pounds, or doubled the five talents, or made the two four, he may obtain the due recompense, entering into the joy of his Lord, either being set over all His possessions, (Mat_24:47) or hearing the word, “Have thou authority over ten cities,” (Luk_19:17) or “Have thou authority over five cities.”61 But we think that these things are spoken of as if they required a long period of time, in order that an account may be made by us of the whole times of the earthly life, so that we might suppose that when the king makes a reckoning with each one of his many servants the matter would require so vast a period of time, until these things come to an end which have existed from the beginning of the world down to the consummation of the age, not of one age, but of many ages. But the truth is not so; for when God wished all at once to rekindle in the memories of all everything that had been done by each one throughout the whole time, in order that each might become conscious of his own doings whether good or bad, He would do it by His ineffable power. For it is not with God as with us; for if we wish to call some things to remembrance, we require sufficient time for the detailed account of what has been said by us, and to bring to our remembrance the things which we wish to remember; but if He wished to call to our memory the things which have been done in this life, in order that becoming conscious of what we have done we may apprehend for what we are punished or honoured, He could do so. But if any one disbelieves the swiftness of the power of God in regard to these matters, he has not yet had a true conception of the God who made the universe, who did not require times to make the vast creation of heaven and earth and the things in them; for, though He may seem to have made these things in six days, there is need of understanding to comprehend in what sense the words “in six days” are said, on account of this, “This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth,” (Gal_2:4 etc). Therefore it may be boldly affirmed that the season of the expected judgment does not require times, but as the resurrection is said to take place “in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye,” (1Co_15:52) so I think will the judgment also be.

 

10. The Man Who Owed Many Talents.

Next we must speak in regard to this, “And when he had begun to reckon, there was brought unto him one which owed many talents.” (Mat_18:24) The sense of this appears to me to be as follows: The season of beginning the judgment is with the house of God, who says, as also it is written in Ezekiel, to those who are appointed to attend to punishments, “Begin ye with My saints;” (Eze_9:6) and it is like “the twinkling of an eye;” but, the time of making a reckoning includes the same “twinkling,” ideally apprehended, for we are not forgetful of what has been previously said of those who owe more. Wherefore it is not written, when he was making reckoning, but it is said, “When he began to reckon,” there was brought, at the beginning of his making a reckoning, one who owed many talents; he had lost tens of thousands of talents, having been entrusted with great things, and having had many things committed to his care, but he had brought no gain to his master, but had lost tens of thousands so that he owed many talents; and, perhaps on this account, he owed many talents, seeing that he followed often the woman, who was sitting upon the talent of lead, whose name is wickedness. (Zec_5:7, Zec_5:8) But observe here that every great sin is a loss of the talents of the master of the house, and such sins are committed by fornicators, adulterers, abusers of themselves with men, effeminate, idolaters, murderers. Perhaps then the one who is brought to the king owing many talents has committed no small sin but all that are great and heinous; and if you were to seek for him among men, perhaps you would find him to be “the man of sin, the son of perdition, he that opposeth and exalteth himself against every God or object of worship;” (2Th_2:3, 2Th_2:4) but if yon seek him outside the number of men, who can this be but the devil who has ruined so many who received him, who wrought sin in them. For “man is a great thing, and a pitiful man is precious,” (Pro_20:6) precious so as to be worthy of a talent, whether of gold like as the lamp which was equal to a talent of gold, (Exo_25:39) or of silver or of any kind of material whatsoever understood intellectually, the symbols of which are recorded in the Words of the Days, (1Ch_22:14) when David became enriched with many talents of which the number is mentioned, so many talents of gold, and so many of silver, and of the rest of the material there named, from which the temple of God was built.

 

11. The Servant Who Owed a Hundred Pence.

Only, though he cannot pay the talents, for he has lost them, he has a wife and children and other things, of which it is written, “All that he has.” (Mat_18:25) And it was possible that when he had been sold along with his own, he would have prospered if some one had bought him, and, by his worth and the things that were his, have paid the whole debt in full; and it was possible that he might no longer be the servant of the king, but become that of his purchaser. And he makes a request that he be not sold along with his own, but may continue to abide in the house of the king; wherefore he fell down and worshipped him, knowing that the king was God, and said, “Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all;” (Mat_18:26) for he was, as is probable, an active man, who knew that he could by a second course of action fill up the whole deficiency of the former loss of many talents. And this truly good king was moved with compassion for the man who owed him many talents and then released him, having bestowed upon him a favour greater than the request which had been made; for the debtor promised to the long-suffering master to pay all his debts, but the Lord moved with compassion for him did not merely forgive him with the idea of receiving his own back as a result of his patience, but even entirely released him and forgave him the whole debt. But this wicked servant, who had besought his master to have patience for his many talents, acted without mercy, for, having found one of his fellow-servants which owed him a hundred pence, he laid hold on him and took him by the throat, saying, “Pay if thou owest.” (Mat_18:28) And did he not exhibit the very excess of wickedness who laid hold of his fellow-servant for a hundred pence, and took him by the throat and deprived him of freedom to breathe, when he himself, for the many talents, had neither been laid hold of, nor seized by the throat, but at first was ordered to be sold along with his wife and children and all that was his own; but afterwards, when he had worshipped him, the master was moved with compassion for him, and he was released and forgiven in regard to the whole of the debt. But it were indeed a hard task to tell according to the conception of Jesus who is the one fellow-servant who was found to be owing a hundred pence, not to his own lord, but to him who owed many talents, and who are the fellow-servants who saw the one taking by the throat, and the other taken, and were exceedingly sorry, and represented clearly unto their own lord all that had been done. But what the truth in these matters is, I declare that no one can interpret unless Jesus, who explained all things to His own disciples privately, takes up His abode in his reason, and opens up all the treasures in the parable which are dark, hidden, unseen, and confirms by clear demonstrations the man whom He desires to illumine with the light of the knowledge of the things that are in this parable, that he may at once represent who is brought to the king as the debtor of many talents, and who is the other one who owes to him a hundred pence, etc.; whether he can be the man of sin previously mentioned, (2Th_2:3) or the devil, or neither of these, but some other, whether a man, or some one of these under the sway of the devil; for it is a work of the wisdom of God to exhibit the things have have been prophesied concerning those who are in themselves of a certain nature, or have been made according to such and such qualities, whether among visible powers or also among some men, in whatever way they may have been written by the Holy Spirit. But as we have not yet received the competent mind which is able to be blended with the mind of Christ, and which is capable of attaining to things so great, and which is able with the Spirit to “search all things, even the deep things of God,” (1Co_2:10) we, forming an impression still indefinitely with regard to the matters in this passage, are of opinion that the wicked servant indicated by the parable who is here represented in regard to the debt of many talents, refers to some definite one.

 

12. The Time of the Reckoning.

But it is fitting to examine at what time the man – the king – in the parable wished to make a reckoning with his own servants, and to what period we ought to refer the things that are said. For if it be after the consummation, or at it at the time of the expected judgment, how are we to maintain the things about him who owed a hundred pence, and was taken by the throat by the man who had been forgiven the many talents? But if, before the judgment, how can we explain the reckoning that was made before this by the king, with his own servants? But we ought to think in a general way about every parable, the interpretation of which has not been recorded by the evangelists, even though Jesus explained all things to His own disciples privately; (Mar_4:34) and for this reason the writers of the Gospels have concealed the clear exposition of the parables, because the things signified by them were beyond the power of the nature of words to express, and every solution and exposition of such parables was of such a kind that not even the whole world itself could contain the books that should be written (Joh_21:25) in relation to such parables. But it may happen that a fitting heart be found, and, because of its purity, able to receive the letters of the exposition of the parable, so that they could be written in it by the Spirit of the living God. But some one will say that, perhaps, we act with impiety, who, because of the secret and mystical import of some of the Scriptures which are of heavenly origin, wish them to be symbolic, and endeavour to expound them, even though it might seem ex hypothesi that we had an accurate knowledge of their meaning. But to this we must say that, if there be those who have obtained the gift of accurate apprehension of these things, they know what they ought to do; but as for us, who acknowledge that we fall short of the ability to see into the depth of the things here signified, even though we obtain a somewhat crass perception of the things in the passage, we will say, that some of the things which we seem to find after much examination and inquiry, whether by the grace of God, or by the power of our own mind, we do not venture to commit to writing; but some things, for the sake of our own intellectual discipline, and that of those who may chance to read them, we will to some extent set forth. But let these things, then, be said by way of apology, because of the depth of the parable; but, with regard to the question at what time the man – the king – in the parable wished to make a reckoning with his own servants, we will say that it seems that this takes place about the time of the judgment which had been proclaimed. And this is confirmed by two parables, one at the close of the Gospel before us, (Mat_25:14-30) and one from the Gospel according to Luke. (Luk_19:12-27) And not to prolong the discussion by quoting the very letter, as any one who wishes can take it from the Scripture himself, we will say that the parable according to Matthew declares, “For it is as when a man going into another country called his own servants, and delivered unto them his own goods, and to one he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one talent;” (Mat_25:14, Mat_25:15) then they took action with regard to that which had been entrusted to them, and, after a long time, the lord of those servants cometh, and it is written in the very words, that he also makes a reckoning with them. (Mat_15:19) And compare the words, “And when he began to make a reckoning,” (Mat_18:24) and consider that he called the going of the householder into another country the time at which “we are at home in the body but absent from the Lord;” (2Co_5:6) but his advent, when, “after a long time the lord of those servants cometh,” (Mat_25:19) the time at the consummation in the judgment; for after a long time the lord of those servants cometh and makes a reckoning with them, and those things which follow take place. But the parable in Luke represents with more clearness, that “a certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return,” and when going, “he called ten servants, and gave to them ten pounds, and said unto them, Trade ye till I come.” (Luk_19:12, Luk_19:13) But the nobleman, being hated by his own citizens, who sent an ambassage after him, as they did not wish him to reign over them, came back again, having received the kingdom, and told the servants to whom he had given the money to be called to himself that he might know what they had gained by trading. And, seeing what they had done, to him who had made the one pound ten pounds, rendering praise in the words, “Well done, thou good servant, because thou wast found faithful in a very little,” (Luk_19:17) he gives to him authority over ten cities, to-wit, those which were under his kingdom. And to another, who had multiplied the pound fivefold, he did not render the praise which he assigned to the first, nor did he specify the word “authority,” as in the case of the first, but said to him, “Be thou also over five cities.”62 But to him who had tied up the pound in a napkin, he said, “Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee, thou wicked servant;” (Luk_19:22) and he said to them that stood by. Take from him the pound, and give it unto him that hath the ten pounds (Luk_19:24) Who, then, in regard to this parable, will not say that the nobleman, who goes into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom and to return, is Christ, going, as it were, into another country to receive the kingdoms of this world, and the things in it? And those who have received the ten talents are those who have been entrusted with the dispensation of the Word which has been committed unto them. And His citizens who did not wish Him to reign over them when He was a citizen in the world in respect of His incarnation, (Luk_19:14) are perhaps Israel who disbelieved Him, and perhaps also the Gentiles who disbelieved Him.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

58 συπφωνήσωσιν.

59 Pro_19:14, ἁρπόζεται.

60 Or reading χωρίζει, following the Vetus Inter, keeps apart.

61 Luk_19:19. In chap. 12 Origen reads: Be thou also over five cities – as W. & H., and comments on the difference of the reward. The mss. are therefore in error here.

62 Luk_19:19. Origen reads: Be thou also over five cities – as W. & H., and comments on the difference of the reward. The mss. are therefore in error here.



Index

The Rev. CHARLES G. FINNEY’S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1851)

LECTURE 1.

Various classes of truths, and how the mind attains to a knowledge of them

LECTURE 2. — Moral Government.

Definition of the term law . . Distinction between physical and moral law . . The essential attributes of moral law . . Subjectivity . . Objectivity . . Liberty, as opposed to necessity . . Fitness . . Universality . . Impartiality . . Justice . . Practicability . . Independence . . Immutability . . Unity . . Equity . . Expediency . . Exclusiveness

LECTURE 3. — Moral Government–Continued.

Definition of the term government . . Distinction between moral and physical government . . The fundamental reason of moral government . . Whose right it is to govern . . What is implied in the right to govern . . Point out the limits of this right . . What is implied in moral government . . Moral obligation . . The conditions of moral obligation . . Remarks

LECTURE 4. — Moral Government–Continued.

Man a subject of moral obligation . . Extent of moral obligation . . Shown by an appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend . . Shown to what acts and states of mind moral obligation must directly extend . . To what acts and mental states moral obligation indirectly extends

LECTURE 5. — Foundation of Moral Obligation.

What is intended by the foundation of moral obligation . . The extent of moral obligation . . Remind you of the distinction between the ground and conditions of obligation . . Points of agreement among the principal parties in this discussion . . Wherein they disagree . . That the sovereign will of God is not the foundation of moral obligation . . The theory of Paley . . The utilitarian philosophy

LECTURE 6. — Foundation of Moral Obligation. False Theories.

The theory that regards right as the foundation of moral obligation

LECTURE 7. — Foundation of Moral Obligation. False Theories.

The theory that the goodness or moral excellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation

LECTURE 8. — Foundation of Moral Obligation. False Theories.

The philosophy which teaches that moral order is the foundation of moral obligation . . The theory that maintains that the nature and relations of moral beings is the true foundation of moral obligation . . The theory that teaches that moral obligation is founded in the idea of duty . . That philosophy which teaches the complexity of the foundation of moral obligation

LECTURE 9. — Foundation of Obligation.

Another form of the theory that affirms the complexity of the foundation of moral obligation; complex however only in a certain sense

LECTURE 10. — Foundation of Obligation.

The intrinsic absurdity of various theories

LECTURE 11.

Summing up

LECTURE 12. — Foundation of Moral Obligation. Practical Bearings of the Different Theories.

The theory that regards the sovereign will of God as the foundation of moral obligation . . The theory of the selfish school . . The natural and necessary results of utilitarianism

LECTURE 13. — Practical Bearings and Tendency of Rightarianism.

The philosophy which teaches that the divine goodness or moral excellence is the foundation of moral obligation . . The theory which teaches that moral order is the foundation of moral obligation . . The practical bearings of the theory that moral obligation is founded in the nature and relations of moral agents . . The theory which teaches that the idea of duty is the foundation of moral obligation . . The complexity of the foundation of moral obligation . . The practical bearings of what is regarded as the true theory of the foundation of moral obligation, viz. that the highest well-being of God and of the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation

LECTURE 14. — Moral Government–Continued.

What constitutes obedience to moral law . . Obedience cannot be partial in the sense that the subject ever does or can partly obey and partly disobey at the same time . . Can the will at the same time make opposite choices? . . The choice of an ultimate end is, and must be, the supreme preference of the mind . . An intelligent choice must respect ends or means . . No choice whatever can be made inconsistent with the present choice of an ultimate end . . Inquiry respecting the strength or intensity of the choice . . The law does not require the constant and most intense action of the will . . An intention cannot be right and honest in kind, and deficient in the degree of intensity . . Examination of the philosophy of the question, whether sin and holiness consist in supreme, ultimate, and opposite choices or intentions . . Objections to the foregoing philosophy considered . . This philosophy examined in the light of the scriptures

LECTURE 15. — Moral Government–Continued.

In what sense we have seen that obedience to moral law cannot be partial . . In what sense obedience to moral law can be partial . . The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the law of God . . There can be no rule of duty but moral law . . Nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral law . . Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. That is, nothing short of what it requires can be in any sense virtue . . Uses of the term justification . . Fundamentally important inquiries respecting this subject . . Remarks

LECTURE 16. — Moral Government–Continued.

What constitutes obedience to moral law . . Just rules of legal interpretation . . That actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation shown from scripture . . In the light of the above rules, inquire what is not implied in entire obedience to the law of God

LECTURE 17. — Moral Government–Continued.

What is implied in obedience to the moral law . . Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy, as they are revealed in consciousness . . Point out the attributes of that love which constitutes obedience to the law of God . . Voluntariness . . Liberty . . Intelligence . . Virtuousness . . Disinterestedness . . Impartiality . . Universality

LECTURE 18. — Attributes of Love.

Efficiency . . Penitence . . Faith . . Complacency

LECTURE 19. — Attributes of Love–Continued.

Opposition to Sin . . Compassion

LECTURE 20. — Attributes of Love–Continued.

Mercy . . Justice . . Veracity

LECTURE 21. — Attributes of Love–Continued.

Patience . . Meekness . . Long-suffering . . Humility

LECTURE 22. — Attributes of Love–Continued.

Self-denial . . Condescension . . Candour . . Stability . . Kindness . . Severity

LECTURE 23. — Attributes of Love–Continued.

Holiness, or Purity . . Modesty . . Sobriety . . Sincerity . . Zeal . . Unity . . Simplicity

LECTURE 24. — Attributes of Love–Continued.

Gratitude . . Wisdom . . Grace . . Economy

LECTURE 25. — Moral Government.

Revert to some points that have been settled . . Show what disobedience to moral law cannot consist in . . What disobedience to moral law must consist in

LECTURE 26. — Moral Government.

What constitutes disobedience . . What is not implied in disobedience to the law of God

LECTURE 27. — Attributes of Selfishness.

What constitutes disobedience to moral law . . What is implied in disobedience to moral law . . Attributes of Selfishness. Voluntariness . . Liberty . . Intelligence . . Unreasonableness . . Interestedness . . Partiality . . Impenitence . . Unbelief

LECTURE 28. — Attributes of Selfishness–Continued.

Efficiency . . Opposition to benevolence or to virtue . . Cruelty . . Injustice

LECTURE 29. — Attributes of Selfishness–Continued.

Oppression . . Hostility . . Unmercifulness . . Falsehood, or lying . . Pride

LECTURE 30. — Attributes of Selfishness–Continued.

Enmity . . Madness . . Impatience . . Intemperance . . Moral recklessness . . Unity

LECTURE 31. — Attributes of Selfishness–Continued.

Egotism . . Simplicity . . Total moral depravity implied in selfishness as one of its attributes . . The scriptures assume and affirm it . . Remarks

LECTURE 32. — Moral Government–Continued.

A return to obedience to moral law is and must be, under every dispensation of the divine government, the unalterable condition of salvation . . Under a gracious dispensation, a return to full obedience to moral law is not dispensed with as a condition of salvation, but this obedience is secured by the indwelling spirit of Christ received by faith to reign in the heart

LECTURE 33. — Moral Government–Continued.

What constitutes the sanctions of law . . There can be no law without sanctions . . In what light sanctions are to be regarded . . The end to be secured by law, and the execution of penal sanctions . . By what rule sanctions ought to be graduated . . God’s law has sanctions . . What constitutes the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God . . The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God . . What constitutes the vindicatory sanctions of the law of God . . Duration of the penal sanctions of the law of God . . Inquire into the meaning of the term infinite . . Infinites may differ indefinitely in amount . . I must remind you of the rule by which degrees of guilt are to be estimated . . That all and every sin must from its very nature involve infinite guilt in the sense of deserving endless punishment . . Notwithstanding all sin deserves endless punishment, yet the guilt of different persons may vary indefinitely, and punishment, although always endless in duration, may and ought to vary in degree, according to the guilt of each individual . . That penal inflictions under the government of God must be endless . . Examine this question in the light of revelation

LECTURE 34. — Atonement.

I will call attention to several well established governmental principles . . Define the term atonement . . I am to inquire into the teachings of natural theology, or into the à priori affirmations of reason upon this subject . . The fact of atonement . . The design of the atonement . . Christ’s obedience to the moral law as a covenant of works, did not constitute the atonement . . The atonement was not a commercial transaction . . The atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public justice . . His taking human nature, and obeying unto death, under such circumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as righteous

LECTURE 35. — Extent of Atonement.

For whose benefit the atonement was intended . . Objections answered . . Remarks on the atonement

LECTURE 36. — Human Government.

The ultimate end of God in creation . . Providential and moral governments are indispensable means of securing the highest good of the universe . . Civil and family governments are indispensable to the securing of this end, and are therefore really a part of the providential and moral government of God . . Human governments are a necessity of human nature . . This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this world . . Human governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of the moral government of God . . It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of human government . . It is absurd to suppose that human governments can ever be dispensed with in the present world . . Objections answered . . Inquire into the foundation of the right of human governments . . Point out the limits or boundary of this right

LECTURE 37. — Human Governments–Continued.

The reasons why God has made no form of civil government universally obligatory . . The particular forms of state government must and will depend upon the virtue and intelligence of the people . . That form of government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet the necessities of the people . . Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue and intelligence or the vice and ignorance of the people demand them . . In what cases human legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null and void . . In what cases we are bound to disobey human governments . . Apply the foregoing principles to the rights and duties of governments and subjects in relation to the execution of the necessary penalties of law

LECTURE 38. — Moral Depravity.

Definition of the term depravity . . Point out the distinction between physical and moral depravity . . Of what physical depravity can be predicated . . Of what moral depravity can be predicated . . Mankind are both physically and morally depraved . . Subsequent to the commencement of moral agency and previous to regeneration the moral depravity of mankind is universal . . The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race, is total

LECTURE 39. — Moral Depravity–Continued.

Proper method of accounting for the universal and total moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race . . Moral depravity consists in selfishness, or in the choice of self-interest, self-gratification, or self-indulgence, as an end . . Dr. Wood’s view of physical and moral depravity examined . . Standards of the Presbyterian Church examined

LECTURE 40. — Moral Depravity–Continued.

Further examination of the arguments adduced in support of the position that human nature is in itself sinful

LECTURE 41. — Moral Depravity–Continued.

The proper method of accounting for moral depravity . . Pres. Edwards’s views examined . . Summary of the truth on this subject . . Remarks

LECTURE 42. — Regeneration.

The common distinction between regeneration and conversion . . I am to state the assigned reasons for this distinction . . I am to state the objections to this distinction . . What regeneration is not . . What regeneration is . . The universal necessity of regeneration . . Agencies employed in regeneration . . Instrumentalities employed in the work . . In regeneration the subject is both passive and active . . What is implied in regeneration

LECTURE 43. — Regeneration–Continued.

Philosophical theories of regeneration . . The different theories of regeneration examined . . Objections to the taste scheme . . The divine efficiency scheme . . Objections to the divine efficiency . . The susceptibility scheme . . Theory of a divine moral suasion . . Objections to this theory . . Remarks

LECTURE 44. — Regeneration–Continued.

Evidences of regeneration . . Introductory remarks . . Wherein the experience and outward life of saints and sinners may agree . . Remarks

LECTURE 45. — Regeneration–Continued.

Wherein saints and sinners or deceived professors must differ

LECTURE 46. — Regeneration–Continued.

In what saints and sinners differ . . What is it to overcome the world? . . Who are those that overcome the world? . . Why do believers overcome the world?

LECTURE 47. — Regeneration–Continued.

Wherein saints and sinners differ

LECTURE 48. — Natural Ability.

Show what is the Edwardean notion of ability . . This natural ability is no ability at all . . What, according to this school, constitutes natural inability . . This natural inability is no inability at all . . Natural ability is identical with freedom or liberty of will . . The human will is free, therefore men have ability to do all their duty

LECTURE 49. — Moral Ability.

What constitutes moral inability according to the Edwardean school . . Their moral inability consists in real disobedience, and a natural inability to obey . . This pretended distinction between natural and moral inability is nonsensical . . What constitutes moral ability according to this school . . Their moral ability to obey God is nothing else than real obedience, and a natural inability to disobey

LECTURE 50. — Inability.

What is thought to be the fundamental error of the Edwardean school on the subject of ability . . State the philosophy of the scheme of inability about to be considered . . The claims of this philosophy

LECTURE 51. — Gracious Ability.

What is intended by the term . . This doctrine as held is an absurdity . . In what sense a gracious ability is possible

LECTURE 52. — The Notion of Inability.

Proper mode of accounting for it

LECTURE 53.

[There is no Lecture LIII in the printed book. The lectures are incorrectly numbered.]

LECTURE 54. — Repentance and Impenitence.

What repentance is not, and what it is . . What is implied in it . . What impenitence is not . . What it is . . Some things that are implied in it . . Some evidences of it

LECTURE 55. — Faith and Unbelief.

What evangelical faith is not . . What it is . . What is implied in it . . What unbelief is not . . What it is,–What is implied in it . . Conditions of both faith and unbelief . . The guilt and desert of unbelief . . Natural and governmental consequences of both faith and unbelief

LECTURE 56. — Justification.

What justification is not . . What it is . . Conditions of gospel justification

LECTURE 57. — Sanctification.

An account of the recent discussions that have been had on this subject

LECTURE 58. — Sanctification.

Remind you of some points that have been settled in this course of study . . Definition of the principal terms to be used in this discussion

LECTURE 59. — Sanctification.

Entire sanctification is attainable in this life

LECTURE 60. — Sanctification.

Bible argument

LECTURE 61. — Sanctification.

Paul entirely sanctified

LECTURE 62. — Sanctification.

Condition of its attainment

LECTURE 63. — Sanctification.

Condition of its attainment–continued . . Relations of Christ to the believer

LECTURE 64. — Sanctification.

Relations of Christ to the believer–continued 

LECTURE 65. — Sanctification.

Relations of Christ to the believer–continued

LECTURE 66. — Sanctification.

Relations of Christ to the believer–continued

LECTURE 67. — Sanctification.

Relations of Christ to the believer–continued

LECTURE 68. — Sanctification.

Objections answered

LECTURE 69. — Sanctification.

Tendency of the denial that Christians have valid grounds of hope that they should obtain a victory over sin in this life

LECTURE 70. — Sanctification.

Objections–continued

LECTURE 71. — Sanctification.

Objections–continued

LECTURE 72. — Sanctification.

Objections–continued

LECTURE 73. — Sanctification.

Remarks

LECTURE 74.

Election

LECTURE 75.

Reprobation

LECTURE 76.

Divine Sovereignty

LECTURE 77.

Purposes of God

LECTURE 78. — Perseverance of Saints.

Notice the different kinds of certainty . . What is not intended by the perseverance of the saints

LECTURE 79.

Perseverance of Saints proved

LECTURE 80. — Perseverance of Saints.

Further objections considered

LECTURE 81. — Perseverance of Saints.

Consideration of principal arguments in support of the doctrine

LECTURE 82. — Perseverance of Saints.

Perseverance proved

LECTURE 83. — Perseverance of Saints.

Further objections answered



Lecture 1 – HOW WE ATTAIN TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN TRUTHS.

The Rev. CHARLES G. FINNEY’S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1851)

ALL teaching and reasoning take certain truths as granted. That the unequivocal, à priori affirmations of the reason are valid, for all the truths and principles thus affirmed, must be assumed and admitted, or every attempt to construct a science, of any kind, or to attain to certain knowledge upon any subject, is vain and even preposterous. As I must commence my lectures on moral government by laying down certain moral postulates, or axioms, which are, à priori, affirmed by the reason, and therefore self-evident to all men, when so stated as to be understood, I will spend a few moments in stating certain facts belonging more appropriately to the department of psychology. Theology is so related to psychology, that the successful study of the former without a knowledge of the latter, is impossible. Every theological system, and every theological opinion, assumes something as true in psychology. Theology is, to a great extent, the science of mind in its relations to moral law. God is a mind or spirit: all moral agents are in his image. Theology is the doctrine of God, comprehending his existence, attributes, relations, character, works, word, government providential and moral, and, of course, it must embrace the facts of human nature, and the science of moral agency. All theologians do and must assume the truth of some system of psychology and mental philosophy, and those who exclaim most loudly against metaphysics, no less than others.

There is a distinction between the mind’s knowing a truth, and knowing that it knows it. Hence I begin by defining self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is the mind’s recognition of itself. It is the noticing of, or act of knowing itself. Its existence, attributes, acts, and states, with the attributes of liberty or necessity which characterize those acts and states. Of this, I shall frequently speak hereafter.

THE REVELATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Self-consciousness reveals to us three primary faculties of mind, which we call intellect, sensibility, and will. The intellect is the faculty of knowledge; the sensibility is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling; the will is the executive faculty, or the faculty of doing or acting. All thinking, perceiving, intuiting, reasoning, opining, forming notions or ideas, belong to the intellect.

Consciousness reveals the various functions of the intellect, and also of the sensibility and will. In this place, we shall attend only to the functions of the intellect, as our present business is to ascertain the methods by which the intellect arrives at its knowledges, which are given to us in self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is, itself, of course, one of the functions of the intellect; and here it is in place to say, that a revelation in consciousness is science, or knowledge. What consciousness gives us we know. Its testimony is infallible and conclusive, upon all subjects upon which it testifies.

Among other functions of the intellect, which I need not name, self-consciousness reveals the three-fold, fundamental distinction of the sense, the reason, and the understanding.

OF THE SENSE.

The sense is the power that perceives sensation and brings it within the field of consciousness. Sensation is an impression made upon the sensibility by some object without or some thought within the mind. The sense takes up, or perceives the sensation, and this perceived sensation is revealed in consciousness. If the sensation is from some object without the mind, as sound or colour, the perception of it belongs to the outer sense. If from some thought, or mental exercise, the perception is of the inner sense. I have said that the testimony of consciousness is conclusive, for all the facts given by its unequivocal testimony. We neither need, nor can we have, any higher evidence of the existence of a sensation, than is given by consciousness.

Our first impressions, thoughts, and knowledges, are derived from sense. But knowledge derived purely from this source would, of necessity, be very limited.

OF THE REASON.

Self-consciousness also reveals to us the reason or the à priori function of the intellect. The reason is that function of the intellect which immediately beholds or intuits a class of truths which, from their nature, are not cognizable either by the understanding or the sense. Such, for example, as the mathematical, philosophical, and moral axioms, and postulates. The reason gives laws and first principles. It gives the abstract, the necessary, the absolute, the infinite. It gives all its affirmations by a direct beholding or intuition, and not by induction or reasoning. The classes of truths given by this function of the intellect are self-evident. That is, the reason intuits, or directly beholds them, as the faculty of sense intuits, or directly beholds, a sensation. Sense gives to consciousness the direct vision of sensation, and therefore the existence of the sensation is certainly known to us. The reason gives to consciousness the direct vision of the class of truths of which it takes cognizance; and of the existence and validity of these truths we can no more doubt, than of the existence of our sensations.

Between knowledge derived from sense and from reason there is a difference: in one case, consciousness gives us the sensation: it may be questioned whether the perceptions of the sense are a direct beholding of the object of the sensation, and consequently whether the object really exists, and is the real archetype of the sensation. That the sensation exists we are certain, but whether that exists which we suppose to be the object and the cause of the sensation, admits of doubt. The question is, does the sense immediately intuit or behold the object of the sensation. The fact that the report of sense cannot always be relied upon, seems to show that the perception of sense is not an immediate beholding of the object of the sensation; sensation exists, this we know, that it has a cause we know; but that we rightly know the cause or object of the sensation, we may not know.

But in regard to the intuitions of the reason, this faculty directly beholds the truths which it affirms. These truths are the objects of its intuitions. They are not received at second hand. They are not inferences nor inductions, they are not opinions, nor conjectures, nor beliefs, but they are direct knowings. The truths given by this faculty are so directly seen and known, that to doubt them is impossible. The reason, by virtue of its own laws, beholds them with open face, in the light of their own evidence.

OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

The understanding is that function of the intellect that takes up, classifies and arranges the objects and truths of sensation, under a law of classification and arrangement given by the reason, and thus forms notions and opinions, and theories. The notions, opinions, and theories of the understanding, may be erroneous, but there can be no error in the à priori intuitions of the reason. The knowledges of the understanding are so often the result of induction or reasoning, and fall so entirely short of a direct beholding, that they are often knowledges only in a modified and restricted sense.

Of the imagination, and the memory, &c., I need not speak in this place.

What has been said has, I trust, prepared the way for saying that the truths of theology arrange themselves under two heads.

I. Truths which need proof.

II. Truths which need no proof.

I. Truths which need proof.

First. Of this class it may be said, in general, that to it belong all truths which are not directly intuited by some function of the intellect in the light of their own evidence.

Every truth that must be arrived at by reasoning or induction, every truth that is attained to by other testimony than that of direct beholding, perceiving, intuiting, or cognizing, is a truth belonging to the class that needs proof.

Second. Truths of demonstration belong to the class that needs proof. When truths of demonstration are truly demonstrated by any mind, it certainly knows them to be true, and affirms that the contrary cannot possibly be true. To possess the mind of others with those truths, we must lead them through the process of demonstration. When we have done so, they cannot but see the truth demonstrated. The human mind will not ordinarily receive, and rest in, a truth of demonstration, until it has demonstrated it. This it often does without recognizing the process of demonstration. The laws of knowledge are physical. The laws of logic are inherent in every mind; but in various states of developement in different minds. If a truth which needs demonstration, and which is capable of demonstration, is barely announced, and not demonstrated, the mind feels a dissatisfaction, and does not rest short of the demonstration of which it feels the necessity. It is therefore of little use to dogmatize, when we ought to reason, demonstrate, and explain. In all cases of truths, not self-evident, or of truths needing proof, religious teachers should understand and comply with the logical conditions of knowledge and rational belief; they tempt God when they merely dogmatize, where they ought to reason, and explain, and prove, throwing the responsibility of producing conviction and faith upon the sovereignty of God. God convinces and produces faith, not by the overthrow of, but in accordance with, the fixed laws of mind. It is therefore absurd and ridiculous to dogmatize and assert, when explanation, illustration, and proof are possible, and demanded by the laws of the intellect. To do this, and then leave it with God to make the people understand and believe, may be at present convenient for us, but if it be not death to our auditors, no thanks are due to us. We are bound to inquire to what class a truth belongs, whether it be a truth which, from its nature and the laws of mind, needs to be illustrated, or proved. If it does, we have no right merely to assert it, when it has not been proved. Let us comply with the necessary conditions of a rational conviction, and then leave the event with God.

To the class of truths that need proof belong those of divine revelation.

All truths known to man are divinely revealed to him in some sense, but I here speak of truths revealed to man by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The Bible announces many self-evident truths, and many truths of demonstration. These may, or might be known, at least many of them, irrespective of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But the class of truths of which I here speak, rest wholly upon the testimony of God, and are truths of pure inspiration. Some of these truths are above reason, in the sense that the reason can, à priori, neither affirm nor deny them.

When it is ascertained that God has asserted them, the mind needs no other evidence of their truth, because by a necessary law of the intellect, all men affirm the veracity of God. But for this necessary law of the intellect, men could not rest upon the simple testimony of God, but would ask for evidence that God is to be believed. But such is the nature of mind, as constituted by the Creator, that no moral agent needs proof that God’s testimony ought to be received. Let it be once settled that God has declared a fact, or a truth, and this is, with every moral agent, all the evidence he needs. The reason, from its own laws, affirms the perfect veracity of God, and although the truth announced may be such that the reason, à priori, can neither affirm, or deny it, yet when asserted by God, the reason irresistibly affirms that God’s testimony ought be received.

These truths need proof in the sense that it needs to be shown that they were given by a divine inspiration. This fact demonstrated, the truths themselves need only to be understood, and the mind necessarily affirms its obligation to believe them.

Under this head I might notice the probable or possible truths; that is, those that are supported by such evidence as only shows them to be probable or possible, but I forbear.

My present object more particularly is to notice– 

II. Truths which need no proof.

These are à priori truths of reason, and truths of sense; that is, they are truths that need no proof, because they are directly intuited or beheld by one of these faculties.

The à priori truths of reason may be classed under the heads of first truths: self-evident truths which are necessary and universal: and self-evident truths not necessary and universal.

1. First truths have the following attributes.

(1.) They are absolute or necessary truths, in the sense that the reason affirms that they must be true. Every event must have an adequate cause. Space must be. It is impossible that it should not be, whether any thing else were or not. Time must be, whether there were any events to succeed each other in time or not. Thus necessity is an attribute of this class.

(2.) Universality is an attribute of a first truth. That is, to truths of this class there can be no exception. Every event must have a cause, there can be no event without a cause.

(3.) First truths are truths of necessary and universal knowledge. That is, they are not merely knowable, but they are known to all moral agents, by a necessary law of their intellect.

That space and time are, and must be, that every event has and must have a cause, and such like truths, are universally known and assumed by every moral agent, whether the terms in which they are stated have ever been so much as heard by him, or not. This last is the characteristic that distinguishes first truths from others merely self-evident, of which we shall soon speak.

(4.) First truths are, of course, self-evident. That is, they are universally directly beheld, in the light of their own evidence.

(5.) First truths are truths of the pure reason, and of course truths of certain knowledge. They are universally known with such certainty as to render it impossible for any moral agent to deny, forget, or practically overlook them. Although they may be denied in theory, they are always, and necessarily, recognized in practice. No moral agent, for example, can, by any possibility, practically deny, or forget, or overlook the first truths that time and space exist and must exist, that every event has and must have a cause.

It is, therefore, always to be remembered that first truths are universally assumed and known, and in all our teachings, and in all our inquiries we are to take the first truths of reason for granted. It is preposterous to attempt to prove them, for the reason that we necessarily assume them as the basis and condition of all reasoning.

The mind arrives at a knowledge of these truths by directly and necessarily beholding them, upon condition of its first perceiving their logical condition. The mind beholds, or attains to the conception of, an event. Upon this conception it instantly assumes, whether it thinks of the assumption or not, that this event had, and that every event must have, a cause.

The mind perceives, or has the notion of body. This conception necessarily developes the first truth, space is and must be.

The mind beholds or conceives of succession; and this beholding, or conception, necessarily developes the first truth, time is, and must be.

As we proceed we shall notice divers truths which belong to this class, some of which, in theory, have been denied. Nevertheless, in their practical judgments, all men have admitted them and given as high evidence of their knowing them, as they do of knowing their own existence.

Suppose, for example, that the law of causality should not be, at all times or at any time, a subject of distinct thought and attention. Suppose that the proposition in words, should never be in the mind, that “every event must have a cause,” or that this proposition should be denied. Still the truth is there, in the form of absolute knowledge, a necessary assumption, an à priori affirmation, and the mind has so firm a hold of it, as to be utterly unable to overlook, or forget, or practically deny it. Every mind has it as a certain knowledge, long before it can understand the language in which it is expressed, and no statement or evidence whatever can give the mind any firmer conviction of its truth, than it had from necessity at first. This is true of all the truths of this class. They are always, and necessarily, assumed by all moral agents, whether distinctly thought of or not. And for the most part this class of truths are assumed, without being frequently, or at least without being generally, the object of thought or direct attention. The mind assumes them, without a distinct consciousness of the assumption. For example, we act every moment, and judge, and reason, and believe, upon the assumption that every event must have a cause, and yet we are not conscious of thinking of this truth, nor that we assume it, until something calls the attention to it.

First truths of reason, then, let it be distinctly remembered, are always and necessarily assumed, though they may be seldom thought of. They are universally known, before the words are understood, by which they may be expressed; and although they may never be expressed in a formal proposition, yet the mind has as certain a knowledge of them as it has of its own existence.

All reasoning proceeds upon the assumption of these truths. It must do so, of necessity. It is preposterous to attempt to prove first truths to a moral agent; for, being a moral agent, he must absolutely know them already, and if he did not, in no possible way could he be put in possession of them, except by presenting to his perception the chronological condition of their developement, and in no case could any thing else be needed, for upon the occurrence of this perception, the assumption, or developement, follows by a law of absolute and universal necessity. And until these truths are actually developed, no being can be a moral agent.

There is no reasoning with one who calls in question the first truths of reason, and demands proof of them. All reasoning must, from the nature of mind and the laws of reasoning, assume the first-truths of reason as certain, and admitted, and as the à priori condition of all logical deduction and demonstration. Some one of these must be assumed as true, directly or indirectly, in every syllogism and in every demonstration.

In all our future investigations we shall have abundant occasion for the application and illustration of what has now been said of first truths of reason. If, at any stage of our progress, we light upon a truth of this class, let it be borne in mind that the nature of the truth is the preclusion, or, as lawyers would express it, the estopple of all controversy.

To deny the reality of this class of truths, is to deny the validity of our most perfect knowledge. The only question to be settled is, does the truth in question belong to this class? There are many truths which men, all sane men, certainly know, of which they not only seldom think, but which, in theory, they strenuously deny.

2. The second class of truths that need no proof are self-evident truths, possessing the attributes of necessity and universality.

Of these truths, I remark– 

(1.) That they, like first truths, are affirmed by the pure reason, and not by the understanding, nor the sense.

(2.) They are affirmed, like first truths, à priori; that is, they are directly beheld or intuited, and not attained to by evidence or induction.

(3.) They are truths of universal and necessary affirmation, when so stated as to be understood. By a law of the reason, all sane men must admit and affirm them, in the light of their own evidence, whenever they are understood.

This class, although self-evident, when presented to the mind, are not, like first truths, universally and necessarily known to all moral agents.

The mathematical axioms, and first principles, the à priori grounds and principles of all science, belong to this class.

(4.) They are, like first truths, universal in the sense that there is no exception to them.

(5.) They are necessary truths. That is, the reason affirms, not merely that they are, but that they must be, true; that these truths cannot but be. The abstract, the infinite, belong to this class.

To compel other minds to admit this class of truths, we need only to frame so perspicuous a statement of them as to cause them to be distinctly perceived or understood. This being done, all sound minds irresistibly affirm them, whether the heart is, or is not, honest enough to admit the conviction.

3. A third class of truths that need no proof, are truths of rational intuition, but possess not the attributes of universality and necessity.

Our own existence, personality, personal identity, &c., belong to this class. These truths are intuited by the reason, are self-evident, and given, as such, in consciousness; they are known to self, without proof, and cannot be doubted. They are at first developed by sensation, but not inferred from it. Suppose a sensation to be perceived by the sense, all that could be logically inferred from this is, that there is some subject of this sensation, but that I exist, and am the subject of this sensation, does not logically appear. Sensation first awakes the mind to self-consciousness; that is, a sensation of some kind first arouses the attention of mind to the facts of its own existence and personal identity. These truths are directly beheld and affirmed. The mind does not say, I feel, or I think, and therefore I am, for this is a mere sophism; it is to assume the existence of the I as the subject of feeling, and afterwards to infer the existence of the I from the feeling or sensation.

4. A fourth class of truths that need no proof are sensations. It has been already remarked, that all sensations given by consciousness, are self-evident to the subject of them. Whether I ascribe my sensations to their real cause may admit of doubt, but that the sensation is real there can be no doubt. The testimony of the sense is valid, for that which it immediately beholds or intuits, that is, for the reality of the sensation. The judgment may err by ascribing the sensation to the wrong cause.

But I must not proceed further with this statement; my design has been, not to enter too minutely into nice metaphysical distinctions, nor by any means to exhaust the subject of this lecture, but only to fix attention upon the distinctions upon which I have insisted, for the purpose of precluding all irrelevant and preposterous discussions about the validity of first and self-evident truths. I must assume that you possess some knowledge of psychology, and of mental philosophy, and leave to your convenience a more thorough and extended examination of the subject but hinted at in this lecture.

Enough, I trust, has been said to prepare your minds for the introduction of the great and fundamental axioms which lie at the foundation of all our ideas of morality and religion. Our next lecture will present the nature and attributes of moral law. We shall proceed in the light of the à priori affirmations of the reason, in postulating its nature and its attributes. Having attained to a firm footing upon these points, we shall be naturally conducted by reason and revelation to our ultimate conclusions.



Lecture 2 – MORAL GOVERNMENT.

The Rev. CHARLES G. FINNEY’S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1851)

I. DEFINITION OF LAW. 

II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MORAL LAW. 

III. ATTRIBUTES OF MORAL LAW. 

I. In discussing this subject, I must begin with defining the term Law. 

Law, in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific for my purpose, is a RULE OF ACTION. In its generic signification, it is applicable to every kind of action, whether of matter or of mind–whether intelligent or unintelligent–whether free or necessary action. 

II. I must distinguish between Physical and Moral Law. 

Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all the changes that occur under the law of necessity, whether in matter or mind. I mean all changes, whether of state or action, that do not consist in the states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law of force, or necessity, as opposed to the law of liberty. Physical law is the law of the material universe. It is also the law of mind, so far as its states and changes are involuntary. All mental states or actions, which are not free and sovereign actions of will, must occur under, and be subject to, physical law. They cannot possibly be accounted for, except as they are ascribed to the law of necessity or force. 

Moral law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule to which moral agents ought to conform all their voluntary actions, and is enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept. It is the rule for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to necessary and unintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as opposed to the law of necessity–of motive and free choice, as opposed to force of every kind. Moral law is primarily a rule for the direction of the action of free will, and strictly of free will only. But secondarily, and less strictly, it is the rule for the regulation of all those actions and states of mind and body, that follow the free actions of will by a law of necessity. Thus, moral law controls involuntary mental states and outward action, only by securing conformity of the actions of free will to its precept. 

III. I must call attention to the essential attributes of moral law. 

1. Subjectivity. It is, and must be, an idea of reason, developed in the mind of the subject. It is an idea, or conception, of that state of will, or course of action, which is obligatory upon a moral agent. No one can be a moral agent, or the subject of moral law, unless he has this idea developed; for this idea is identical with the law. It is the law developed, or revealed within himself; and thus he becomes “a law to himself,” his own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this idea, or law. 

2. Objectivity. Moral law may be regarded as a rule of duty, prescribed by the supreme Lawgiver, and external to self. When thus contemplated, it is objective; when contemplated as a necessary idea or affirmation of our own reason, we regard it subjectively, or as imposed upon us by God, through the necessary convictions of our own minds. When contemplated as within ourselves, and as the affirmation of our own reason we predicate of it subjectivity; but when thought of as a law declared and enforced by the will of God, it is contemplated as distinct from our own necessary ideas, and predicate of it objectivity. 

3. A third attribute is liberty, as opposed to necessity. The precept must lie developed in the reason, as a rule of duty–a law of moral obligation–a rule of choice, or of ultimate intention, declaring that which a moral agent ought to choose, will, intend. But it does not, must not, can not possess the attribute of necessity in its relations to the actions of free will. It must not, cannot, possess an element or attribute of force, in any such sense as to render conformity of will to its precept, unavoidable. This would confound it with physical law. 

4. A fourth attribute of moral law, is fitness. It must be the law of nature, that is, its precept must prescribe and require, just those actions of the will which are suitable to the nature and relations of moral beings, and nothing more nor less; that is, the intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of the universe being given as the ground, and the nature and relations of moral beings as the condition of the obligation, the reason hereupon necessarily affirms the intrinsic propriety and fitness of choosing this good, and of consecrating the whole being to its promotion. This is what is intended by the law of nature. It is the law or rule of action imposed on us by God, in and by the nature which he has given us. 

5. A fifth attribute of moral law is universality. The conditions and circumstances being the same, it requires, and must require, of all moral agents, the same things, in whatever world they may be found. 

6. A sixth attribute of moral law is, and must be, impartiality. Moral law is no respecter of persons–knows no privileged classes. It demands one thing of all, without regard to anything, except the fact that they are moral agents. By this it is not intended, that the same course of outward conduct is required of all; but the same state of heart in all–that all shall have one ultimate intention–that all shall consecrate themselves to one end–that all shall entirely conform, in heart and life, to their nature and relations. 

7. A seventh attribute of moral law is, and must be, justice. That which is unjust cannot be law. 

Justice, as an attribute of moral law, must respect both the precept and the sanction. Justice, as an attribute of the precept, consists in the requisition of just that, and no more, which is in exact accordance with the nature and relations of the ruler and the subject. 

Justice, as an attribute of the sanction, consists in apportioning rewards and punishments, to the merit of obedience on the one hand, and to the guilt of disobedience on the other. 

Sanctions belong to the very essence and nature of moral law. A law without sanctions is no law; it is only counsel, or advice. Sanctions are the motives which the law presents, to secure obedience to the precept. Consequently, they should always be graduated by the importance of the precept; and that is not properly law which does not promise, expressly or by implication, a reward proportionate to the merit of obedience, and threaten punishment equal to the guilt of disobedience. Law cannot be unjust, either in precept or sanction: and it should always be remembered, that what is unjust, is not law, cannot be law. It is contrary to the true definition of law. Moral law is a rule of action, founded in the nature and relations of moral beings, sustained by sanctions equal to the merit of obedience, and the guilt of disobedience. 

8. An eighth attribute of moral law is practicability. That which the precept demands must be possible to the subject. That which demands a natural impossibility is not, and cannot be, moral law. The true definition of law excludes the supposition that it can, under any circumstances, demand an absolute impossibility. Such a demand could not be in accordance with the nature and relations of moral agents, and therefore practicability must always be an attribute of moral law. To talk of inability to obey moral law, is to talk nonsense. 

9. A ninth attribute of moral law is independence. It is founded in the self-existent nature of God. It is an eternal and necessary idea of the divine reason. It is the eternal self-existent rule of the divine conduct, the law which the intelligence of God prescribes to himself. Moral law, as we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and cannot originate in the will of God. It originates, or rather, is founded in his eternal, self-existent nature. It eternally existed in the divine reason. It is the idea of that state of will which is obligatory upon God upon condition of his natural attributes, or, in other words, upon condition of his nature. As a law, it is entirely independent of his will just as his own existence is. It is obligatory also upon every moral agent, entirely independent of the will of God. Their nature and relations being given, and their intelligence being developed, moral law must be obligatory upon them, and it lies not in the option of any being to make it otherwise. Their nature and relations being given, to pursue a course of conduct suited to their nature and relations, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory, independent of the will of any being. 

10. A tenth attribute of moral law is immutability. Moral law can never change, or be changed. It always requires of every moral agent a state of heart, and course of conduct, precisely suited to his nature and relations. Whatever his nature is, his capacity and relations are; entire conformity to just that nature, those capacities and relations, so far as he is able to understand them, is required at every moment and nothing more nor less. If capacity is enlarged, the subject is not thereby rendered capable of works of supererogation–of doing more than the law demands; for the law still, as always, requires the full consecration of his whole being to the public interests. If by any means whatever, his ability is abridged, moral law, always and necessarily consistent with itself, still requires that what is left–nothing more or less–shall be consecrated to the same end as before. Whatever demands more or less than entire, universal, and constant conformity of heart and life, to the nature, capacity and relations of moral agents, be they what they may, is not, and cannot be, moral law. To suppose that it could be otherwise, would be to contradict the true definition of moral law. If therefore, the capacity is by any means abridged, the subject does not thereby become incapable of rendering full obedience; for the law still demands and urges, that the heart and life shall be fully conformed to the present, existing nature, capacity, and relations. Anything that requires more or less than this, whatever else it is, is not, and cannot be, moral law. To affirm that it can, is to talk nonsense. Moral law invariably holds one language. It never changes the spirit of its requirement. “Thou shalt love,” or be perfectly benevolent, is its uniform and its only demand. This demand it never varies, and never can vary. It is as immutable as God is, and for the same reason. To talk of letting down, or altering moral law, is to talk absurdly. The thing is naturally impossible. No being has the right or the power to do so. The supposition overlooks the very nature of moral law. Should the natural capability of the mind, by any means whatever, be enlarged or abridged, it is perfectly absurd, and a contradiction of the nature of moral law, to say, that the claims of the law are either elevated or lowered. Moral law is not a statute, an enactment, that has its origin or its foundation in the will of any being. It is the law of nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himself, and which God imposes upon us because it is entirely suited to our nature and relations, and is therefore naturally obligatory upon us. It is the unalterable demand of the reason, that the whole being, whatever there is of it at any time, shall be entirely consecrated to the highest good of universal being, and for this reason God requires this of us, with all the weight of his authority. It cannot be too distinctly understood, that moral law is nothing more nor less, than the law of nature revealed in the necessary ideas of our own reason, and enforced by the authority of God. It is an idea of that which is fit, suitable, agreeable to our nature and relations for the time being, that which it is reasonable for us to will and do, at any and every moment, in view of all the circumstances of our present existence,–just what the reason affirms, and what God affirms, to be suited to our nature and relations, under all the circumstances of the case.*(see below) 

11. An eleventh attribute of moral law is unity. Moral law proposes but one ultimate end of pursuit to God, and to all moral agents. All its requisitions, in their spirit, are summed up and expressed in one word, love or benevolence. This I only announce here. It will more fully appear hereafter. Moral law is a pure and simple idea of the reason. It is the idea of perfect, universal, and constant consecration of the whole being, to the highest good of being. Just this is, and nothing more nor less can be, moral law; for just this, and nothing more nor less, is a state of heart and a course of life exactly suited to the nature and relations of moral agents, which is the only true definition of moral law. 

12. Equity is another attribute of moral law. Equity is equality. That only is equitable which is equal. The interest and well-being of every sentient existence, and especially of every moral agent, is of some value in comparison with the interests of others, and of the whole universe of creatures. Moral law demands that the interest and well-being of every member of the universal family shall be regarded by each according to its relative or comparative value, and that in no case shall it be sacrificed or wholly neglected, unless it be forfeited by crime. The distinction, allowed by human tribunals, between law and equity, does not pertain to moral law, nor does nor can it strictly pertain to any law. For it is impossible that that should be law, in the sense of imposing obligation, of which equity is not an attribute. An inequitable law cannot be. The requirements of law must be equal. A moral agent may, by transgression, forfeit the protection of law, and may come into such governmental relations, by trampling on the law, that moral law may demand that he be made a public example–that his interest and well-being be laid upon the altar, and that he be offered a sacrifice to public justice, as a preventive of crime in others. It may happen also that sacrifices may be demanded by moral law of innocent beings, for the promotion of a greater amount of good than that sacrificed by the innocent. Such was the case with the atonement of Christ, and such is the case with the missionary, and with all who are called by the law of love to practice self-denial for the good of others. But let it be remembered, that moral law never requires nor allows any degree of self-denial and self-sacrifice that relinquishes a good of greater value than that gained by the sacrifice. Nor does it in any case demand nor permit that any interest, not forfeited by its possessor, shall be relinquished or finally neglected, without adequate ultimate compensation. As has been said, every interest is of some comparative value; and ought to be so esteemed and treated. Moral law demands, and must demand, that it shall be so regarded by all moral agents to whom it is known. “THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR AS THYSELF” is its unalterable language. It can absolutely utter no other language than this, and nothing can be moral law which holds any other language. Law is not, and cannot be, an arbitrary enactment of any being or number of beings. Unequal LAW is a misnomer. That which is unequal in its demands, is not and cannot be, law. Law must respect the interests and the rights of all, and of each member of the universal family. It is impossible that it should be otherwise, and still be law. 

13. Expediency is another attribute of moral law. 

That which is upon the whole most wise is expedient,–that which is upon the whole expedient is demanded by moral law. True expediency and the spirit of moral law are always identical. Expediency may be inconsistent with the letter, but never with the spirit of moral law. Law in the form of commandment is a revelation or declaration of that course which is expedient. It is expediency revealed, as in the case of the decalogue, and the same is true of every precept of the Bible, it reveals to us what is expedient. A revealed law or commandment is never to be set aside by our views of expediency. We may know with certainty that what is required is expedient. The command is the expressed judgment of God in the case, and reveals with unerring certainty the true path of expediency. When Paul says, “All things are lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient,” we must not understand him as meaning that all things in the absolute sense were lawful to him, or that anything that was not expedient was lawful to him. But he doubtless intended, that many things were inexpedient that are not expressly prohibited by the letter of the law,–that the spirit of the law prohibited many things not expressly prohibited by the letter. It should never be forgotten that that which is plainly demanded by the highest good of the universe is law. It is expedient. It is wise. The true spirit of the moral law does and must demand it. So, on the other hand, whatever is plainly inconsistent with the highest good of the universe is illegal, unwise, inexpedient, and must be prohibited by the spirit of moral law. But let the thought be repeated, that the Bible precepts always reveal that which is truly expedient, and in no case are we at liberty to set aside the spirit of any commandment upon the supposition that expediency requires it. Some have denounced the doctrine of expediency altogether, as at all times inconsistent with the law of right. These philosophers proceed upon the assumption that the law of right and the law of benevolence are not identical but inconsistent with each other. This is a common but fundamental mistake, which leads me to remark that– 

Law proposes the highest good of universal being as its end, and requires all moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this end. Consequently, expediency must be one of its attributes. That which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful to the universe must be demanded by moral law. Moral law must, from its own nature, require just that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the highest degree promotive of the public good,–in other words, that which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful, and therefore expedient. It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right would be obligatory if it necessarily tended to and resulted in universal and perfect misery. Than which a more nonsensical affirmation was never made. The affirmation assumes that the law of right and of good-will are not only distinct, but may be antagonistic. It also assumes that that can be law that is not suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. Certainly it will not be pretended that that course of willing and acting that necessarily tends to, and results in, universal misery, can be consistent with the nature and relations of moral agents. Nothing is or can be suited to their nature and relations, that is not upon the whole promotive of their highest well-being. Expediency and right are always and necessarily at one. They can never be inconsistent. That which is upon the whole most expedient is right, and that which is right is upon the whole expedient. 

14. Exclusiveness is another attribute of moral law. That is, moral law is the only possible rule of moral obligation. A distinction is usually made between moral, ceremonial, civil, and positive laws. This distinction is in some respects convenient, but is liable to mislead and to create an impression that something can be obligatory, in other words can be law, that has not the attributes of moral law. Nothing can be law, in any proper sense of the term, that is not and would not be universally obligatory upon moral agents under the same circumstances. It is law because and only because, under all the circumstances of the case, the course prescribed is fit, proper, suitable, to their natures, relations, and circumstances. There can be no other rule of action for moral agents but moral law, or the law of benevolence. Every other rule is absolutely excluded by the very nature of moral law. Surely there can be no law that is or can be obligatory upon moral agents but one suited to, and founded in their nature, relations, and circumstances. This is and must be the law of love or benevolence. This is the law of right, and nothing else is or can be. Every thing else that claims to be law and to impose obligation upon moral agents, from whatever source it emanates, is not and cannot be a law, but must be an imposition and “a thing of nought.”

*(from above) It has been said, that if we “dwarf,” or abridge our powers, we do not thereby abridge the claims of God; that if we render it impossible to perform so high a service as we might have done, the Lawgiver, nevertheless, requires the same as before, that is, that under such circumstances he requires of us an impossibility;–that should we dwarf, or completely derange, or stultify our powers, he would still hold us under obligation to perform all that we might have performed, had our powers remained in their integrity. To this I reply,

That this affirmation assumes, that moral law and moral obligation are founded in the will of God;–that his mere will makes law. This is a fundamental mistake. God cannot legislate in the sense of making law. He declares and enforces the common law of the universe, or, in other words, the law of nature. This law, I repeat it, is nothing else than that rule of conduct which is in accordance with the nature and relations of moral beings. The totality of its requisitions are, both in its letter and its spirit, “Thou shalt love, &c., with all thy heart, thy soul, thy might, thy strength.” That is, whatever there is of us, at any moment, is to be wholly consecrated to God, and the good of being, and nothing more nor less. If our nature or relations are changed, no matter by what means, or to what extent, provided we are still moral agents, its language and spirit are the same as before,–“Thou shalt love with all thy strength,” &c.

I will here quote from the “Oberlin Evangelist,” an extract of a letter from an esteemed brother, embodying the substance of the above objection, together with my reply.

“One point is what you say of the claims of the law, in the ‘Oberlin Evangelist,’ vol. ii. p. 50:–‘the question is, what does the law of God require of Christians of the present generation, in all respects in our circumstances, with all the ignorance and debility of body and mind which have resulted from the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution through so many generations?’ But if this be so, then the more ignorant and debilitated a person is in body and mind in consequence of his own or ancestors’ sins and follies, the less the law would require of him, and the less would it be for him to become perfectly holy–and, the nearer this ignorance and debility came to being perfect, the nearer would he be to being perfectly holy, for the less would be required of him to make him so. But is this so? Can a person be perfectly sanctified, while particularly that ‘ignorance of mind,’ which is the effect of the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution, remains? Yea, can he be sanctified at all, only as this ignorance is removed by the truth and Spirit of God; it being a moral and not a physical effect of sinning? I say it kindly, here appears to me, at least, a very serious entering wedge of error. Were the effect of human depravity upon man simply to disable him, like taking from the body a limb, or destroying in part, or in whole, a faculty of the mind, I would not object; but to say, this effect is ignorance, a moral effect wholly, and then say, having this ignorance, the law levels its claims according to it, and that with it, a man can be entirely sanctified, looks not to me like the teachings of the bible.”

1. I have seen the passage from my lecture, here alluded to, quoted and commented upon, in different periodicals, and uniformly with entire disapprobation.

2. It has always been separated entirely from the exposition which I have given of the law of God in the same lectures; with which exposition, no one, so far as I know, has seen fit to grapple.

3. I believe, in every instance, the objections that have been made to this paragraph, were made by those who profess to believe in the present natural ability of sinners to do all their duty.

4. I would most earnestly and respectfully inquire, what consistency there is, in denominating this paragraph a dangerous heresy, and still maintaining that men are at present naturally able to do all that God requires of them?

5. I put the inquiry back to those brethren,–By what authority do you affirm, that God requires any more of any moral agent in the universe, and of man in his present condition, than he is at present able to perform?

6. I inquire, does not the very language of the law of God prove to a demonstration, that God requires no more of man than, in his present state, he is able to perform? Let us hear its language: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and will all thy strength. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” Now here, God so completely levels his claims, by the very wording of these commandments, to the present capacity of every human being, however young or old, however maimed, debilitated, or idiotic, as, to use the language or sentiment of Prof. Hickok, of Auburn Seminary, uttered in my hearing that, “if it were possible to conceive of a moral pigmy, the law requires of him nothing more, than to use whatever strength he has, in the service and for the glory of God.”

7. I most respectfully but earnestly inquire of my brethren, if they believe that God requires as much of men as of angels, of a child as of a man, of a half-idiot as of a Newton? I mean not to ask whether God requires an equally perfect consecration of all the powers actually possessed by each of these classes; but whether in degree, he really requires the same, irrespective of their present natural ability?

8. I wish to inquire, whether my brethren do not admit that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that every abuse of the physical system has abridged the capacity of the mind, while it remains connected with the body? And I would also ask, whether my brethren mean to maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of present natural ability to comply with all the requirements of God, and also the fact that God now requires of man just the same degree of service that he might have rendered if he had never sinned, or in any way violated the laws of his being? And if they maintained these two positions at the same time, I further inquire, whether they believe that man has naturally ability at the present moment to bring all his faculties and powers, together with his knowledge, into the same state in which they might have been, had he never sinned? My brethren, is there not some inconsistency here?

The fact is, you contradict yourselves. Your positions are precisely as follow:–

(1.) Man is able perfectly to keep all the commandments of God.

(2.) God requires of man just that service in kind and degree, which would have been possible to him had he never sinned.

(3.) But man has sinned, abused, and crippled his powers, in so much that, to render the kind and degree of service which God demands of him, is a natural impossibility.

9. In the paragraph above quoted, the brother admits, that if a man by his own act had deprived himself of any of his corporeal faculties, he would not thenceforth have been under an obligation to use those faculties. But he thinks this principle does not hold true, in respect to ignorance; because he esteems ignorance a moral, and not a natural defect. Here I beg leave to make a few inquiries:

(1.) Should a man wickedly deprive himself of the use of his hand, would not this be a moral act? No doubt it would.

(2.) Suppose a man by his own act should make himself an idiot, would not this be a moral act?

(3.) Would he not in both cases render himself naturally unable, in the one case to use his hand, and in the other his reason? Undoubtedly he would. But how can it be affirmed, with any show of reason, that in the one case his natural inability discharges him from obligation, and not in the other–that he is still bound to use his reason, but not his hand? Now the fact is, that in both these cases the inability is natural.

(4.) I ask, if a man willingly remained in ignorance of God, whether his ignorance would constitute a moral inability? If a moral inability, he can instantly overcome it, by the right exercise of his own will, for nothing can be a moral inability that cannot be instantaneously removed by our own volition. But can the present ignorance of mankind be instantaneously removed by an act of volition on the part of men, and their knowledge become as perfect as it might have been had they never sinned? If not, why call ignorance a moral inability, or a moral effect? The fact is that ignorance is often the natural effect of moral delinquency. Neglect of duty occasions ignorance; and this ignorance, while it remains, constitutes a natural inability to perform those duties of which the mind is ignorant; and all that can be required is, that from the present moment, the mind should diligently engage in acquiring what knowledge it can, and perfectly obey, as fast as it obtains the light. If this is not true, it is utter nonsense to talk about natural ability as being a sine quà non of moral obligation. And I would kindly, but most earnestly, ask my brethren, by what rule of consistency they maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of a natural ability to do whatever God requires, and also insist that he requires men to know as much, and in all respects to render him the same kind and degree of service as if they never had sinned, or rendered themselves in any respect naturally incapable of doing and being, at the present moment, all that they might have done and been, had they never, in any instance, neglected duty?

10. This objector appears to be strongly impressed with the consideration, that if a man’s ignorance can be any excuse for his not doing, at present, what he might have done, but for this ignorance, it will follow, that the less he knows the less is required of him, and should he become a perfect idiot, he would be entirely discharged from moral obligation. To this I answer: Yes, or the doctrine of natural ability and the entire government of God, are a mere farce. If a man should annihilate himself, would not he thereby set aside his moral obligation to obey God? Yes truly. Should he make himself an idiot, would he not thereby annihilate his moral agency; and of course his natural ability to obey God? Will my New School brethren adopt the position of Dr. Wilson of Cincinnati, as maintained on the trial of Dr. Beecher, that “moral obligation does not imply ability of any kind?” The truth is, that for the time being, a man may destroy his moral agency, by rendering himself a lunatic or an idiot; and while this lunacy or idiotcy continues, obedience to God is naturally impossible, and therefore not required.

But it is also true, that no human being can deprive himself of reason and moral agency, but for a limited time. There is no reason to believe, that the soul can be deranged or idiotic, when separated from the body. And therefore moral agency will in all cases be renewed in a future, if not in the present state of existence, when God will hold men fully responsible for having deprived themselves of power to render him all that service which they might otherwise have rendered. But do let me inquire again, can my dear brethren maintain, that an idiot or a lunatic can be a moral agent? Can they maintain that a being is the subject of moral obligation any farther than he is in a state of sanity? Can they maintain, that an infant is the subject of moral obligation, previous to all knowledge? And can they maintain, that moral obligation can, in any case, exceed knowledge? If they can and do–then, to be consistent, they must flatly deny that natural ability is a sine quà non of moral obligation, and adopt the absurd dogma of Dr. Wilson, that “moral obligation does not imply any ability whatever.” When my brethren will take this ground, I shall then understand and know where to meet them. But I beseech you not to complain of inconsistency in me, nor accuse me of teaching dangerous heresy, while I teach nothing more than you must admit to be true, or unequivocally admit in extenso, the very dogma of Dr. Wilson, quoted above.

I wish to be distinctly understood. I maintain, that present ignorance is present natural inability, as absolutely as that the present want of a hand is present natural inability to use it. And I also maintain, that the law of God requires nothing more of any human being, than that which he is at present naturally able to perform, under the present circumstances of his being. Do my brethren deny this? If they do, then they have gone back to Dr. Wilson’s ground. If they do not, why am I accounted a heretic by them, for teaching what they themselves maintain?

11. In my treatise upon the subject of entire sanctification, I have shown from the Bible, that actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, and that the legal maxim, “ignorance of the law excuses no one,” is not good in morals.

12. Professor Stuart, in a recent number of the Biblical Repository, takes precisely the same ground that I have taken, and fully maintains, that sin is the voluntary transgression of a known law. And he further abundantly shows, that this is no new or heterodox opinion. Now Prof. Stuart, in the article alluded to, takes exactly the same position in regard to what constitutes sin that I have done in the paragraph upon which so much has been said. And may I be permitted to inquire, why the same sentiment is orthodox at Andover, and sound theology in the Biblical Repository, but highly heterodox and dangerous at Oberlin?

13. Will my brethren of the new school, to avoid the conclusiveness of my reasonings in respect to the requirements of the law of God, go back to old schoolism, physical depravity, and accountability based upon natural inability, and all the host of absurdities belonging to its particular views of orthodoxy? I recollect that Dr. Beecher expressed his surprise at the position taken by Dr. Wilson, to which I have alluded, and said he did not believe that “many men could be found, who could march up without winking to the maintenance of such a proposition as that.” But to be consistent, I do not see but that my brethren with or “without winking,” are driven to the necessity, either of “marching up” to maintaining the same proposition, or they must admit that the objectionable paragraph in my lecture is the truth of God.



Lecture 3 – ON GOVERNMENT.

The Rev. CHARLES G. FINNEY’S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1851)

I. TERM GOVERNMENT DEFINED. 

II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL AND PHYSICAL GOVERNMENT. 

III. FUNDAMENTAL REASON OF MORAL GOVERNMENT. 

IV. WHOSE RIGHT IT IS TO GOVERN. 

V. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN THE RIGHT TO GOVERN. 

VI. LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO GOVERN. 

VII. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. 

VIII. MORAL OBLIGATION DEFINED. 

IX. CONDITIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

I. Government defined.

The primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, control, by, or in accordance with, rule or law. This seems to be the generic signification of the term government; but it appears not to be sufficiently broad in its meaning, to express all that properly belongs to moral government. This leads me, 

II. To distinguish between moral and physical government. 

All government is, and must be, either moral or physical; that is, all guidance and control must be exercised in accordance with either moral or physical law; for there can be no laws that are neither moral nor physical. Physical government, is control, exercised by a law of necessity or force, as distinguished from the law of free will, or liberty. It is the control of substance, as opposed to free will. The only government of which substance, as distinguished from free will, is capable, is and must be physical. This is true, whether the substance be material or immaterial, whether matter or mind. States and changes, whether of matter or mind, that are not actions of free will, must be subject to the law of necessity. In no other way can they be accounted for. They must therefore belong to the department of physical government. Physical government, then, is the administration of physical law, or the law of force.

Moral government consists in the declaration and administration of moral law. It is the government of free will by motives as distinguished from the government of substance by force. Physical government presides over and controls physical states, and changes of substance or constitution, and all involuntary states and changes. Moral government presides over and controls, or seeks to control, the actions of free will: it presides over intelligent and voluntary states and changes of mind. It is a government of motive, as opposed to a government of force–control exercised, or sought to be exercised, in accordance with the law of liberty, as opposed to the law of necessity. It is the administration of moral as opposed to physical law. 

Moral government includes the dispensation of rewards and punishments; and is administered by means as complicated and vast, as the whole of the works, and providence, and ways, and grace of God. 

III. I am to inquire into the fundamental reason of moral government.

Government must be founded in a good and sufficient reason, or it is not right. No one has a right to prescribe rules for, and control the conduct of, another, unless there is some good reason for his doing so. There must be a necessity for moral government, or the administration of it is tyranny. Is there any necessity for moral government? And if so, wherein? I answer, that from the nature and relations of moral beings, virtue, or holiness, is indispensable to happiness. But holiness cannot exist without moral law and moral government; for holiness is nothing else than conformity to moral law. Moral government, then, is indispensable to the highest well-being of the universe of moral agents, and therefore ought to exist. The universe is dependent upon this as a means of securing the highest good. This dependence is a good and sufficient reason for the existence of moral government. Let it be understood, then, that moral government is a necessity of moral beings, and therefore right.–When it is said, that the right to govern is founded in the relation of dependence, it is not, or ought not to be, intended, that this relation itself confers the right to govern irrespective of the necessity of government. The mere fact, that one being is dependent on another, does not confer on one the right to govern, and impose upon the other obligation to obey, unless the dependent one needs to be governed, and consequently, that the one upon whom the other is dependent cannot fulfil to him the duties of benevolence, without governing or controlling him. The right to govern implies the duty to govern. Obligation, and consequently, the right to govern, implies that government is a necessary means of fulfilling to the dependent party the duties of benevolence. Strictly speaking, the right to govern is founded in the intrinsic value of the interests to be secured by government; and the right is conditionated upon the necessity of government as a means of securing those interests. I will briefly sum up the argument under this head, as follows:– 

1. It is impossible that government should not exist.

2. Every thing must be governed by laws suited to its nature.

3. Matter must be governed by physical laws, because it is not susceptible of government by motive. 

4. The free actions of will must be governed by motives, and moral agents must be governed by moral considerations; for free will is not susceptible of government by force.

5. We are conscious of moral agency, and, as moral agents, can be governed only by a moral government.

6. Our nature and circumstances demand that we should be under a moral government; because–

(1.) Moral happiness depends upon moral order.

(2.) Moral order depends upon the harmonious action of all our powers, as individuals and as members of society. 

(3.) No community can perfectly harmonize in all their views and feelings, without perfect knowledge, or, to say the least, the same degree of knowledge on all subjects on which they are called to act. 

(4.) But no community ever existed, or will exist, in which every individual possesses exactly the same amount of knowledge, and where the members are, therefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views, and opinions. 

(5.) But if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the same amount of knowledge, they will not, in every thing, harmonize, as it respects their courses of conduct. 

(6.) There must, therefore, be in every community, some standard or rule of duty, to which all the subjects of the community are to conform themselves. 

(7.) There must be some head or controlling mind, whose will shall be law, and whose decision shall be regarded as infallible, by all the subjects of the government. 

(8.) However diverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they must all agree, that the will of the lawgiver is right, and universally the rule of duty. 

(9.) This will must be authoritative, and not merely advisory. 

(10.) There must of necessity be a penalty attached to, and incurred by, every act of disobedience to this will. 

(11.) If disobedience be persisted in, exclusion from the privileges of the government is the lowest penalty that can consistently be inflicted. 

(12.) The good, then, of the universe imperiously requires, that there should be a moral governor.

IV. Whose right it is to govern.

We have just seen, that necessity is a condition of the right and duty to govern–that the highest well-being of the universe demands, and is the end of moral government. It must, therefore, be his right and duty to govern, whose attributes, physical and moral, best qualify him to secure the end of government. To him all eyes and hearts should be directed, to fill this station, to exercise this control, to administer all just and necessary rewards and punishments. It is both his right and duty to govern. 

That God is a moral governor, we infer– 

1. From our own consciousness. From the very laws of our being, we naturally affirm our responsibility to him for our conduct. As God is our creator, we are naturally responsible to him for the right exercise of our powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity to the same rule, to which he conforms his whole being, he is under a moral obligation to require us to be holy, as he is holy. 

2. His natural attributes qualify him to sustain the relation of a moral governor to the universe. 

3. His moral character also qualifies him to sustain this relation. 

4. His relation to the universe as Creator and preserver, when considered in connexion with the necessity of government, and with his nature and attributes, confers on him the right of universal government. 

5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to him and to each other, render it obligatory upon him to establish and administer a moral government over the universe. 

6. The honour of God demands that he should administer such a government. 

7. His conscience must demand it. He must know that it would be wrong for him to create a universe of moral beings, and then refuse or neglect to administer over them a moral government, since government is a necessity of their nature and relations. 

8. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless he acted in accordance with his conscience. 

9. If God is not a moral governor he is not wise. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and in the use of the most appropriate means to accomplish those ends. If God is not a moral governor, it is inconceivable that he should have had any important end in view in the creation of moral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any suitable means for the promotion of their happiness as the most desirable end. 

10. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to exert a moral influence over moral agents. 

11. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is governed by moral laws, or by laws suited to the nature of moral agents. 

12. Consciousness recognizes the existence of an inward law, or rule of action, together with a knowledge of the moral quality of actions. 

13. This inward moral consciousness, or conscience, is proof conclusive of the existence of a rule of duty which is obligatory upon us. Indeed, this consciousness is only the mind’s direct beholding this law, as affirmed by the reason. This rule implies a ruler, and this ruler must be God. 

14. If God is not a moral governor, our very nature deceives us. 

15. If God is not a moral governor, the whole universe, so far as we have the means of knowing it, is calculated to mislead mankind in respect to this fundamental truth. 

16. If there is no such thing as moral government, there is, in reality, no such thing as moral character; but we as certainly know that we have moral character, as that we exist. 

17. All nations have believed that God is a moral governor. 

18. Our nature is such, that we must believe it. The conviction of our moral accountability to God, is in such a sense the dictate of our moral nature, that we cannot escape from it. 

19. We must disapprove the character of God, if we ever come to a knowledge of the fact that he created moral agents, and then exercised over them no moral government. 

20. The connection between moral delinquency and suffering is such as to render it certain that moral government does, as a matter of fact, exist. 

21. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God, contains a most simple and yet comprehensive system of moral government. 

22. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of moral government, we are sure of nothing.

V. What is implied in the right to govern.

1. From what has just been said, it must be evident, that the right to govern, implies the necessity of government, as a means of securing an intrinsically valuable end. 

2. Also that the right to govern, implies the duty, or obligation to govern. There can be no right, in this case, without corresponding obligation; for the right to govern is founded in the necessity of government, and the necessity of government imposes obligation to govern. 

3. The right to govern, implies obligation, on the part of the subject, to obey. It cannot be the right, or duty, of the governor to govern, unless it is the duty of the subject to obey. The governor and subject are alike dependent upon government, as the indispensable means of promoting the highest good. The governor and the subject must, therefore, be under reciprocal obligation, the one to govern, and the other to be governed, or to obey. The one must seek to govern, the other must submit to be governed. 

4. The right to govern, implies the right and duty to dispense just and necessary rewards and punishments–to distribute rewards proportioned to merit, and penalties proportioned to demerit, whenever the public interest demand their execution. 

5. It implies the right and duty, to use all necessary means to secure the end of government, as far as possible. 

6. It implies obligation, on the part of the subject, cheerfully to acquiesce in any measure, that may be necessary, to secure the end of government, and in case of disobedience, to submit to merited punishment, and also, if necessary, to aid in the infliction of the penalty of law. 

7. It implies the right and obligation of both ruler and ruled, to consecrate themselves to the promotion of the great end of government, with a single and steady aim. 

8. It implies obligation, both on the part of the ruler and the ruled, to be always ready, and when occasion arises, actually to make any personal and private sacrifice demanded by the higher public good–to cheerfully meet any emergency, and exercise any degree of self-denial, that can, and will, result in a good of greater value to the public, than that sacrificed by the individual, or by any number of individuals, it always being understood, that present voluntary sacrifices shall have an ultimate reward. 

9. It implies the right and duty to employ any degree of force, which is indispensable to the maintenance of order, the execution of wholesome laws, the suppression of insurrections, the punishment of rebels and disorganizers, and sustaining the supremacy of moral law. It is impossible that the right to govern should not imply this; and to deny this right, is to deny the right to govern. Should an emergency occur, in which a ruler had no right to use the indispensable means of securing order, and the supremacy of law, the moment this emergency occurred, his right to govern would, and must, cease: for it is impossible that it should be his right to govern, unless it be at the same time, and for the same reason, his duty to govern. For it is absurd to say, that it is his right and duty to govern, and yet, at the same time, that he has not a right to use the indispensable means of government. It is the same absurdity, as to say, that he has, and has not, the right to govern, at the same time. If it be asked, whether an emergency like the one under consideration is possible, and if so, what might justly be regarded as such an emergency, I answer, that should circumstances occur under which the sacrifice necessary to sustain, would overbalance the good to be derived from the prevalence of government, this would create the emergency under consideration, in which the right to govern would cease. 

VI. Point out the limits of this right.

The right to govern is, and must be, just co-extensive with the necessity of government. We have seen, that the right to govern is founded in the necessities of moral beings. In other words, the right to govern is founded upon the fact, that the highest good of moral agents cannot be secured, but by means of government. 

It is a first truth of reason, that what is good or valuable in itself, should be chosen for its own sake, and that it must therefore be the duty of moral agents to aim at securing, and so far as in them lies, to use the means of securing, the highest good of the universe, for its own sake, or on account of its intrinsic value. If moral government is the only means by which this end can be secured, then government is a necessity of the universe, thence a duty. But under this head, to avoid mistake, and to correct erroneous impressions, which are sometimes entertained, I must show what is not the foundation of the right to govern. The boundary of the right must, as will be seen, depend upon the foundation of the right. The right must be as broad as the reason for it. If the reason of the right be mistaken, then the limits of the right cannot be ascertained, and must necessarily be mistaken also. 

1. Hence the right to govern the universe, for instance, cannot be founded in the fact, that God sustains to it the relation of Creator. This is by itself no reason why he should govern it, unless it needs to be governed–unless some good will result from government. Unless there is some necessity for government, the fact that God created the universe can give him no right to govern it. 

2. The fact that God is the owner and sole proprietor of the universe is no reason why he should govern it. Unless either his own good or the good of the universe, or of both together, demand government, the relation of owner cannot confer the right to govern. Neither God, nor any other being, can own moral beings, in such a sense as to have a right to govern them, when government is wholly unnecessary, and can result in no good whatever to God, or to his creatures. Government, in such a case, would be perfectly arbitrary and unreasonable, and consequently an unjust, tyrannical and wicked act. God has no such right. No such right can, by possibility, in any case exist. 

3. The right to govern cannot be founded in the fact, that God possesses all the attributes, natural and moral, that are requisite to the administration of moral government. This fact is no doubt a condition of the right; for without these qualifications he could have no right, however necessary government might be. But the possession of these attributes cannot confer the right independently of the necessity of government: for however well qualified he may be to govern, still, unless government is necessary, to securing his own glory and the highest well-being of the universe, he has no right to govern it. Possessing the requisite qualifications is the condition, and the necessity of government is the foundation of the right to govern. More strictly, the right is founded in the intrinsic value of the interests to be secured by government, and conditionated upon the fact, that government is the necessary means of securing the end. 

4. Nor is the right to govern conferred by the value of the interests to be secured, nor by the circumstance of the necessity of government merely, without respect to the condition just above mentioned. Did not God’s natural and moral attributes qualify him to sustain that relation better than any one else, the right could not be conferred on him by any other fact or relation. 

5. The right to govern is not, and cannot be, an abstract right based on no reason whatever. The idea of this right is not an ultimate idea in such a sense, that our intelligence affirms the right without assigning any reason on which it is founded. The human intelligence cannot say that God has a right to govern, because he has such a right; and that this is reason enough, and all the reason that can be given. Our reason does not affirm that government is right because it is right, and that this is a first truth, and an ultimate idea. If this were so, then God’s arbitrary will would be law, and no bounds could possibly be assigned to the right to govern. If God’s right to govern be a first truth, an ultimate truth, fact, and idea, founded in no assignable reason, then he has the right to legislate as little, and as much, and as arbitrarily, as unnecessarily, as absurdly, and injuriously as possible; and no injustice is, or can be done; for he has, by the supposition, a right to govern, founded in no reason, and of course without any limit. Assign any other reason, as the foundation of the right to govern, then the value of the interests to be secured, and conditionated upon the necessity of government, and you may search in vain for any limit to the right. But the moment the foundation and the condition of the right are discovered, we see instantly, that the right must be co-extensive with the reason upon which it is founded, or in other words, must be limited by, and only by the fact, that thus far, and no farther, government is necessary to the highest good of the universe. No legislation can be valid in heaven or earth–no enactments can impose obligation, except upon the condition, that such legislation is demanded by the highest good of the governor and the governed. Unnecessary legislation is invalid legislation. Unnecessary government is tyranny. It can, in no case, be founded in right. It should, however, be observed, that it is often, and in the government of God universally true, that the sovereign, and not the subject, is to be the judge of what is necessary legislation and government. Under no government, therefore, are laws to be despised or rejected because we are unable to see, at once, their necessity, and hence, their wisdom. Unless they are palpably unnecessary, and therefore unwise and unjust, they are to be respected and obeyed as a less evil than contempt and disobedience, though at present we are unable to see their wisdom. Under the government of God there can never be any doubt, and of course any ground, for distrust and hesitancy, as it respects the duty of obedience. 

VII. What is implied in moral government.

1. Moral government implies a moral governor. 

2. It implies the existence of moral law. 

3. It implies the existence of moral agents as the subjects of moral government. 

4. It implies the existence of moral obligation to obey moral law. 

5. It implies the fact of moral character, that is, of praise or blame-worthiness in the subjects of moral government. A moral agent must be under moral obligation, and one who is under moral obligation must have moral character. If he complies with obligation he must be holy and praise-worthy, if he refuse to comply with moral obligation he must be sinful and blame-worthy. 

VIII. Moral obligation.

Obligation is a bond, or that which binds. Moral obligation is oughtness. It is a responsibility imposed on the moral agent by his own reason, and by the authority of God. God reveals obligation to and through the reason. 

The idea of obligation, or of oughtness, is an idea of the pure reason. It is a simple, rational conception, and strictly speaking, does not admit of a definition, since, there are no terms more simple by which it may be defined. Obligation is a term by which we express a conception or idea which all men have, as is manifest from the universal language of men. All men have the ideas of right and wrong, and have words by which these ideas are expressed, and, perhaps, no idea among men more frequently reveals itself in words than that of oughtness or obligation. The term cannot be defined, for the simple reason that it is too well and too universally understood to need or even to admit of being expressed in any language more simple and definite than the word obligation itself. 

IX. The conditions of moral obligation.

There is a distinction of fundamental importance between the condition and the ground of obligation, which has been overlooked by some writers, and of course they have confused the whole question of obligation. The ground of obligation is the consideration which creates or imposes obligation, the fundamental reason of the obligation. Of this I shall inquire in its proper place, in the course of which inquiry I shall have occasion to notice some instances of the confusion just alluded to, arising out of confounding the ground and the conditions of obligation. At present I am to define the conditions of obligation. But I must in this place observe that there are various forms of obligation. For example, obligation to choose an ultimate end of life as the highest good of the universe; obligation to choose the necessary conditions of this end, as holiness, for example; and obligation to put forth executive efforts to secure this end. The conditions of obligation vary with the form of obligation, as we shall fully perceive in the course of our investigations. 

A condition of obligation in any particular form is a sine quà non of obligation in that particular form. It is that, without which, obligation in that form could not exist, and yet is not the fundamental reason of the obligation. For example, the possession of the powers of moral agency is a condition of the obligation to choose the highest good of being in general, as an ultimate end, or for its own sake. But the intrinsic value of this good is the ground of the obligation. This obligation could not exist without the possession of these powers; but the possession of these powers cannot of itself create the obligation to choose the good in preference to the ill of being. The intrinsic difference between the good and the ill of being is the ground of the obligation to will the one rather than the other. I will first define the conditions upon which all obligation depends, and without which obligation in no form can exist, and afterwards proceed to point out the conditions of distinct forms of obligation. 

1. Moral agency is universally a condition of moral obligation. The attributes of moral agency are intellect, sensibility, and free will.

(1.) Intellect, includes, amongst other functions which I need not name, reason, conscience, and self-consciousness. As has been said on a former occasion, reason is the intuitive faculty or function of the intellect. It gives by direct intuition the following among other truths: the absolute–for example, right and wrong; the necessary–space exists; the infinite–space is infinite; the perfect–God is perfect–God’s law is perfect, &c. In short, it is the faculty that intuits moral relations and affirms moral obligation to act in conformity with perceived moral relations. It is that faculty that postulates all the à priori truths of science whether mathematical, philosophical, theological, or logical. 

Conscience is the faculty or function of the intellect that recognizes the conformity or disconformity of the heart and life to the moral law as it lies revealed in the reason, and also awards praise to conformity, and blame to disconformity to that law. It also affirms that conformity to the moral law deserves reward, and that disconformity deserves punishment. It also possesses a propelling or impulsive power, by which it urges the conformity, and denounces the nonconformity of will, to moral law. It seems, in a certain sense, to possess the power of retribution. 

Consciousness is the faculty or function of self-knowledge. It is the faculty that recognizes our own existence, mental actions, and states, together with the attributes of liberty or necessity, belonging to those actions or states. 

“Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself.” By consciousness I know that I am–that I affirm that space is,–that I also affirm that the whole is equal to all its parts–that every event must have a cause, and many such like truths. I am conscious not only of these affirmations, but also that necessity is the law of these affirmations, that I cannot affirm otherwise than I do, in respect to this class of truths. I am also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk and write, and I am just as conscious that liberty is the law of this choice. That is, I am conscious of necessarily regarding myself as entirely free in this choice, and affirming my own ability to have chosen not to sit at my desk, and of being now able to choose not to sit and write. I am just as conscious of affirming the liberty or necessity of my mental states as I am of the states themselves. Consciousness gives us our existence and attributes, our mental acts and states, and all the attributes and phenomena of our being, of which we have any knowledge. In short, all our knowledge is given to us by consciousness. The intellect is a receptivity as distinguished from a voluntary power. All the acts and states of the intellect are under the law of necessity, or physical law. The will can command the attention of the intellect. Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, and all its phenomena are involuntary, and under a law of necessity. Of this we are conscious. Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is– 

(2.) Sensibility. This is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling. All sensation, desire, emotion, passion, pain, pleasure, and, in short, every kind and degree of feeling, as the term feeling is commonly used, is a phenomenon of this faculty. This faculty supplies the chronological condition of the idea of the valuable, and hence of right and wrong, and of moral obligation. The experience of pleasure or happiness developes the idea of the valuable, just as the perception of body developes the idea of space. But for this faculty the mind could have no idea of the valuable, and hence of moral obligation to will the valuable, nor of right and wrong, nor of praise and blame-worthiness. 

Self-love is a phenomenon of this department of the mind. It consists in a constitutional desire of happiness, and implies a corresponding dread of misery. It is doubtless through, or by this constitutional tendency that the rational idea of the intrinsic value of happiness or enjoyment is at first developed. Animals, doubtless, have enjoyment, but we have no evidence that they possess the faculty of reason in the sense in which I have defined the term. Consequently they have not, as we suppose, the rational conception of the intrinsic worth or value of enjoyment. They seek enjoyment from a mere impulse of their animal nature, without, as we suppose, so much as a conception of moral law, obligation, right or wrong. 

But we know that moral agents have these ideas. Self-love is constitutional. Its gratification is the chronological condition of the developement of the reason’s idea of the intrinsically valuable to being. This idea developes that of moral law, or in other words, the affirmation that this intrinsic good ought to be universally chosen and sought for its own sake. 

The sensibility, like the intellect, is a receptivity or purely a passive, as distinguished from a voluntary faculty. All its phenomena are under the law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct effort, feel when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the intellect that when the intellect is intensely occupied with certain considerations, the sensibility is affected in a certain manner, and certain feelings exist in the sensibility by a law of necessity. I am conscious that when certain conditions are fulfilled, I necessarily have certain feelings, and that when these conditions are not fulfilled, I cannot be the subject of those feelings. I know by consciousness that my feelings and all the states and phenomena of the sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my will. By willing I can direct my intellect to the consideration of certain subjects, and in this way alone affect my sensibility, and produce a given state of feeling. So on the other hand, if certain feelings exist in the sensibility which I wish to suppress, I know that I cannot annihilate them by directly willing them out of existence, but by diverting my attention from the cause of them, they cease to exist of course and of necessity. Thus, feeling is only indirectly under the control of the will. 

(3.) Moral agency implies the possession of free-will. By free-will is intended the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in every instance, in compliance with moral obligation. Free-will implies the power of originating and deciding our own choices, and of exercising our own sovereignty, in every instance of choice upon moral questions–of deciding or choosing in conformity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral obligation. That man cannot be under a moral obligation to perform an absolute impossibility, is a first truth of reason. But man’s causality, his whole power of causality to perform or do anything, lies in his will. If he cannot will, he can do nothing. His whole liberty or freedom must consist in his power to will. His outward actions and his mental states are connected with the actions of his will by a law of necessity. If I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary motion, or unless some resistance be opposed that overcomes the power of my volitions. The sequences of choice or volition are always under the law of necessity, and unless the will is free, man has no freedom; and if he has no freedom he is not a moral agent, that is, he is incapable of moral action and also of moral character. Free-will then, in the above defined sense, must be a condition of moral agency, and, of course, of moral obligation. 

As consciousness gives the rational affirmation that necessity is an attribute of the affirmations of the reason, and of the states of sensibility, so it just as unequivocally gives the reason’s affirmation that liberty is an attribute of the actions of the will. I am as conscious of the affirmation that I could will differently from what I do in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation that I cannot affirm, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than I do. I am as conscious of affirming that I am free in willing, as I am of affirming that I am not free or voluntary in my feelings and intuitions. 

Consciousness of affirming the freedom of the will, that is, of power to will in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse thus to will, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation. For example, no man affirms, or can affirm, his obligation to undo all the acts of his past life, and to live his life over again. He cannot affirm himself to be under this obligation, simply because he cannot but affirm the impossibility of it. He cannot but affirm his obligation to repent and obey God in future, because he is conscious of affirming his ability to do this. Consciousness of the affirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation to comply with that requisition. Then no moral agent can affirm himself to be under obligation to perform an impossibility. 

2. A second condition of moral obligation is light, or so much knowledge of our moral relations as to develope the idea of oughtness. This implies–

(1.) The perception or idea of the intrinsically valuable. 

(2.) The affirmation of obligation to will the valuable for its own sake. 

(3.) The developement of the idea that it is right to will the good, or the valuable, and wrong not to will it, for its own sake or disinterestedly. 

Before I can affirm my obligation to will, I must perceive something in that which I am required to will, as an ultimate end, that renders it worthy of being chosen. I must have an object of choice. That object must possess, in itself, that which commends itself to my Intelligence as worthy of being chosen. 

All choice must respect means or ends. That is, everything must be willed either as an end or a means. I cannot be under obligation to will the means until I know the end. I cannot know an end, or that which can possibly be chosen as an ultimate end, until I know that something is intrinsically valuable. I cannot know that it is right or wrong to choose or refuse a certain end, until I know whether the proposed object of choice is intrinsically valuable or not. It is impossible for me to choose it, as an ultimate end, unless I perceive it to be intrinsically valuable. This is self-evident; for choosing it as an end is nothing else than choosing it for its intrinsic value. Moral obligation, therefore, always and necessarily implies the knowledge that the well-being of God and of the universe is valuable in itself, and the affirmation that it ought to be chosen for its own sake, that is, impartially and on account of its intrinsic value. It is impossible that the ideas of right and wrong should be developed until the idea of the valuable is developed. Right and wrong respect intentions, and strictly nothing else, as we shall see. Intention implies an end intended. Now that which is chosen as an ultimate end, is and must be chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic value. Until the end is apprehended, no idea or affirmation of obligation can exist respecting it. Consequently, no idea of right or wrong in respect to that end can exist. The end must first be perceived. The idea of the intrinsically valuable must be developed. Simultaneously with the developement of the idea of the valuable the intelligence affirms, and must affirm obligation to will it, or, which is, strictly speaking, the same thing, that it is right to will it, and wrong not to will it. 

It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation, or of right and wrong, should be developed upon any other conditions than those just specified. To affirm the contrary were absurd. Suppose, for instance, it should be said that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the developement of the idea of moral obligation, and of right and wrong. Let us look at it. It is agreed that moral obligation, and the ideas of right and wrong respect, directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all intentions must respect either means or ends. It is also admitted that obligation to will means, cannot exist until the end is known. It is also admitted that the choice of an ultimate end implies the choice of a thing for its own sake, or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now, from these admissions, it follows that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is the condition of moral obligation, and also of the idea of moral obligation. It must follow also that the idea of the valuable must be the condition of the idea that it would be right to choose, or wrong not to choose, the valuable. When I come to the discussion of the subject of moral depravity, I shall endeavour to show that the idea of the valuable is very early developed, and is among the earliest, if not the very first, of human intellections. I have here only to insist that the developement of this idea is a sine quà non of moral obligation. It is, then, nonsense to affirm that the ideas of right and wrong are developed antecedently to the idea of the valuable. It is the same as to say that I affirm it to be right to will an end, before I have the idea of an end; or which is the same thing, of the intrinsically valuable, or wrong not to will an end when as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any reason why it should be willed, or, in other words, while I have no idea of an ultimate end. This is absurd. 

Let it be distinctly understood then, that the conditions of moral obligation, in the universal form of obligation to will the highest well-being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, are–

1. The possession of the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a moral agent. 

2. Light, or the developement of the ideas of the valuable, of moral obligation, of right and wrong. 

It has been absurdly contended that sensibility is not necessary to moral agency. This assertion overlooks the fact that moral law is the law of nature; that, therefore, were the powers and susceptibilities radically different from what they are, or were the correlation of these powers radically otherwise than it is, they could not still be moral agents in the sense of being under the same law that moral agents now are. Possessing a different nature, they must of necessity be subject to a different law. The law of their nature must be their law, and no other could, by any possibility, be obligatory upon them. 

I have defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, i.e. obligation to be benevolent, to love God and our neighbour, or to will the universal good of being for its intrinsic value. Obligation in this form is universal and always a unit, and has always the same conditions. But there are myriads of specific forms of obligation which relate to the conditions and means of securing this ultimate end. We shall have occasion hereafter fully to show that obligation respects three classes of the will’s actions, viz. the choice of an ultimate end–the choice of the conditions and means of securing that end–and executive volitions or efforts put forth to secure the end. I have already shown that moral agency, with all that is implied in it, has the universal conditions of obligation to choose the highest good of being, as an ultimate end. This must be self-evident. 

Obligation to choose the conditions of this end, the holiness of God and of all moral agents, for example, must be conditioned upon the perception that these are the conditions. In other words, the perception of the relation of these means to the end must be a condition of the obligation to will their existence. The perception of the relation is not the ground but simply the condition of obligation in this form. The relation of holiness to happiness as a condition of its existence could not impose obligations to will the existence of holiness without reference to the intrinsic value of happiness, as the fundamental reason for willing it as a necessary condition and means. The ground of the obligation to will the existence of holiness, as a means of happiness, is the intrinsic value of happiness, but the perceived relation of holiness to happiness is a condition of the obligation. But for this perceived relation the obligation could not exist, yet the perceived relation could not create the obligation. Suppose that holiness is the means of happiness, yet no obligation to will holiness on account of this relation could exist but for the intrinsic value of happiness. 

3. Conditions of obligation to put forth executive acts. 

Having now defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, and also in the form of obligation to choose the existence of holiness as a necessary means of happiness, I now proceed to point out the conditions of obligation to put forth executive volitions or efforts to secure holiness, and secure the highest good of being. Our busy lives are made up in efforts to secure some ultimate end, upon which the heart is set. The sense in which obligation extends to these executive volitions or acts I shall soon consider, at present I am concerned only to define the conditions of these forms of obligation. These forms of obligation, be it understood, respect volitions and consequent outward acts. Volitions, designed as executive acts, always suppose an existing choice of the end designed to be secured by them. Obligation to put forth executive efforts to secure an end must be conditioned upon the possibility, supposed necessity, and utility of such efforts. If the end chosen does not need to be promoted by any efforts of ours, or if such efforts are impossible to us, or if they are seen to be of no use, there can be no obligation to make them. 

Anything is a condition of obligation which is essential to the existence of obligation in a given form, but it is not the ground or fundamental reason of the obligation. As we proceed, we shall have occasion to notice many instances as illustrations of what is here premised, and to show what confusion has resulted from confounding the distinction between the grounds and conditions of obligation as here stated. 

But observe, executive acts are such as are put forth with design to secure some end, and presuppose the existence of both the end and the design, and also the supposition or belief that such executive acts are possible, necessary, and useful. It is important, however, to observe that the utility of ultimate choice, or the choice of an object for its own sake, is not a condition of obligation in that form. 

Ultimate choice, or the choice of an object for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value, is not an effort designed to secure or obtain that object; that is, is not put forth with any such design. When the object which the mind perceives to be intrinsically valuable (as the good of being, for example), is perceived by the mind, it cannot but choose or refuse it. Indifference in this case is naturally impossible. The mind, in such circumstances, is under a necessity of choosing one way or the other. The will must embrace or reject it. The reason affirms the obligation to choose the intrinsically valuable for its own sake, and not because choosing it will secure it. Nor does the real choice of it imply a purpose or an obligation to put forth executive acts to secure it, except upon condition that such acts are seen to be necessary, and possible, and calculated to secure it. 

Ultimate choice is not put forth with design to secure its object. It is only the will’s embracing the object or willing it for its own sake. In regard to ultimate choice the will must choose or refuse the object entirely irrespectively of the tendency of the choice to secure the object. Assuming this necessity, the reason affirms that it is right, fit, suitable, or, which is the same thing, that the will ought, or is under obligation to choose, the good or valuable, and not refuse it, because of its intrinsic nature, and without regard to whether the choosing will secure the object chosen. 

But executive acts, be it remembered, are, and must be, put forth with design to secure their object, and of course, cannot exist unless the design exist, and the design cannot exist unless the mind assumes the possibility, necessity, and utility of such efforts. 

REMARKS.

1. If God’s government is moral, it is easy to see how sin came to exist; that a want of experience in the universe, in regard to the nature and natural tendencies and results of sin, prevented the due influence of sanctions. 

2. If God’s government is moral, we see that all the developements of sin are enlarging the experience of the universe in regard to its nature and tendencies, and thus confirming the influence of moral government over virtuous minds. 

3. If God’s government is moral, we can understand the design and tendency of the atonement; that it is designed, and that it tends to reconcile the exercise of mercy, with a due administration of law. 

4. If God’s government is moral, we can understand the philosophy of the Spirit’s influences in convicting and sanctifying the soul; that this influence is moral, persuasive, and not physical. 

5. If the government of God is moral, we can understand the influence and necessity of faith. Confidence is indispensable to heart obedience in any government. This is emphatically true under the divine government. 

6. If God’s government is moral, we can see the necessity and power of Christian example. Example is the highest moral influence. 

7. If God’s government is moral, his natural or physical omnipotence is no proof that all men will be saved; for salvation is not effected by physical power. 

8. If God’s government is moral, we see the importance of watchfulness, and girding up the loins of our minds. 

9. If God’s government is moral, we see the necessity of a well-instructed ministry, able to wield the motives necessary to sway mind. 

10. If God’s government is moral, we see the philosophical bearings, tendencies, and power of the providence, law, and gospel of God, in the great work of man’s salvation.



Lecture 4 – MORAL OBLIGATION.

The Rev. CHARLES G. FINNEY’S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1851)

I. MAN A SUBJECT OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

II. EXTENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

I. Man is a subject of moral obligation.

This is a first truth of reason. A first truth, be it remembered, has this invariable characteristic, namely, all moral agents know it, by a necessity of nature, and assume its truth, in all their practical judgments, whatever their philosophical theories may be. Take, for example, the affirmation, or assumption, that every event must have had an adequate cause. This is a first truth; all men know it, and, in all their practical judgments, assume it, whatever their theorizings may be. 

Now who does not know, with the same certainty, that men possess the attributes of moral agents; to wit, intellect, (including reason, conscience, and consciousness,) sensibility, and free will. Every moral agent does know, and cannot but know this. That man has intellect and sensibility, or the powers of knowing and feeling, has not, to my knowledge, been doubted. In theory, the freedom of the will in man has been denied. Yet the very deniers have, in their practical judgment, assumed the freedom of the human will, as well, and as fully, as the most staunch defenders of human liberty of will. Indeed, nobody ever did or can, in practice, call in question the freedom of the human will, without justly incurring the charge of insanity. By a necessity of his nature, every moral agent knows himself to be free. He can no more hide this fact from himself, or reason himself out of the conviction of its truth, than he can speculate himself into a disbelief of his own existence. He may, in speculation, deny either, but in fact he knows both. That he is, that he is free, are truths equally well known, and known precisely in the same way, namely, he intuits them–sees them in their own light, by virtue of the constitution of his being. I have said that man is conscious of possessing the powers of a moral agent. He has also the idea of the valuable, of right and of wrong: of this he is conscious. But nothing else is necessary to constitute man or any other being a subject of moral obligation, than the possession of these powers, together with sufficient light on moral subjects to develope the ideas just mentioned. 

Again. Man, by a law of necessity, affirms himself to be under moral obligation. He cannot doubt it. He affirms absolutely, and necessarily, that he is praise or blame-worthy as he is benevolent or selfish. Every man assumes this of himself, and of all other men, of sound mind. This assumption is irresistible, as well as universal. 

The truth assumed then, is a first truth, and not to be called in question. But if it be called in question, in theory, it still remains and must remain, while reason remains, a truth of certain knowledge from the presence of which there is, and can be, no escape. The spontaneous, universal, and irresistible affirmation that men, of sound mind, are praise or blame-worthy, as they are selfish or benevolent, shows beyond contradiction, that all men regard themselves, and others, as the subjects of moral obligation.

II. Extent of moral obligation.

By this is intended, to what acts and states of mind does moral obligation extend? This certainly is a solemn and a fundamentally important question. 

In the examination of this question I shall, 

1. Show by an appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend. 

2. To what acts or states of mind moral obligation must directly extend.

3. To what acts and mental states moral obligation must indirectly extend. 

I. I am to show by an appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend.

1. Not to external or muscular action. These actions are connected with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity. If I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless the nerves of voluntary motion are paralyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion, that overpowers the strength of my will, or, if you please, of my muscles. It is generally understood and agreed that moral obligation does not directly extend to bodily or outward action. 

2. Not to the states of the sensibility. I have already remarked, that we are conscious, that our feelings are not voluntary, but involuntary states of mind. Moral obligation cannot, therefore, directly extend to them. 

3. Not to states of the intellect. The phenomena of this faculty, we also know, by consciousness, to be under the law of necessity. It is impossible that moral obligation should extend directly to any involuntary act or state of mind. 

4. Not to unintelligent acts of will. There are many unintelligent volitions, or acts of will, to which moral obligation cannot extend, for example, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants, before the reason is at all developed. They must, at birth, be the subjects of volition, as they have motion or muscular action. The volitions of somnambulists are also of this character. Purely instinctive volitions must also come under the category of unintelligent actions of will. For example: a bee lights on my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread on a hot iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed, there are many actions of will, which are put forth under the influence of pure instinct, and before the intellect can affirm obligation to will or not to will. These surely cannot have moral character, and of course moral obligation cannot extend to them. 

II. To what acts and states of mind moral obligation must directly extend. 

1. To ultimate acts of will. These are, and must be, free. 

Intelligent acts of will, as has been before observed, are of three classes. 1. The choice of some object for its own sake, i.e. because of its own nature, or for reasons found exclusively in itself, as, for example, the happiness of being. These are called ultimate choices, or intentions. 2. The choice of the conditions and means of securing the object of ultimate choice, as, for example, holiness, as the conditions or means of happiness. 3. Volitions, or executive efforts to secure the object of ultimate choice. Obligation must extend to these three classes of the actions of the will. In the most strict and proper sense it may be said, that obligation extends directly, only to the ultimate intention. We learn, from consciousness, that the choice of an end necessitates (while the choice of the end exists) the choice of the known conditions and means of securing this end. I am free to relinquish, at any moment, my choice of an end, but while I persevere in the choice, or ultimate intention, I am not free to refuse the known necessary conditions and means. If I reject the known conditions and means, I, in this act, relinquish the choice of the end. The desire of the end may remain, but the actual choice of it cannot, when the will knowingly rejects the known necessary conditions and means. In this case, the will prefers to let go the end, rather than to choose and use the necessary conditions and means. In the strictest sense the choice of known conditions and means, together with executive volitions, is implied in the ultimate intention or in the choice of an end. 

When the good or valuable, per se, is perceived, by a moral agent, he instantly and necessarily, and without condition, affirms his obligation to choose it. This affirmation is direct and universal, absolute, or without condition. Whether he will affirm himself to be under obligation to put forth efforts to secure the good must depend upon his regarding such acts as necessary, possible, and useful. 

The obligation, therefore, to put forth ultimate choice, is in the strictest sense direct, absolute, and universal. 

Obligation to chose holiness, (as the holiness of God) as the means of happiness, is indirect in the sense that it is conditioned. 1. Upon the obligation to choose happiness as a good per se; and, 2. Upon the knowledge that holiness is the necessary means of happiness. 

Obligation to put forth executive volitions is also indirect in the sense that it is conditioned; 1. Upon obligation to choose an object as an end; and, 2. Upon the necessity, possibility, and utility of such acts. 

It should here be observed, that obligation to choose an object for its own sake, implies, of course, obligation to reject its opposite; and obligation to choose the conditions of an intrinsically valuable object for its own sake, implies obligation to reject the conditions or means of the opposite of this object. Also, obligation to use means to secure an intrinsically valuable object, implies obligation to use means, if necessary and possible, to prevent the opposite of this end. 

For example. Obligation to will happiness, for its intrinsic value, implies obligation to reject misery, as an intrinsic evil. Obligation to will the conditions of the happiness of being, implies obligation to reject the conditions of misery. Obligation to use means to promote the happiness of being, implies obligation to use means, if necessary and practicable, to prevent the misery of being. 

Again, the choice of any object, either as an end, or a means, implies the refusal of its opposite. In other words, choice implies preference, refusing is properly only choice in an opposite direction. For this reason, in speaking of the actions of the will, it has been common to omit the mention of nilling, or refusing, since such acts are properly included in the categories of choices and volitions. It should also be observed that choice, or willing, necessarily implies an object chosen, and that this object should be such that the mind can regard it as being either intrinsically, or relatively valuable, or important. As choice must consist in an act, an intelligent act, the mind must have some reason for choice. It cannot choose without a reason, for this is the same as to choose without an object of choice. A mere abstraction without any perceived or assumed, intrinsic, or relative importance, to any being in existence, cannot be an object of choice, either ultimate or executive. The ultimate reason which the mind has for choosing is in fact the object of choice; and where there is no reason there is no object of choice. 

2. I have said, that moral obligation respects in the strictest sense, and directly the intention only. I am now prepared to say still further, that this is a first truth of reason. It is a truth universally and necessarily assumed, by all moral agents, their speculations to the contrary, in any wise, notwithstanding. This is evident from the following considerations. 

(1.) Very young children know and assume this truth universally. They always deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused of any delinquency, to say, “I did not mean to,” or if accused of short coming, to say, “I meant or intended to have done it–I designed it.” This, if true, they assume to be an all-sufficient vindication of themselves. They know that this, if believed, must be regarded as a sufficient excuse to justify them in every case. 

(2.) Every moral agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect justification, in case it can be sincerely and truly made. 

(3.) It is a saying as common as men are, and as true as common, that men are to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs, intentions. It is impossible for us not to assent to this truth. If a man intend evil, though, perchance, he may do us good, we do not excuse him, but hold him guilty of the crime which he intended. So if he intend to do us good, and, perchance, do us evil, we do not, and cannot condemn him. For this intention and endeavour to do us good, we cannot blame him, although it has resulted in evil to us. He may be to blame for other things connected with the affair. He may have come to our help too late, and have been to blame for not coming when a different result would have followed; or he may have been blameable for not being better qualified for doing us good. He may have been to blame for many things connected with the transaction, but for a sincere, and of course hearty endeavour to do us good, he is not culpable, nor can he be, however it may result. If he honestly intended to do us good, it is impossible that he should not have used the best means in his power, at the time: this is implied in honesty of intention. And if he did this, reason cannot pronounce him guilty, for it must judge him by his intentions. 

(4.) Courts of criminal law have always in every enlightened country assumed this as a first truth. They always inquire into the quo animo, that is, the intention, and judge accordingly. 

(5.) The universally acknowledged truth that lunatics are not moral agents and responsible for their conduct, is but an illustration of the fact that the truth we are considering, is regarded, and assumed, as a first truth of reason. 

3. We have seen that the choice of an end implies, and, while the choice continues, necessitates the choice of the known conditions and means of the end, and also the putting forth of volition to secure the end. If this is true, it follows that the choice of the conditions and means of securing an end, and also the volitions put forth as executive efforts to secure it, must derive their character from the ultimate choice or intention, which gives them existence. This shows that moral obligation extends, primarily and directly, only to the ultimate intention or choice of an end, though really, but less directly, to the choice of the conditions and means, and also to executive volitions. 

But I must distinguish more clearly between ultimate and proximate intentions, which discrimination will show, that in the most strict and proper sense, obligation belongs to the former, and only in a less strict and proper sense to the latter. 

An ultimate end, be it remembered, is an object chosen for its own sake. 

A proximate end is an object chosen as a condition or means of securing an ultimate end. 

An ultimate end is an object chosen because of its intrinsic nature and value. 

A proximate end is an object chosen for the sake of the end, and upon condition of its relation as a condition or means of the end. 

Example:–A student labours to get wages, to purchase books, to obtain an education, to preach the gospel, to save souls, and to please God. Another labours to get wages, to purchase books, to get an education, to preach the gospel, to secure a salary, and his own ease and popularity. In the first supposition he loves God and souls, and seeks, as his ultimate end, the happiness of souls, and the glory and gratification of God. In the last case supposed, he loves himself supremely, and his ultimate end is his own gratification. Now the proximate ends, or immediate objects of pursuit, in these two cases, are precisely alike, while their ultimate ends are entirely opposite. Their first, or nearest end is to get wages. Their next end is, to obtain books, and so we follow them, until we ascertain their ultimate end, before we learn the moral character of what they are doing. The means they are using, i.e. their immediate objects or proximate ends of pursuit, are the same, but the ultimate ends, at which they aim, are entirely different, and every moral agent, from a necessary law of his own intellect, must, as soon as he understands the ultimate end of each, pronounce the one virtuous, and the other sinful, in his pursuits. One is selfish and the other benevolent. From this illustration it is plain, that strictly speaking, moral character, and, of course, moral obligation, respect directly, the ultimate intention only. We shall see, in the proper place, that obligation also extends, but less directly, to the use of means to obtain the end. 

4. The Bible every where, either expressly or impliedly recognizes this truth. “If there be a willing mind,” that is, a right willing or intention, “it is accepted,” &c. 

5. Again. All the law is fulfilled in one word, “love.” Now this cannot be true, if the spirit of the whole law does not directly respect intentions only. If it extends directly to thoughts, emotions, and outward actions, it cannot be truly said that love is the fulfilling of the law. This love must be good will, for how could involuntary love be obligatory? 

6. Again. The spirit of the Bible every where respects the intention. If the intention is right, or if there be a willing mind, it is accepted as obedience. But if there be not a willing mind, that is, right intention, no outward act is regarded as obedience. The willing, is always regarded by the scripture, as the doing. “If a man look on a woman, to lust after her,” that is, with licentious intentions, or willing, “he hath committed adultery with her already,” &c. So on the other hand, if one intends to perform a service for God, which, after all, he is unable to perform, he is regarded as having virtually done it, and is rewarded accordingly. 

This is too obviously the doctrine of the Bible to need further elucidation. 

III. To what acts and mental states moral obligation indirectly extends.

Under this head I remark– 

That it has been already said, the choice of means and executive volitions, together with outward action, and also the states of the intellect and sensibility, are connected with ultimate intention by a law of necessity. 

(1.) The muscles of the body are, directly, under the control of the will. I will to move, and my muscles must move, unless there be interposed some physical obstruction of sufficient magnitude to overcome the strength of my will. 

(2.) The intellect is also directly under the control of the will. I am conscious that I can control and direct my attention as I please, and think, upon one subject or another. 

(3.) The sensibility, I am conscious, is only indirectly controlled by the will. Feeling can be produced only by directing the attention and thoughts to those subjects that excite feeling, by a law of necessity. 

The way is now prepared to say– 

1. That obligation extends indirectly to all intelligent acts of will in the sense already explained, all men are too conscious to need proof. 

2. That moral obligation extends indirectly, to outward, or bodily actions. These are often required, in the word of God. The reason is, that being connected with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity, if the will is right, the outward action must follow, except upon the contingencies just named, and therefore such action may reasonably be required. But if the contingencies, just named, intervene, so that outward action does not follow the choice or intention, the Bible accepts the will for the deed, invariably. “If there be a willing mind, it is accepted according,” &c. 

3. Moral obligation extends, but more directly, to the states of the sensibility, so that certain emotions or feelings are required as outward actions are, and for the same reason, namely, the states of the sensibility are connected with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity. But when the sensibility is exhausted, or when, for any reason, the right action of the will does not produce the required feelings, it is accepted upon the principle just named. 

4. Moral obligation, indirectly, extends also to the states of the intellect; consequently the Bible, to a certain extent, and in a certain sense, holds men responsible for their thoughts and opinions. It everywhere assumes that if the heart be constantly right, the thoughts and opinions will correspond with the state of the heart, or will; “If any man will do his will he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God.” “If thine eye be single thy body shall be full of light.” It is, however, manifest that the word of God every where assumes that, strictly speaking, all virtue and vice belong to the heart or intention. Where this is right, all is regarded as right; and where this is wrong, all is regarded as wrong. It is upon this assumption that the doctrine of total depravity rests. It is undeniable that the veriest sinners do many things outwardly, which the law of God requires. Now unless the intention decides the character of these acts, they must be regarded as really virtuous. But when the intention is found to be selfish, then it is ascertained that they are sinful notwithstanding their conformity to the letter of the law of God. 

The fact is, that moral agents are so constituted that it is impossible for them not to judge themselves, and others, by their subjective motives or intentions. They cannot but assume it, as a first truth, that a man’s character is as his intention is, and consequently that moral obligation respects, directly, intention only. 

5. Moral obligation then indirectly extends to every thing about us, over which the will has direct, or indirect control. The moral law, while, strictly, it legislates over intentions only, yet in fact, in a sense less direct, legislates over the whole being, inasmuch as all our powers are directly or indirectly connected with intention, by a law of necessity. Strictly speaking, however, moral character belongs alone to the intention. In strict propriety of speech, it cannot be said that either outward action, or any state of the intellect, or sensibility, has a moral element or quality belonging to it. Yet in common language, which is sufficiently accurate for most practical purposes, we speak of thought, feeling, and outward action as holy or unholy. By this, however, all men really mean, that the agent is holy or unholy, is praise or blame-worthy, in his exercises and actions, because they regard them as proceeding from the state or attitude of the will.